

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

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MEMOIRS

OF

THE REIGN OF LEWIS XVI.

VOL. V.

78

79

80

87

88

89

81

82

83

90

91

92

84

85

86

93

94

95

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL

MEMOIRS

OF

THE REIGN OF LEWIS XVI.

FROM

HIS MARRIAGE TO HIS DEATH:

Founded on a Variety of Authentic Documents, furnished to the Author, before the Revolution, by many eminent Statesmen and Ministers; and on the Secret Papers discovered, after the 10th of August 1792, in the Closets of the King at Versailles and the Tuileries:

BY JOHN LEWIS SOULAVIE,

THE ELDER,

COMPILER OF THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL DUKE OF RICHELIEU, AND OF THE MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF ST. SIMON.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

IN SIX VOLUMES.

Accompanied with Explanatory Tables, and One Hundred and Thirteen Portraits.

37599 ac

VOL. V.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR G. AND J. ROBINSON, PATERNOSTER-ROW;

By T. Davison, Lombard-Street, White-Friars.

1802.

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

CONTENTS

OF

THE FIFTH VOLUME.

PLATE V.

(To face the Title-page of Vol. V.)

78. DE JUIGNE, Archbishop of Paris.—79. Abbé Maury.—80. Mirabeau (*Viscount*).—81. Cazalès.—82. Malouet.—83. Dulau, Archbishop of Arles.—84. Boisgelin, Archbishop of Aix.—85. Cicé, Archbishop of Bordeaux.—86. D'Antraignes.—87. Montlozier.—88. D'Ormesson.—89. Cardinal de la Rochefoucault.—90. Brissot.—91. Condorcet.—92. Servan.—93. Rolland.—94. Claviere.—95. Gaudet.

CHAP. I. Political Situation of France at the Close of the Year 1786. Every Measure of M. de Vergennes attacked by Count Grimoard, in a Memorial entitled "Inquiry into the Political State of France in October 1786," which was read by Marshal de Castries to the King, in the Presence of M. de Vergennes—This Memorial exhibits all the principal Negotiations since 1774—some Critical Observations on the Peace of 1783, on the French Fisheries, the India Trade, and the United Provinces—ill defended against England by M. de Vergennes—forming an interesting Analysis of the

PAGE.

Conduct of this Minister with respect to the Empire, the Emperor, Russia, and the Turks - - - - - 1

CHAP. II. M. de Vergennes' Ministry—Relative Situation of the Queen and M. de Vergennes—Situation of that Minister between two opposite Parties; that of the Duke of Aiguillon, who projected the Ruin of the Queen, and that of the Duke of Choiseul, who had made her the Tool of his Ambition—M. de Vergennes temporises with every Opinion, and veers with every Faction—He is resolved to die in Office.—Plan of the Aiguillon Party against Maria Antoinetta—Progress of the national Hatred against her. - - - - - - - - 90

CHAP. III. Connexion of M. Vergennes' Ministry and System, relative to the House of Austria, with the prior and subsequent Systems.—View of the general Result of the Formation of an Austrian Party in France during the Reign of the Bourbon Dynasty, and a French opposite Party - - - 97

CHAP. IV. While Austria gives Inertness to the Department of our Foreign Politics, the English Systems revolutionise our Finances.—Table exhibiting a View of the French Administration under Lewis XVI. opposed by the Anglo-Genevese Administrations, and the Anglo-Genevese ones opposed by the French.—Considerations on these Oppositions in the Financial Department - - 107

CHAP. V. Division in the Republic of Letters, effected by Frederic II. and Catharine.—The Clergy of France, struck with new Dread at the Progress of Philosophy, humbly throw themselves at the Feet of Lewis XVI., repeating their Intreaties to this Monarch, to suppress the Writings of

PAGE.

the Philosophers.—Model of a new anti-philosophical Legislation presented by the Clergy to the King - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 117

CHAP. VI. New Terrors of the Clergy assembled in 1780 against the Non-execution of the Laws against Protestants—Remonstrances of the Gallican Church against their Worship, their Boldness, and their Enterprises.—The Clergy of France propose new Regulations for the Increase of Conversions—They declare to the King, that the Annals of Calvinism present an uniform Series of Conspiracies; that this Sect is Republican in its Maxims, and even in the very Essence of its Constitution; that the Altar and the Throne will be endangered the Moment the Fetters of Protestantism are broken - 138

CHAP. VII. Consequences of the Influence of Foreign Power in the internal Affairs of France—Conversation on that Subject between Benjamin Franklin and the Writer of these Memoirs—The Mention of two Phænomena in the Revolutions of the Globe leads Franklin to speak of the Revolutions planned by England, of which the Author of these Memoirs had discovered existing Proofs—The Interest taken by Franklin in their being made public—His Reason for it.—The Protestants, so far back as the Reign of Lewis XIV., had entertained the Idea of erecting an independent Republic in the Heart of the Southern Protestant Provinces—Franklin mentions the Discovery to M. de Vergennes, and gives him a Letter from Soulavie—M. de Vergennes' Reply—Result of the Author's Inquiry on that Head—Franklin's Resolution of publishing this English Project in the Paris

PAGE.

Journal—Extract from that Journal.—The Insurrection, called the Insurrection of the Masks in the Cevennes, organised by the English, in the Reign of Lewis XVI.—Tranquillity of the Protestants - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 159

CHAP. VIII. Continuation of the secret War carried on between the French and English Cabinets—Their Treaties of Peace are only Treaties of Falsehood.—The two Nations secretly encourage the opposite Parties in either Government.—Progress of the French Nation towards a Revolution, by Means of the private Intrigues of the English, and the secret Resentment of the two Nations to each other - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 183

CHAP. IX. Sketch of the Genevese Government—Two opposite Factions harass that Republic—Character of its Aristocracy—Of its Democracy—The Qualities common to both Parties—Striking Difference of its Worship to that of all other Protestants; of its Politics, to those of every other Government; of the Tenets of its famous Men, to established Doctrines, and of the Principles of its Ministers, to the most admired Governments—How far this Diversity is dangerous to France and the other States of Europe; and how far favourable to Knowledge in the natural Sciences - - 188

CHAP. X. Attachment of the Government and Aristocratic Party in Geneva to France.—Attachment of the Leaders of the Democratic Party to the Court of London.—The latter demand of the former the Collection and Publication of the Laws of the Republic—The Government sees nothing in this Request but a Plan of overthrowing, to its

PAGE.

Prejudice, the existing Laws of the State, and of establishing the obsolete ones.—Reasons alleged by the Popular Party against the Government, and by the Government and Aristocratic Party against the Popular one—A Committee composed of the two Parties, to digest the Plan of a new Code—Its Debates and dilatory Forms—Broken up by the Executive Power, and covered with Ridicule.—Portrait of Reybatz, a Writer of the popular Party, and of Claviere, Duroveray, d'Ivernois, Janot, Gasc, Anspach, and other Leaders of the popular Party, published by d'Ivernois himself.—Claviere and Duroveray are placed by Mr. Necker near M. de Vergennes, to influence and soften the Minister.—Regulations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs relative to the revolutionary Genevese Party.—Regulations of M. de Maurepas - - - - - - - - - - - - - 197

CHAP. XI. The French and Genevese Governments strengthen the Aristocratic Party by joining that Part of the Natives who were flattered with the Hope of new Concessions.—Considerations on the Utility of a third Party in all States ill organised and liable to Revolutions.—Extreme Distrust of the popular Party—It flatters the People, and robs it of its most valuable Prerogatives to adopt them itself. The Natives, formerly no better than Helots, are flattered by both Factions. —They despise the popular Party, and side with the Government.—Resentment of the People of Geneva.—The Attorney-general Duroveray denounces the Head of the Natives, the French Envoy, and France itself.—Anger of Count de Ver-

PAGE.

gennes—He demands that this Denunciation be burnt by the Hands of the Executioner, and its Author displaced.—First Insurrection of the Inhabitants of Geneva—They take up Arms, and seize the Military Posts of the Town.—Mr. Necker's Conduct in this Conjuncture—He favours the Genevese People, and warns them to shun the Effusion of Blood, if they would avoid the Anger of Lewis XVI.—Mr. Necker retires from the Ministry, and M. de Vergennes prepares to punish the Heads of the Genevese Democracy - - - - 211

CHAP. XII. The Swiss join with France and the King of Sardinia to suppress the popular Party, and to deliver the Genevese Hostages from Prison. —Private Opinion of Lewis XVI.—M. de Vergennes calls the Genevese Revolution an Epidemic Disease.—Protest of the Genevese Fugitives.—Revolutionary Party in a State of Terror—Their Negotiations with the British Ministry.—The Activity and Preparations of the Genevese for maintaining a Siege.—Threats of the Generals of the three combined Powers.—Anecdote of Womerat. —Military Summonses of Geneva.—Exile of twenty-two revolutionary Leaders.—Anspach's Speech in his Club.—Entrance of the three Armies into Geneva.—The Delivery from Prison of the eleven Magistrates.—Suppression of the eleven provisionary Members - - - - - - - 236

CHAP. XIII. The Revolutionists withdraw to London.—Complaints in France against the Military Expedition of the Marquis of Jaucourt.—The Exiles favourably received by the English Government.—Dreadful Plot against France imputed to

PAGE.

them by M. Adhémar.—England, in negotiating the Peace of 1783, rewards the Plans and Hatred of the Exiles to France.—Agreement made by the English Government with the banished Genevese —Instrument by which the Sum of Fifty Thousand Pounds Sterling is secured to them - - - - 250

CHAP. XIV. Reciprocal Effects of the Hatred which subsisted between the old Government of France and England—Necessity of the two Nations terminating their old Disputes.—The Punic War intended by England against France, proved in the End only destructive to the House of Bourbon - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 264

CHAP. XV. The opposite Factions in Geneva continually accuse each other of being the Tools of England—Diplomatic Papers on this Head.—Picture of the Revolutions directed by the English in France, by Means of the Exiles from Geneva, in 1782, by Lewis XVI.; and by the other revolutionary Genevese, Dumont, Duroveray, and Claviere, against the Monarchical and Constitutional France; by Marat against the Principles of a Republic, and by d'Ivernois against every Sort of Government - - - - - - - - - - - - 269

APPENDIX.—Official Papers respecting an Inquiry into the Political Situation of France, in October 1786, by the Count de Grimoard - - - 353

Official Papers relative to the Plunder of Geneva, and the Proscriptions of the Revolutionary Tribunal under the Syndicship of Gasc and Janot, and the Revolutionary Government of the Clubs in Insurrection - - - - - - - - - - - - - 395

MEMOIRS

OF THE

REIGN OF LEWIS XVI.

CHAP. I.

Political Situation of France at the Close of the Year 1786. *Every Measure of M. de Vergennes attacked by Count Grimoard, in a Memorial entitled "Inquiry into the Political State of France in October* 1786," *which was read by Marshal de Castries to the King, in the Presence of M. de Vergennes—This Memorial exhibits all the principal Negotiations since* 1774—*some Critical Observations on the Peace of* 1783, *on the French Fisheries, the India Trade, and the United Provinces—ill defended against England by M. de Vergennes—forming an interesting Analysis of the Conduct of this Minister with respect to the Empire, the Emperor, Russia, and the Turks.*

WE have hitherto exhibited M. de Vergennes as he appeared from the memorials and reports he had himself secretly remitted to the king against M. Turgot and Mr. Necker: we have attended also to the opinion which the public had then formed of the talents and character of this minister, conformably to his reputation, and what

had been gathered from his measures, perhaps but imperfectly known, since they had been concerted in the silence of the cabinet. We have now other facts to present, which will give to the face of things a different complexion, and enable the reader to judge, whether it were really the faults of M. de Vergennes, as the author of the ensuing memorial asserts, which occasioned the fall of the political grandeur of France, and its degradation in the eyes of Europe.—History may be considered as a trial, in which the writer acts merely as reporter, and the public as judge.

This attack on the minister for foreign affairs bears a stamp of plain dealing and honesty, that distinguishes it from the system of intrigue, since it was made in the presence of the accused, who had the power of defending himself. All views of personal interest seem excluded; and the sole end proposed appears to be that of giving real information to the king of the state of the other powers of Europe. But the undertaking was difficult: Lewis XVI. was strongly prejudiced in favour of M. de Vergennes; and had any false or even doubtful facts been advanced against him, certain disgrace would have followed to the accuser; for the king was extremely suspicious in his temper, and in his first resentments hasty and even violent; besides,

he was well acquainted with the progress and result of every negotiation.

It was also necessary to be careful to spare the king's vanity, of which he had an abundant portion; and to prevent him from imagining, that his own character would be involved in the faults imputed to his minister, as he might, in many instances, by a single word, have opposed his measures. Nor can we avoid being struck with the address with which the author of the memorial has eluded this embarrassment, by confining himself to a recital of facts, accompanied with reflexions, which, though they may perhaps be severe, arise naturally from the circumstances, and always command attention, without scarcely naming the king, who thus appears to have no share in the faults of the accused.

It was, however, hardly possible to avoid mentioning one error committed by the king, relative to the election of the archduke Maximilian to the co-adjutorship of Cologne and Munster, in 1780; but this error is touched with the utmost gentleness and the nicest dexterity, by seeming to suppose, that he knew the grounds of the whole, while he suffered the house of Austria to acquire those new powers in the empire. The writer had two other rocks to shun: first, the exciting the distrust of the king,

by appearing too great a friend to the alliance with Joseph II. whom he disliked; and, secondly, the queen's resentment, whose credit with the king, and extreme zeal for the emperor, her brother, every one well knew. It was necessary therefore to keep clear of the anger of this princess, by not blaming too severely the union of France and Austria. The author of the Inquiry, however, was too well informed, as well as too good a citizen, to applaud so monstrous a system; and accordingly he avoids this, while he blames, with equal justice and truth, the courts both of Versailles and Vienna for their respective errors in the alliance of 1756—a frankness, which conciliated all parties, and at which the queen could take no offence, should the memorial ever reach her; since she would see, that, though the Austrian monarch was represented as not always right in his conduct towards France, ample justice was at the same time done to the faults of M. de Vergennes, whom it was well known she could not endure. In a word, the writing in question appears to be equally worthy of attention, for the facts it contains, and the principles it establishes, and to merit a place amongst the most curious and instructive of those documents necessary to be consulted in writing a genuine history of Lewis XVI.

It may be proper to mention how this valuable paper fell into my hands.

In a port-folio, inscribed on the outside, by the king's hand, *Political Papers*, were found a great number of pieces, of which two in particular attracted my notice. Of these, one was the memorial in question, which had for title, *Inquiry into the Political State of France in October* 1786; and in the margin of which was written, in the king's hand, "Council of State at Fontainebleau, in the month of November 1786."

From this marginal note, it appears incontrovertible, that the memorial was read in council at Fontainebleau in November 1786, by some minister, which must evidently have been M. de Castries, he only having a right, as secretary of state for the marine department, to render an account to the king of affairs relating to the colonies, and to accuse M. de Vergennes, as he there does, on the stipulations with regard to the fisheries, the sugar islands in the East and West Indies, and other colonial subjects. As a minister, and member of the council of state, and having an ill opinion of M. de Vergennes, he had at the same time the right to make known his opinion generally on the various interests of the kingdom. M. de Castries, however, did not himself compose the

memorial; at least, the following observations strongly militate against the supposition.

M. de Castries was a brave military officer, and a loyal and good citizen, but almost destitute of learning, and wholly incapable of any composition, like the present, which required style, reasoning, penetration, and a thorough knowledge of the intrigues of the various courts of Europe. He might furnish the materials for the work, and particularly the circumstances which had passed before his eyes in the council of state, which it was necessary to bring to the king's recollection, to prove to him, in how many important conjunctures the hopes and promises of M. de Vergennes had proved either deceitful or nugatory. But the capacity of M. de Castries reaching no further, he could neither have drawn up the memorial itself, nor the papers, N° 2 and 4, accompanying it; one entitled, *Considerations on the Affairs of the United Provinces, and their subsequent Effects as to France*; and the other, *Reflexions on the State of the Politics of Europe.*

With regard to its real author we have circumstances only to guide us; but these circumstances are equivalent nearly to facts, and seem to prove the memorial, as well as the pieces accompanying it, to be the composition of count Grimoard, whom we have mentioned before.

In the first place, the hand-writing of the memorial is exactly like that of other pieces written by the count, and found amongst the king's papers. Secondly, the corrections, though but few, are all in the same hand as the body of the work, which proves it to be the original manuscript; at the same time that there is not a single word in the hand-writing of M. de Castries, which would be so easily recognised by its badness. Thirdly, we can discover in it the simple, clear, and concise style, as well as the spirit of analysis, which distinguish all the other works of count Grimoard, whether published or in manuscript, which have fallen into our hands. Fourthly, in the same port-folio, which had been the king's, was another work with the name of Grimoard affixed to it, the title of which was, *Historical and Political Memoirs of the Dutch United Provinces, from the Foundation of that Republic in* 1579, *to February* 1786 *.

* We regret that the extent of this work, which contains sixteen sheets of large paper, will not allow more than the heads of the chapters to be inserted here; from which, however, some idea of the whole may be collected.

Chap. I.—Foundation of the Republic. Aggrandisement of the Stadtholdership, and its Situation till 1776—William I.—Maurice—Frederic Henry—William II.—First Suspension of

"*Inquiry into the Political State of France in October* 1786.

"Such frequent embarrassments occur in our daily intercourse with the principal foreign powers, whose political interests have any connexion with our own, that it seems reasonable to conclude, that such embarrassments are the result of measures and plans neither maturely considered in their commencement, nor ably directed in their progress. It behoves us, therefore, at least to examine the most essential points of our present political situation, in order to remedy, as soon as possible, the inconveniences which the proceedings of our ministry have produced,

of the Stadtholdership—William III.—Second Suspension of the Stadtholdership—William IV.—William V.

Chap. II.—Revolution effected by the Duke of Vauguyon in the United Provinces—and its Consequences, to the Commencement of 1786.

Chap. III.—Epitome of the Constitution and Government of the United Provinces—their Finances, Strength, and Population—1. Gueldres—2. Holland—3. Zealand—4. Utrecht—5. Friesland—6. Overyssel—7. Groningen, and the Drenta—Countries of the Generalty—Chamber of Accounts—Chamber of Finances—Court for the Receipts of the Generalty—Religion—Public Instruction—States-General—Council of State—Army—Admiralty—Admiral-General—Admiralties of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Enchuysen, Zealand or Middleburg, Friesland or Harlingen—Naval Force—Commerce—East- and West-India

and will continue to produce, should it persevere in false views, and persist in employing means so feeble and inadequate as to become degrading to a great power like that of France, whose dignity seems for some years past to have been but too much neglected in the conduct of affairs with the other powers of Europe. But not to go too far back, or enter into too wide a field, this Inquiry will be confined to those measures of the king's reign which respect England, Holland, Germany, Russia, and Turkey—powers with whom we have relations equally direct and important, and which become every day more difficult to manage.

" We shall pass over the courts of Denmark,

-India Companies—Surinam Company—Chamber of the Levant—Reflexions on the Constitution and Government of the United Provinces.

Chap. IV.—On the Stadtholdership, and its Prerogatives—Of William V. the present Stadtholder.

Chap. V.—Of the Aristocrats and Patriots—their Ends and Means.

Chap. VI.—Plan for turning the Divisions of the Republic to its own Advantage and the Advantage of France.

The second chapter, which relates to the operations of the duke of Vauguyon in Holland, from the end of 1776 to May 1784, is full of facts, little known and highly interesting; and gives, besides, an exalted idea of the talents of their embassador, who supported with success and applause the burthen of the department for foreign affairs.

Sweden, Poland, and Italy, which are nearly non-entities; that of Turin excepted, whose attachment to France seems inviolable. We shall in like manner refrain to speak of Portugal, whose close connexions with the court of London may authorise us to consider her as an English province; or of Spain, the fidelity of whose monarch, and the affection he bears to ours, give no room to suppose he would injure us, or throw any considerable difficulties in our way,—though it is well known that he, as well as his first minister, was hurt by an expression of one of our ministers*, who, with all his circumspection, will sometimes let fall expressions, which answer no good purpose, and, in the end, prove mischievous. The expression to which we allude, escaped him in a conference, where, in reply to some proposal on the subject of acknowledging the public character of the American ministers in the beginning of 1778, to which the Spanish embassador objected, he said, 'That were it necessary to choose between the family compact and the independence of the United States of America, he should not hesitate to vote for the latter;'—an inconsiderate declaration, which would doubtless have effec-

*The name of M. de Vergennes is here written in the king's hand.

tually cooled the friendship of his catholic majesty, had he not judged it to be rather the opinion of a private individual, than an expression of the real sentiments of our king.

ENGLAND.

" It is well known, that the late duke of Choiseul conceived, and first set on foot, the project of separating the northern colonies of America from the mother country, and that his successors in office have merely followed his footsteps. Scarcely had the king ascended the throne, when reasons of state seemed to render it necessary, that he should abide by this plan, in order to prevent the colonies, which, on the 4th of July 1776, had declared their independency, from again falling under the yoke of Great-Britain. It is superfluous to examine here, whether the means employed, during the two preceding years, to obtain that end, were the best that could have been adopted. It is equally useless, to state the manner in which the maritime war, which broke out in 1778, between France and England, was conducted on our part. We shall confine ourselves to the articles of the peace, signed with the court of London on the 20th of January and 3d of September, 1783; of which the first are provisionary, and the other definitive.

"It must be observed, in the first place, that the events of the war were in general favourable to us; that our naval armament supported with glory the honour of the French flag in the seas of Europe, Asia, and America; that the failure of count Grasse, in the engagement of the 12th of April, 1782, cannot be reckoned as one of those reverses of fortune, which places a great maritime power under a necessity of submission; that the retreat of our fleet at St. Domingo, with the loss of a few ships, occasioned only a slight derangement in the plan of the campaign for that year, since there still remained in our ports, either building or armed, vessels more than sufficient to replace those we had lost, and to preserve the superiority, which the junction of the Spanish force with ours had given us; that, on the other hand, the marquis of Bouillé had taken several of the sugar islands belonging to the English, who, beaten also in India by M. de Suffrein, and deprived for this year at least, by the interception of one of their merchant fleets, of the returns of the immense commerce they maintain in the East, and thereby of the power of recruiting their finances, were wholly unable to procure the supplies necessary for the preparation and support of the campaign of 1783, and were accordingly obliged, before the close of 1782, to

sue for peace—voluntarily offering, as its first condition, to acknowledge the independence of the American colonies, which had been the motive or pretence of the war.

" It is therefore evident, that France could not treat under more favourable circumstances. Yet we shall demonstrate, first, that the negotiation was not either begun or concluded with suitable dignity or capacity; secondly, that we did not avail ourselves, as we ought to have done, of the prosperous state of our arms, to obtain advantages, which we were in a situation to exact; thirdly, that the interest of the allies was neither honourably nor firmly defended against England; and lastly, that the peace of 1783 wiped off only some of the smallest blots of that of 1763—since, as to the cod-fishery and India trade, our situation is by no means sufficiently improved.

" As Great-Britain was reduced to the necessity of asking for peace, it became the dignity of our situation, after receiving her proposals, to have transmitted, in an unequivocal manner, well-digested conditions, as the *sine qua non* on which France would treat. Such a mode of proceeding, alike simple and easy, would also have abridged the negotiation: but much time was lost in disputes about cessions and restitutions; and it is not to be denied, that, during these debates, the king's minister discovered

too plainly his inclination to conclude a treaty, however trivial might be the advantages we should obtain. This disposition, which could not escape the observation of Mr. Fitzherbert, encouraged the court of London to show less readiness to concede. Lord Shelburne (since marquis of Lansdowne), in a conference with the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries then in London, even indulged himself in a sort of triumph and raillery with regard to France; and as our negotiator, in conformity no doubt to his timid instructions, and fearing a rupture of the negotiations, bore with the utmost humility this species of insult, Mr. d'Heredia, whom the Spanish embassador had thought proper to send to England, to watch over the interests of his court, disgusted with the ill-timed meekness of M. Gerard de Rayneval, who remained silent, replied with spirit, 'My lord, you are not acquainted with Spain!'—a Castilian sally, by which he meant, 'If you persist in insulting France, Spain will know how to avenge it.'—In short, the conferences both in London and Versailles wanted the nobleness of character belonging to great political discussions, and assumed in its stead that of a wrangle between petty attornies, where one party suffers itself to be the dupe of the other. Unfortunately, this was not the English

party; for, in 1784, lord Shelburne said, respecting this peace, to a Frenchman of rank, with whom he had been formerly acquainted at college*, 'Had your court appeared less solicitous to terminate the war, it would have obtained from us far greater sacrifices.'—Let us now examine the intrinsic value of those which were really made us, and what further sacrifices ought to have been demanded.

"The 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of the preliminary treaty, and the 4th, 5th, and 6th of the definitive treaty, regulate the nature of the French fisheries on the coast of Newfoundland, and the adjacent parts of North America.

"At the time of making the peace, it was generally thought, and has since been proved, that the regulations with regard to the fisheries were disadvantageous to us—an object, however, highly essential, since, independent of the advantages to be procured in the balance of trade, it is in fisheries that our best sailors are formed—whilst the ceding the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon to us was very little, in comparison of what might have been obtained from the English, to whom we had much better have left a sugar island the more in the Antilles, if we could

* "M. de Bouillé," whose name is written in the king's hand.

thereby have induced them to abandon Newfoundland to us. That the fisheries were not better adjusted is the more surprising, as the French negotiator was provided with documents, calculated to give him every information on the subject. In December 1782, the consuls of St. Malo sent to the minister of the marine an excellent paper, drawn up by a M. Perréa, of Grandville in Normandy, a person interested in the cod fishery, which contains all the information requisite on that head*. The paper was immediately dispatched to M. de Vergennes, that he might avail himself of it in his discussions with England; and M. de Vergennes returned for answer, that he had received this work before from the author himself, and had hastened to bestow on him the praise his knowledge and good intentions merited.—Why then, since M. de Vergennes was in possession of this paper, and knew the value of it, did he neglect attending to it in his negotiations with the court of London?

"By the 7th and 8th articles of the preliminaries of the definitive treaty, the islands of Grenada and the Grenadilloes, of St. Vincent, Dominique, St. Christopher, Nevis, and Montserrat, which had been taken by the marquis

* See N°I. at the end of the volume.

of Bouillé, were restored to England; while England, on her part, was to restore the island of St. Lucia, and to cede Tobago to us. It is impossible to conceive how the French negotiator could think of accepting Tobago, a colony as yet to be raised, in compensation for such numerous cessions; and why, as was observed at the time, he did not strenuously insist on keeping Dominique, an island difficult to be attacked, easily defended, and which intercepts the communication between Martinique and Guadaloupe. To have known the advantage of the nearest possessions was reason sufficient for us to insist upon retaining this important settlement.

"The 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th articles of the preliminary and definitive treaties regard our African establishments. This part of the treaty of peace was the least blamed by the public; it is in fact the part which is least important and least known, since only a small number of merchants are interested in it. Those, however, whose speculations are directed towards Africa, have expressed their dissatisfaction, and asserted, that the peace might have been more advantageous to our commerce in that quarter of the world.

"The 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th articles determine our situation in India. These unaccountable stipulations have excited general dis-

content, and been looked upon as a disgrace to the French name. The author of the treaty has been reproached for having sacrificed or misunderstood the interests of the nation in Asia; where its re-establishment on the same footing as in 1748, the date of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, ought to have been required, even though to obtain it had been neceſſary to continue the war for another campaign, of which, it is more than probable, England would not have incurred the riſk. Every man was shocked to see the French flag and the French trade in the East subject to the caprice of Great-Britain; and to observe, in the 13th article, that we received with apparent gratitude to the court of London 'the liberty of surrounding Chandernagore with a ditch, to drain off the water,'—a clause by which the king is made to renounce the privilege belonging to every landholder, of doing on his estate whatever he shall think proper: so that we possess Chandernagore without a right of fortifying it, should our interests require such a measure. Besides, the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th articles, particularly the 13th, are so ill drawn up, and so vague in their meaning, that their observance has already given rise to numerous disputes with the English, who interpret them after their own manner; and it will be absolutely

necessary, by a subsequent agreement, to rectify them, or begin the war again; unless we would remain in Asia at the mercy of the *English faith*, which is become equivalent at least to that *Punic faith*, so famed in past ages.

"The 17th article of the preliminaries and the definitive treaty, has freed us henceforth from the disgrace of maintaining at our expence an English commissary at Dunkirk, to see that the fortifications of that port be not rebuilt.

"The other conditions of the peace are scarcely deserving of notice, the 18th article excepted, by which France is bound to conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce with Great-Britain, within two years from the 1st of January 1784.

"By virtue of this stipulation, which prudence should have taught us carefully to avoid, we are engaged to enter into commercial ties with England, who had often made a similar proposal, to which the French government, with great wisdom, would never condescend to listen. Till now it had been thought imprudent to sacrifice to speculation, or, at least, to very uncertain hopes, the advice of the best politicians, who have ever been of opinion,—first, that it would be dangerous to allow the English a free trade with France, since they might be led, by

means of it, to interfere with our domestic concerns, and occasion internal commotions: secondly, that we do not stand in need of the commodities of England, while England on the contrary cannot exist without ours, as, for example, our wines of Bourdeaux; that we ought therefore to restrict ourselves, as formerly, to the supplying that country, without exposing ourselves, by receiving any kind of merchandise whatever in return, to pay a tribute more or less considerable to the industry of that rival nation: thirdly, that if, imprudently, we place the trinkets and stuffs of England in competition with those of France, we may by so doing, if not wholly destroy, at least essentially injure our own manufactures: fourthly, that the balance of trade would be evidently to the advantage of Great-Britain, who cannot in return grant us an equivalent to what she will receive, partly from the usages and forms of her government, and partly from the small extent and uniformity of her territory, that does not admit of the same variety of productions as ours, which, from Dunkirk to Perpignan, experiences at least three different climates, each having its appropriate commodities and modes of employment.

"The wisest part of the French nation had adopted these opinions, which it conceived to

be well founded: and the public no sooner learned, that a treaty of commerce with England was actually on foot, than the minister was assailed with a crowd of remonstrances, which showed at once the general uneasiness and discontent. This spirit was still heightened, on finding that the sieur Gerard de Rayneval was charged with the negotiation, that is to say, with the defence of the interests of France, against Mr. William Eden, a man who is supposed to be the best versed in the commercial interest, productions, and revenue of Great-Britain, and consequently the most capable of seizing on the various relations under each of these heads, and thereby of rendering the treaty eminently advantageous to his nation. Mr. Eden besides received the assistance of the best-informed merchants, manufacturers, and speculators; many of whom, it is known, were sent by the court of London to Paris, purposely to give him every necessary information. Nothing can more strongly evince the extreme attention which is paid by the English government to objects of commerce, and the judgment it employs in the choice of those to whom it intrusts the care of discussing and regulating its interests. It might perhaps be doing injustice to the sieur de Rayneval, to suppose, that his knowledge and capacity were not sufficient to enable him

to cope with Mr. Eden; but it must be allowed, that, not enjoying the confidence of the public, his apprenticeship in commercial affairs ought not have been begun at the risk of our dearest interests, and the successful issue of so important a negotiation. The treaty was however signed at Versailles the 26th of last September; and, though not yet printed, the newsmongers have contrived to learn certain articles of it, which are extremely injurious to France, and complaints and remonstrances already pour in from all parts of the nation. The minister, whose particular province it is to attend to these things, pretends, that 'we must wait the test of experience, which will prove, that we have not deceived ourselves, and that the English have not outwitted us.' We earnestly hope that such will be the fact; but to refer vaguely-existing and pressing objections to the experience of the future, is evading the question instead of answering it; and it is to be feared, that what has already happened as to the peace with England, will again occur with regard to the treaty of commerce. The king has certainly not forgotten, that, at the time the peace was sued for by that power, several of the ministers insisted on the necessity of maturely weighing its conditions; while M. de Vergennes, on the contrary, urged the necessity of a speedy con-

clusion, that France, no longer troubled by the Engliſh, might oppose more effectually the plans of Ruſſia and the emperor against the Turks. It was said, in answer to this, that it might so happen that we should lose our aim, both with respect to Great-Britain and the courts of Vienna and Petersburg, and that we should then suffer two evils instead of one: to which M. de Vergennes replied then as he does now, 'that the future would show his expectations to be well founded.' His opinion prevailed; and what was the result? By a precipitate peace we lost the principal advantages which our success in the war entitled us to reap; and, in spite of his well-founded expectations, Russia was not prevented from invading the Crimea, and, consequently, of enfeebling and despoiling the Ottoman empire, in which we ourselves concurred, by exhorting the Porte to satisfy the ambition of Catharine II.

DUTCH UNITED PROVINCES.

"After the revolution of 1747, by which the court of London re-established the stadtholder, France lost all influence over the United Provinces; which England despotically governed till the year 1780, by the hands of sir Philip Yorke, her embassador at the Hague, and duke Lewis of Brunswic, preceptor to the stadt-

holder, William V. The influence of France has now succeeded that of Great-Britain in the republic; and we cannot refuse to the duke of Vauguyon, the king's embassador in Holland from the 21st of December 1776 to the 28th of May 1783, the honour of having excited in our favour this salutary revolution, which tended to unite the Dutch forces to ours, and to enfeeble the English power in Europe and the other quarters of the globe. So complete was the impulse given to the United Provinces by the duke of Vauguyon, that neither the endeavours of the stadtholder nor of England could at all check its effect. The British court, seeing the sceptre of Holland thus snatched from its hands, endeavoured, in order to recover it, to intimidate and alarm the republicans in principle, who were the party favourable to France, by harassing their commerce in every possible way. These violent proceedings still further exasperated the minds of the Dutch against the English ministry, who at length, the 20th of December 1780, took the desperate step of declaring war against the republic; and from that moment the republic made common cause with the French. It is true, the intrigues of the stadtholder, and other creatures of Great-Britain, so far paralysed the naval force of the Dutch, that we were obliged to protect

the whole, and re-conquer a part, of their Indian and American colonies; but after the declaration of the 17th of July 1782, importing, that the king would not separate his cause from that of the United States, good policy required at least, that France should exact for them, at the conclusion of the peace, the *statu quo ante bellum*, and that England should have been peremptorily informed, that we were resolved, unless that clause was complied with; to continue hostilities. Far from adopting this line of conduct, the minister contented himself with interposing trivial and paltry good offices, to obtain from the court of London, on the 20th of January 1783, a suspension of arms against the States-General; to whom, on the 2d of December 1782, it had been signified, that the king would, without indemnity, restore them such of their colonies as should be in his hands at the conclusion of the general peace. By neglecting to have the republic comprehended in this treaty, besides giving a proof to all Europe of our fickleness and pusillanimity, we were guilty of the fault of abandoning Holland to the old system of violence and arrogance on the part of the English; who, by exacting from her, by the preliminaries of 2d September 1783, and the definitive treaty of 2d May 1784, in which we had not even a share, the cession of Negapat-

nam and its territory, in the peninsula of India, had evidently no other view than to engage the Hollanders, by the offer of a future restitution of that colony, to abandon its engagements with France, and bow the neck once more to the British yoke. The duke of Manchester, sent by Great-Britain to Paris to sign the definitive treaty between that power and the king, spoke very freely upon the subject to Meſſrs. Brantsen and Berkenrode, the embassadors of the republic, proposing to them, to transfer the negotiation to London, where the most perfect satisfaction would readily be given. They replied, however, that they doubted whether the States-General would consent to such an arrangement;—to which the English embassador answered, 'That it was astoniſhing the Dutch should so blindly abandon themselves to a weak and insidious minister, who desired only to make tools of them; while, in case of necessity, they would obtain nothing from him but refusals, softened by vain and barren compliments.' This conversation, though faithfully reported to M. de Vergennes, as well as the analogous and very active proceedings of the English partisans in the United States, tending to disseminate the same opinions, and foment the distrust and hatred excited against us by the loss of Negapat-

nam, could not yet rouse the minister from his apathy, notwithstanding the evident necessity of attending to the interior of the republic; and he still persevered in it, neglecting to employ the intervention of France to stop in their origin the steps taken by the king of Prussia, and prevent him from intimidating our partisans by his threats, who continued to attack the pretended prerogatives of the stadtholder, his niece's husband. It was in vain that the patriots repeatedly remonstrated, that this apathy in our court rendered nugatory all their efforts to excite in the Seven Provinces that trust and liking, with which our minister ought to have been solicitous the French name should ever be accompanied.

"When the emperor, in November 1783, and afterwards in 1784, began to make claims which were harassing to the republic, requiring the opening of the Scheldt, the cession of Maestricht and its dependencies, the territory of Outre Meuse, the district of Vroenhoven, and the sum of seventy millions of florins,—the minister for foreign affairs, instead of frankly concerting measures with the king of Prussia, who sent prince Henry, his brother, into France, to say, that he wished nothing more earnestly than to see the intruding policy of Joseph II. re-

pressed, and that we ought candidly to declare to that monarch, that we would not allow him to harass or despoil the United Provinces, by urging against them any of his pretensions, —instead of doing this, the minister proposed a mediation to the contesting parties, in which they, as well as the rest of Europe, saw more of weakness than friendship; particularly when it was known, that Mr. Brantsen, having seemed desirous of pressing the conclusion of the alliance long projected by the duke of Vauguyon between France and the States-General, M. de Vergennes answered, with an openness very surprising in one who had long been minister, 'I do not think proper to make the king marry a law-suit.'—It was hence perceived, that the arrangement between the emperor and the Dutch, our future allies, would be an expensive business to the latter. The king of Prussia, with his usual superior penetration, was one of the first to foresee the impolitic conclusion of this affair. 'You will find,' said he to a French general * who was conversing with him towards the close of the year 1784, 'that M. de Vergennes will compel their High Mightinesses to make it up with my brother

* "M. de Bouillé."—Written in the king's hand.

Joseph, by giving him something to drink, which will encourage him to be more exorbitant another time.'

"This prophecy was completely verified by the treaty of the 8th of November, 1785, which terminated the differences between the emperor and the United Provinces: an arrangement that was the more justly blamed, as it was equally disadvantageous to the Austrian monarch, the Dutch provinces, and France. The first of these powers not only failed in attaining its projected end, but, in the vain hope of its accomplishment, had expended in warlike preparations much more than the value of the cessions and the money promised him. As to the second, it beheld its territory lessened, its finances drained, and its debts increased, by the levy of troops, the purchase of arms, ammunition, provisions, and other useless military preparations, on account of old claims, which France might have saved it from acknowledging and ceding, if, as was said above, she had, in concert with Prussia, declared to the emperor, that the two crowns would defend Holland, if attacked. It is much to be doubted, whether Joseph II. who was more interested in exchanging Bavaria, and pursuing the plans concerted with Russia against the Turks, than in any other schemes, would have exposed himself to a war, uncertain in its event, and ruinous in its expenditure, by obstinately

continuing his threats against Holland, who could besides cede nothing of essential consequence to his power, of which he would even risk the diminution, should his armies be beaten by the French and Prussians. With regard to our own court, the weak manner in which it defended, against the court of Vienna, what M. de Vergennes called 'the law-suit of the United Provinces,' discredited it in the eyes of Europe, though it had squandered much money in useless preparations of war, and, which the king of Prussia had not foreseen, had assisted the Dutch in giving 'something to drink to the emperor,'—pecuniary sacrifices, for which they owed us in reality but little gratitude, since they could perceive, that we might easily have spared in this respect both ourselves and them.

"To comprehend the whole of this affair, it is necessary to be informed, that M. de Vergennes, without any apparent reason, so greatly dreaded that the negotiation entered into with the Austrian monarch, under the mediation of the king, should be broken off, that he declared to the embassadors of the republic, that their instructions authorising only the promise of four millions and a half of Dutch florins, his majesty agreed to join in the payment of the ten millions, stipulated by the 15th and 16th articles of the treaty; and it was upon this assurance that the embassadors signed.

When a categorical explanation, however, became necessary, as to the quota to be discharged by France, M. de Vergennes attempted to prevaricate, and pretended to have consented only to a certain sum, much below the four millions and a half necessary for the completion of the payment to the emperor: the Dutch, on the contrary, maintained, that the offer made to their embassadors clearly implied this express sum. This difference gave rise at the Hague to a discussion, equally warm and disagreeable, between our embassador and the heads of the patriotic party, as to the good faith of our minister; in the course of which our embassador, to remove all distrust, using the following expression, 'The intentions of the king, and the well-known character of M. de Vergennes, ought to be your security,' Mr. Van Berckel, pensionary of Amsterdam, replied, with more warmth than politeness,—'We rely entirely on the good intentions of the king, for as to M. de Vergennes, we have been long apprehensive that he has no character, either moral or political.'—In the course of a few days the French agents succeeded in appeasing the Dutch, and induced them to be contented with the payment, on our part, of a very moderate sum. Some amongst them were even of opinion, that nothing should be required from us; but M. de Verac

having been obliged to relate this scene, or at least a chief part of it, to M. de Vergennes, the minister, who had at first instructed the embassador to be firm as to the article of money, was so greatly alarmed at the first expression of dislike in the Dutch, that he sent a courier extraordinary to M. de Verac, with an abrupt order, to notify without delay to the States-General, 'That it had always been the king's intention to furnish four millions and a half of florins, making nine millions forty-five thousand French livres, in order to complete the indemnity allowed the emperor by the treaty of the 5th of November;—a timid precipitation, which produced us the absolute loss of a considerable sum, a part of which, at least, might evidently have been spared. The Dutch, who had been at first both surprised and displeased at the attempt to impose on them, were equally astonished to see us now, by a public declaration, give the lie to assertions, which they had themselves heard from the embassador, and at the levity with which our minister altered his measures upon the appearance of the least opposition.

"Peace being concluded between the emperor and the United Provinces, M. de Vergennes was no longer apprehensive of 'marrying the king to a law-suit,' and our definitive treaty with them was at length signed at Fontainebleau,

the 10th of November 1785. It contains nineteen articles, five of which are separate. There is no objection to be made to this act, which was the work of the duke of Vauguyon, who had long since drawn up the plan of it: this was the moment to make it useful, and to be active in establishing a system of politics conformable to our interests in the heart of the republic, and to put an end to the differences, or rather the indecent struggles, existing between the patriots, our party, and the stadtholder, who was a mere English viceroy in Holland, either by the submission, or, if necessary, by the expulsion of the latter. The late king of Prussia, uncle to the princess of Orange, for whose husband he had no esteem, was desirous of concurring with us in an arrangement, at that time easy, and which he even proposed to us; by which we might have shown a respect to this monarch in the person of his niece, which would certainly not have been injurious either to us, or to the patriot party, who themselves earnestly desired an end of their civil commotions. But indolence, indifference, and imbecillity, were on our side carried to the height: we not only suffered the great Frederic to die without availing ourselves of his good intentions to put an end to a quarrel which began to weary him, but we still continue in the

same stupid mistake, by trusting too much to the easiness of his successor: for the very great attachment he has to his sister, the princess of Orange, is not to be outweighed, as M. de Vergennes flatters himself, by his gratitude for the few pecuniary services he obtained for this monarch before his accession to the throne. In fine, by a temporising system, as hurtful to our own interests as to those of the republic, we have suffered a real civil war to break out in the heart of it: for what else can we call the raising the standard of the stadtholder against Elburg and Harlem in Guelderland, on the 4th and 5th of September last, and the fate which he evidently destines to Utrecht and its patriots, if he is allowed to become the strongest, and it is possible he may be so, through our fault? The sole motive of his conduct is the indifference, not to say contempt for us, which the English minister has succeeded in inspiring him with, by convincing him, that our indolence is such, that he may wound the interests of France, and even offend her with impunity, in the person of her partisans, the patriots.

"Those who are best acquainted with the affairs of Holland, believe the accommodation, to accomplish which M. de Rayneval was sent to the Hague, to be no longer possible. They ground their opinion, First, On that inaction

—so wholly displaced as to be capable of justification on no reasonable motive whatever— which has caused so great an irritation, that any approach to conciliation between the two parties dividing the republic would seem henceforward to be out of the question; whence results the disgraceful alternative of taking shame to ourselves, by suffering the United Provinces to fall once more under the power of the stadtholder, that is of England, or of totally expelling this prince, at the risk indeed of exposing ourselves to a war with this power, in which Prussia would no doubt take part. Secondly, on the known character of the prince of Orange, and the nature of the intrigues of the English minister at the Hague, which will be sufficiently efficacious to engage him to reject every conciliatory expedient with the patriotic party. In like manner, the negotiation we have just inconsiderately entered into with the Prussian envoy, baron Gortz, will produce only the strange effect, of exhibiting to astonished Europe the spectacle of the interests and wishes of a king of France disputing with the obstinacy of a Dutch stadtholder. From these unanswerable arguments we have a right to infer, that our injudicious conduct will render nugatory an alliance, which we desired, because it gave us

the certain promise of sufficient means to injure England, whenever the patriotic party, who detests that power, should have acquired the chief influence in the government. The patriots, on their side, wished to support themselves, *without* against the English, and *within* against the stadtholder, with the weight which the king's name naturally throws into the political scale. Nothing, therefore, could be more easy, than to attain the end proposed by the French minister and the Dutch republicans, since each desired the same thing: yet, by a fatality every way inexplicable, but by acknowledging all our measures to have been absurd, we have, in reality, less influence now in Holland, than in May 1784, the period when the duke of Vauguion unfortunately left the Hague. From the time of that embassador's departure, our measures have been uniformly deficient in their combination and consequences: sometimes we have remained in the most blameable apathy; sometimes we have shown a seeming partiality to the stadtholder, which has gained us little favour from him, and given disgust to the patriots; sometimes we have roused and brought forward the latter, without afterwards properly supporting them; and thus, independent of the dissatisfaction this uncertain

and versatile conduct gave to all parties, we have done infinite discredit to our national honour and politics.

"The importance of our relations with Holland requires a still further detail than we have yet given, and this is the object of the paper entitled *Considerations on the Affairs of the United Provinces of the Low Countries, and their subsequent Effects as to France* *. But the limits prescribed to us will not suffer us to pass over one object, deemed of sufficient importance to deserve the strictest attention of the king.

"Several months before the signing of the treaty of alliance between France and the republic, count Grimoard had projected a plan for uniting the colonial resources of the two nations, in order to destroy the English power in India, the first war that should happen. This plan was approved by the king, who ordered the execution of it by count Grimoard himself, who was in consequence sent to the Hague in November 1785, under another plausible pretence, with instructions from the minister for foreign affairs and the minister of the marine, to whom the affairs in question equally related. In less than six weeks the count succeeded in convincing the principal

* See N° II. at the end of the volume.

members of the Dutch government of the efficacy and advantage of the measures he proposed to them; he even induced them to agree, that the king for a time should have joint possession of the Cape of Good Hope, and the port of Trincomalé in the island of Ceylon, to form the military establishments there which would be necessary for the execution of their plan, whenever the war should break out. Of six dispatches sent by the count, the 18th of November, and the 2d, 9th, 12th, 15th, and 16th of December, 1785, (two of which were sent by extraordinary couriers) not one was communicated, notwithstanding the agreement, to M. de Castries, nor was even the receipt of them acknowledged to the count. Surprised at this silence, the count wrote a private letter, on the 12th of December, to M. de Castries; in consequence of which the latter insisted on seeing the dispatches, which M. de Vergennes promised to send him, but failed in his promise. He sent however to the count, by an express which arrived at the Hague on the 25th, a letter, artfully dated the 15th of December, though it was not really written on the 20th or even 21st of that month, and subsequent to the receipt of his dispatch of the 16th. In this letter he was told 'to suspend his negotiations, which, from a zeal undoubtedly laudable, but which

might give umbrage to Holland, he had pushed with too much activity, since we must avoid being suspected of a desire of governing the republic; and that he had acted, besides, on his own ideas, which did not at all correspond with those of the king's ministers.' This order, so contradictory to those given to the count before his departure, was irregularly sent, without the concurrence, or even the knowledge, of M. de Castries, to whom, as minister of the marine, the plan respecting India more immediately belonged. The count however suspended the discussion of the colonial convention, the fundamental articles of which had already been agreed upon in private conferences; and, returning to France at the close of January 1786, he gave the most satisfactory account of his conduct, of which, indeed, the success of his measures, and the incontestible proofs of the satisfaction of the Dutch, were a sufficient apology. The king, being informed of these circumstances, ordered the negotiation to be renewed; but the count observed, that it would not be necessary he should yet return to the Hague; since, as the rhinegrave of Salm, whom the patriotic party intended deputing on a secret mission to our court, was daily expected, it would be proper to wait his arrival, previous to resuming the discussion of

the articles of the colonial convention. The rhinegrave confirmed the report of the count, and assured the king's ministers, that the Dutch government, satisfied with the colonial project, eagerly desired its execution, and that he was authorised to enter confidentially into the subject. To avoid all misunderstanding, it was agreed to treat in writing, and the rhinegrave was to make his memorandums or notes in one margin, and transmit them to M. de Vergennes, who was to send them to M. de Castries, after making in like manner, in the other margin, such notes or observations on his part as he should think necessary.

"On the 27th of last May the rhinegrave presented a memorial, entitled *Considerations on the Means of reciprocally securing to the French and Dutch their Possessions in the East Indies;* in the 2d article of which he explained the expedients which the patriots wished to be employed, in pursuance of the 10th article of the treaty of alliance between France and the United Provinces, in order to bring the States-General, officially and legally, to a conclusion of the secret convention respecting the colonies. On the 3d of June following, M. de Vergennes sent M. de Castries, not the rhinegrave's original paper, but a copy, in which the second paragraph of the 2d article, beginning, 'It appears

besides necessary,' and ending 'with the heads of the patriotic party,' was wholly suppressed, in order to prevent M. de Castries from requiring, as he would naturally have done, that the king's embassador at the Hague should be ordered to execute the formalities required by the Dutch, and prescribed by their constitution. This fraud—which is too flagrant to be imputed to any mistake of the transcriber, and of which the proof is hereto annexed, (III.)* drawn from a comparison between the rhinegrave's memorial, as presented by him, and the false and mutilated copy transmitted by M. de Vergennes—this fraud was not discovered till the 14th of September last. From the discovery of these tricks and subterfuges, to which we decline giving their true and just epithets, it appears, that this minister, from the period of December 1785, has evaded the furthering of a plan, which the king had adopted from a sense of its importance, and of which he had repeatedly ordered the execution. The necessity of coming at last to a decision in this business is evident; for to abandon the colonial

* This was not found amongst the papers of the king, who had no doubt returned it to M. de Castries, after ascertaining that M. de Vergennes' copy of the rhinegrave of Salm's memorial was a false one.

convention, after having proposed it to the Dutch, and received their approbation, would be to give up at once the incalculable advantages against England which it holds out, and to exhibit, in their eyes, a character of the utmost levity and indecision.

GERMANY.

" On the king's accession to the throne, on the 10th of May 1774, he found France and Vienna bound to each other by the exclusive treaties of alliance of the 1st of May 1756, and the 30th of December 1758. We shall not here repeat the arguments advanced, during the last thirty years, for and against this treaty of union; since our present inquiry relates only to the examining, whether the political department has conducted itself with propriety with regard to it in the various circumstances which have arisen since 1774, or has turned to advantage, as far as was just, the stipulations of that treaty, or has rectified what might be found in it to our disadvantage.

" The interview of the emperor with the king of Prussia at Neisse in Silesia, in August 1769; the recent agreement there signed by the two monarchs on the 28th; the second interview at Nieustadt in Moravia, on the 5th of September 1770, where the measures taken at

Neisse the preceding year were confirmed; the forgetfulness of the alliance which the court of Vienna had contracted in July 1771 with the Turks, who granted a subsidy of thirty millions, of which it received about nine in specie, on condition of defending them against Ruſſia, to whose mercy it abandoned them, whilst it kept their money; the division of Poland, projected by prince Henry of Prussia in 1771, to prevent a general inflammation, and signed by the courts of Berlin and Petersburg on the 17th of February, 1772, which was provisionally approved on the 4th of March by Austria, who came into the definitive treaty on the 5th of August following—in fine, the dismemberment of the states of Poland, effected on the 1ſt of September of the same year, by the three powers engaged in the division, and taking possession of it;—all these arrangements, of which the court of Vienna had given no amicable information to ours, which could not have failed to disapprove them, produced a coolness that lasted during the life of the deceased monarch, in spite of all the attempts and arguments of the Austrian minister to persuade him, that those measures, so far from violating, contained nothing contrary to the alliance subsisting between the two monarchies from 1756, and of which the conditions had been always observed,

on our part, with a fidelity and exactness, perhaps too scrupulous.

" A defensive treaty for eight years, concluded in 1764, between Prussia and Russia, had occasioned between the latter power and the Austrians such open animosity, that it was not even appeased by the division of Poland." This animosity was still farther heightened on the grand-vizier's being compelled, the 10th of July 1774, to sign the treaty of Kainardgi with the Russian general, so injurious to the Ottoman empire. The respective boundaries were not regulated till the year 1775, by a private convention, by which the court of Petersburg, abusing its conquests, greatly extended its dominion at the expence of the Turks, and in a manner which implied plans of invasion. The emperor, at once jealous and uneasy at the advantages of the Russians, sent the baron Thugut to us in 1777, with proposals for a new defensive alliance, to secure Turkey from further aggression and the lawless ambition of Catharine II. France could not wish for a more favourable opportunity of at length turning to advantage its connexion with Auftria, and making that power concur in the preservation of the Turkish empire, which we have so great an interest in supporting: yet M. de Vergennes' answer to baron Thugut was—'That

he was apprehensive lest the proposed alliance should alarm the other powers of Europe; that it was probable that Russia, exhausted by a long war, and satisfied both with the glory and aggrandisement she had obtained by the peace of Kainardgi, would not think for a long time of molesting the Turks; that it would be therefore sufficient to keep a watch over the empress, against whom it would be time enough to unite when her disposition to attack the Ottoman empire should be known.' These arguments, false and insidious, founded on a narrow policy, but well agreeing with a capricious system of moderation, not to say weakness, which the least discussion must overturn, astonished and displeased the emperor. He concluded, that he could no longer rely on our ministry, since they refused arrangements dictated by the evident interest of France—a reflexion which certainly contributed to lead that monarch to connect himself afterwards with Russia, whose alliance held out to him advantages, henceforth not to be expected from ours. Such was the origin of that formidable league, which threatens and alarms not Turkey alone, but all Europe. Subsequent events will prove that M. de Vergennes could not have committed a more serious error, or one more fatal to France, than that of rejecting

the overtures of the emperor, whom he should rather have met half'way, had not his advances rendered it unnecessary; and that to the inconsiderate reply of that minister is to be attributed most of the embarrassments we have since experienced, and the absolute decline of our political influence.

" On the 30th of December, 1777, died the elector of Bavaria, the last male of his line: an event, which produced in the French minister the same astonishment and the same hesitation, as to the measures to be adopted, as if it could not have been foreseen at least for a year past. We were on the brink of a war with England; and it was desirable to avoid an open rupture with the emperor, already highly displeased with the ill success of baron Thugut's mission, and who pretended to a right of dismembering the succession of the deceased. These wise views were frustrated by mistaken ones, which proved, as we shall see, how little M. de Vergennes understood the intentions of the king of Prussia. He declared, that this monarch would accede as easily to the division of Bavaria, as he had to that of Poland, provided the court of Vienna gave him a sufficient compensation: but Frederic soon proved the injustice of this opinion, by claiming the guarantee given by our court in the treaty of West-

phalia, which the emperor was desirous of violating, by ranking himself amongst the heirs of the elector of Bavaria, and showed unequivocally his intention of attacking Austria if it persisted in its projected usurpation of a part of the Bavarian succession, which by right reverted wholly to the palatine house, the most faithful and important of our allies in the empire. We ought therefore to have supported its interests with as much energy as we displayed weakness—a truth which the following detail will prove.

"The emperor, threatened by Prussia, who proposed to make common cause with us, claimed, in case of hostilities on the part of the latter, the succours stipulated by the alliance of 1756, or at least, conformably to the 3d article of the 30th December 1758, the annual subsidy of 8,340,000 livres payable monthly, in twelve equal parts. The French minister properly replied, that his was not the *casus fœderis*; because, whatever aggression the court of Vienna suffered, it would solely result from the invasion of Bavaria, over which Austria had no real right. But, instead of adding, that, however unwilling to infringe the alliance of 1756, which the king on the contrary was very desirous to maintain, he could not allow, that it authorised any unjust invasion, which it was the wisest policy

to repress; the good offices of France were offered to conciliate the pretenders to the Bavarian succession, whom the king of Prussia supported against the emperor. The emperor then insidiously proposed, to desist from his views of aggrandisement in Bavaria, if Frederic would renounce the margravates of Anspach and Bareith, which would fall to him on the death of the reigning margrave; an absurd request, of which M. de Vergennes had the complaisance to adopt all the ridicule, when, wishing to impress it in one of his ostensible dispatches, he called it 'a magnanimous resolution of the court of Vienna.' The king of Prussia, when this letter was communicated to him, said that it contained nothing but mere *stop-gaps*, and, spurning our vain representations, ordered his armies into Bohemia. In short, by one of those subterfuges, the constant indication of feebleness, France, mis-led by a false estimate of the alliance of 1756, which it was no doubt apprehensive of seeing openly broken, secretly furnished the emperor with money, which he accepted without the smallest gratitude; but, through an unluckiness which often attends dark and indirect actions, the measures for sending it to him were so badly taken, or the secret so ill kept, that the king of Prussia, having discovered it, ordered his envoy in France

to complain heavily of the proceeding. M. de Vergennes endeavoured to deny it, but was, in consequence, overwhelmed with confufion, the Prussian minister showing him the written proof, that he had given pecuniary aid to the court of Vienna, against a cause, in which France ought to have taken the same interest as Frederic.

" The struggle continuing to subsist between this monarch and Austria, for the Bavarian succession, it gave such uneasiness to our ministers, that they negotiated with Russia to put an end to the war; and the mediation of the two powers produced, on the 13th of May 1779, the treaty of Teschen. By the 4th article of the convention, agreed on the same day, between the court of Vienna and the elector palatine, the latter ceded to the former all that part of Bavaria lying between the Danube, the Inn, and the Saltza, comprehending almost the whole generalty or government of Burghausen; a dismemberment, it is true, inconsiderable, compared with the first pretensions of Austria, but which increased the power of a rival monarchy to France, in the same proportion as it diminished that of a friend to our crown. The king of Prussia, who showed himself a zealous defender of the rights of the Germanic body, was unwilling the elector palatine should

cede any thing; and openly said, after the signing the treaty, that M. de Vergennes had insisted so strenuously on his yielding the district of Burghausen at least, that, not to disoblige the king, in whose name it was urged, he had at last given it up. M. de Vergennes endeavoured afterwards to justify his conduct, by pretending, 'That the emperor was indebted to France for an acquisition which preserved his dignity; the king of Prussia, for an arrangement which prevented the occasion of a new war; while the succession of Bavaria was almost wholly secured to the palatine family: so that we ought to pride ourselves on the result of the peace of Teschen.' It is evident, that in this way there would be no difficulty in palliating the most serious faults, in the eyes of those who take ministerial flourishes for reasonings; but this counterfeit money will not pass with men of any penetration; and, in reality, the negotiation at Teschen dissatisfied the emperor, who did not gain what he wanted; the king of Prussia, who saw his natural enemy unjustly aggrandised; the elector palatine, still more unjustly despoiled of a part of his inheritance; and the Germanic body, who, ever accustomed to look on France as its protector, was extremely astonished to find, that it must henceforward place less confidence in us than in the

king of Prussia, which essentially injured our consequence in the empire. But the greatest impolicy of all, in this conjuncture, was the allowing Russia, who is for meddling in all things, in order to extend her influence by her mediation, which, so far from being sought for, ought to have been avoided, to interfere in the affairs of Germany, where, it is to be feared, she will in the end gain an influence destructive to ours. The ensuing facts will prove, on how weak a foundation M. de Vergennes' self-congratulations, relative to the peace of Teschen, were raised; and that, had he followed, on the contrary, the dictates of plain common sense at this period, France would have become once more the point on which the empire would rest for support; a sure protection to resort to, in every attempt injurious either to the laws and constitutions of the Germanic body, or the rights and prerogatives of any of its members.

"The real origin of our mistakes, with respect to the alliance with Austria, was the desire on our part of appearing to remain faithful to it; and to conciliate, at the same time, other interests, which were wholly irreconcileable. In this we have deceived ourselves, and have given rise to a distrust, which our conduct, instead of weakening, daily strengthens. Some insist on the necessity of forming a new system

with respect to Vienna, while others are of opinion we should be contented with modifying that of 1756, in a manner better adapted to the principles in which it originated; and which, it is said, might have rendered it useful to us, had not our too great complaisance in matters of importance evinced to the Austrian minister the possibility of imposing on our good nature. Be this as it may, we have reason to suppose, that M. de Vergennes has never considered an alliance with the emperor in the light in which it ought to be considered by a French minister. It appears, indeed, that he was equally fearful of its infringement, and of the blame of yielding too much to the court of Vienna; and hence his equivocal, uncertain, and often contradictory proceedings, calculated only to produce successive and almost perpetual embarrassments, which a firm, methodical, and well-measured conduct, might have prevented. The plan M. de Vergennes ought to have followed was simple in itself, and easy in its execution. Since the king, by many motives, was attached to this alliance, it should neither have been overthrown nor sapped; the past should have been less referred to, than redressed, by fixing bases necessary to strengthen this political combination, so that if France acted not in future the first part, she might at least divide it with the emperor,

constantly retaining the place naturally assigned her amongst the powers of Europe, that is to say, in the foremost line with the Austrian monarch, the first potentate in rank, though not in reality, and which he can only become by a continuation of errors on our part easy to be avoided: for when France once rises from its present lethargy, the political and military preponderance which Austria has acquired at our expence will exist no longer.

"The treaty of Teschen was scarcely concluded, when the emperor, whose advances by baron Thugut, in 1777, we had rejected, seeing us engaged in a war with England, and concluding, from the timidity of our cabinet, that he should receive from us no very effectual or certain assistance in time of need, and still less compliance in ratifying his personal ambition, resolved, without formally renouncing the alliance of 1756, to conciliate the empress of Russia, whose views agreed with his own, and who was above all things desirous of aggrandising her power at the expence of the Turks, whose spoils Joseph II. himself hoped to share. Th court of Petersburg, judging that the concurrence of that of Vienna would facilitate the execution of its designs, opposed no obstacles to the wishes of the emperor, who had an interview with Catharine in June 1780, at Mohilof in Rus-

sian Lithuania, in which was laid the foundation of the plan, which afterwards burst forth. France showed at first a perfect indifference to this union of the two imperial courts, though she had the greatest interest to prevent it; and the prevention was a measure by no means difficult to accomplish, at least before the two powers had as yet signed any treaty. But our ministry appear to have been deficient alike in foresight and activity. The Austrian monarch gave us, at the same period, another proof of his unfriendly intentions, undertaking, in August 1780, without our knowledge, to propose, in the name of the court of London, to the court of Madrid, which made common cause with us in the war against England, the restoration of Gibraltar, if it would consent to separate its interests from those of France. The unshaken fidelity of the king of Spain, however, induced him to reject the proposal, of which he gave us information. This proved, that Austria would be the ally of Great-Britain, the moment that power found any interest in being so. Another proof of the ill intentions of the court of Vienna must not be omitted, evinced by a letter, written to the elector palatine by prince Kaunitz, in October 1780, on the doubt entertained, whether the title of *excellence* should be given to the minister plenipotentiary, whom the king maintains there.

'Refuse,' says Kaunitz, 'the title of excellence; heap humiliations on a court, that unjustly insists on having an influence in the empire: to suffer it, would be essentially to injure our constitution and tranquillity.' The elector followed not the advice of the prince; but the letter, notwithstanding, too clearly evinces the Austrian feelings towards France, to make any reflexion on it necessary. Now was the time for a full explanation with the emperor, as we had neglected the opportunity during the conferences at Mohilof, on the various suspicions and disputes he had at various times excited in us. It ought to have been represented to him, that by his allying himself, first to Prussia and Russia in the division of Poland, and afterwards to Catharine II. for the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, he really infringed the alliance of 1756, though, perhaps, he might maintain the contrary, no doubt because he had not been sufficiently opposed on this head in 1772; but that he must not expect to blind us in future with regard to that object, or his intentions relative to the empire, in which, since the 18th of August 1765, when he first wore the imperial crown, he has on every occasion shown himself despotical, excluding, at the same time, the intervention of France, whose

most moderate proceedings he has received with ill humour, or has frequently counteracted more or less openly; so much does the guarantee of that crown displease him, though founded upon the faith of treaties:—that the intention of the king was to maintain the alliance with Austria, but that it was become indispensable, that the latter should explain the nature and extent of his views, which would always be seconded, when not contrary to equity and our own interests; that, on the other hand, it was but reasonable the emperor should act in the same manner towards us, who could not become the blind and passive instruments of his ambition; that it was highly improper he should preserve only the shadow of an union with us, that he might call upon us in difficulties, and claim an aid when attacked, even though he might provoke the aggression, as, for instance, when he wanted to appropriate almost the whole Bavarian succession; that he could not reasonably pretend to act exactly as he chose, and make what alliances he pleased, for his own private interest, without any regard to our alliance and the advantages he had derived from it; that in short, as we had adopted his friendship and his enmities, it was but just he should do the same for us; and, above all, that he

should not refuse his reciprocity as to the Ottoman empire, which we held in the highest estimation.

" It is probable, so frank and categorical a declaration would have laid open the emperor's intentions, more certainly than our petty intrigues and weak complaints, which produced no effect; and it must be acknowledged, that if, as has been said, the court of Vienna, after availing itself of the chief benefit of our alliance, has acted ill towards us, we also have not been exempt from blame on our part, particularly as to the mission of baron Thugut; and that, if we have sometimes conceded too much to the emperor, we have at others darkly and insidiously opposed him, at the very time we were making protestations of the sincerest zeal; a wily and unjustifiable proceeding, which, readily discovered by the Austrian monarch, inspired him with that distrust, which is the true origin of his friendship with Russia. If we could not succeed in frustrating the measures above mentioned, France ought not at least to have remained a tame spectator of them, but should, either really or apparently, have endeavoured to ally herself with the Prussian monarch, who was sensible of the advantage of an union with us, for the security of his possessions against the two imperial courts,

Had Vienna still resisted this coercive means, the blame of the rupture had been imputed to the emperor, and not to France, and would have fallen on him alone; and the king being then at liberty to take whatever side he should think most proper for the interest of his crown, would have felt no regret, and incurred no reproach.

"The public were much displeased with M. de Vergennes, for not having prevented the archduke Maximilian, as he might have done, from being nominated co-adjutor of Cologne and Munster, in 1780; but it would be unjust to impute to this minister the increase of influence and power which this measure gave the house of Austria in Germany, if the king himself thought proper, in this instance, that policy should yield to the pleasure he felt in procuring a considerable establishment for the queen's brother, assured as he before was of the grand-mastership of the Teutonic order.

"In 1783, the emperor, without informing us of his engagements with Russia, wished us to join him in inducing the grand-signior to ratify various conditions, which the court of Petersburg, ever at variance with the Turkish monarch, *peremptorily* demanded, for what it called satisfaction. The French minister, instead of representing to the Austrian government, how

extraordinary it was, that, in contempt of our alliance, it should have taken upon itself a commission so revolting to the king, ordered our embassador at Constantinople to neglect nothing to obtain entire satisfaction for Russia. This despicable condescension, far from securing peace between Catharine II. and the Turks, immediately produced the invasion of the Crimea and the several countries adjacent. When the emperor made known to us the demands of his new ally, he did not conceal his own intention of seizing on Moldavia and Wallachia, as his share. Upon this, M. de Vergennes determined to authorise only a part of what was required of him, to leave the Russians to act as they would, but prevent the Austrian monarch from gaining any thing. This was well done, as far as it respected Austria; but the error of suffering the aggrandisement of Russia was not therefore lessened: yet he was heard to compliment himself on this arrangement, saying 'The emperor at least has gained nothing; and the satisfaction given the court of Petersburg, though it falls heavily on the Turk, is at least no way prejudicial to France:'—a singular mode of reasoning truly, not to be pardoned even in a tyro in politics, yet employed by a minister of long standing, with every mark of satisfaction, as if the displeasing and enfeebling an

ally, so useful as the Turks, were in reality no injury to us. We shall again discuss this extraordinary topic, under the article *Ruſſia.*

"As the conduct of France relative to the Dutch republic and the emperor has been already discussed under the former head, it would be superfluous to dwell on it here; but we cannot pass over in silence the extraordinary and unreasonable part which our court was at that time made to act in the events which produced the Germanic league, which was signed the 23d of July, 1785, by the king of Pruſſia, the king of England, as elector of Hanover, the elector of Saxony, and, successively, by several other of the German states. Though, by the treaty of Teschen, the court of Vienna had solemnly renounced all pretensions to Bavaria, it appears that it had not renounced the project of finally exchanging it for other possessions; for, on the 13th of January 1785, we find that count Lehrbach, the emperor's plenipotentiary at Munich, had induced the elector palatine to sign a treaty, by which he consented, that the Upper and Lower Bavaria, the Higher Palatinate, and the landgravate of Leuchstenburg, as well as the duchies of Neuburg and Sultzbach, should be ceded to Austria in exchange for the Netherlands, (excepting only the duchy of Luxemburg and county of Namur) and to

be called the kingdom of Austria or Burgundy. The court of Vienna further engaged, to pay three millions of florins to the elector and the duke of Deux-ponts, and to give up to them the advantages that were expected to result from the emperor's designs against the Dutch. When this treaty was on the point of being concluded, count Romantzof, the Russian envoy in Germany, required the duke of Deux-ponts to subscribe to it, giving him but eight days for consideration, and declaring at the same time, that, should he even refuse his consent, the exchange would equally take place, under the guarantee of France and Russia. To this the duke firmly replied, 'that he would never consent to an arrangement, as injurious to his family as to the empire, in which the concurrence of the king of Prussia and the Germanic body had been purposely avoided, though they were both interested in it as guarantees of the treaty of Teschen, the 8th article of which deprived the elector palatine of the right of disposing, at his will, not only of Bavaria, but of his other states.'

"The duke of Deux-ponts immediately dispatched couriers both to Berlin and Versailles, to remonstrate against the exchange itself, and the personal violence with which he was threatened. On receiving the declaration of the king of Prus-

sia, that he would oppose this arrangement with all his power, M. de Vergennes returned for answer, 'that the duke of Deux-ponts having refused his consent to it, the emperor would most probably give it up.' Our wise minister then proposed to the court of Vienna the abandoning the project, and afterwards vainly endeavoured to efface in the mind of Frederic the Great the profound impression it was calculated to produce: to which that monarch sent for answer, 'that the notice the duke of Deux-ponts had received incontestably proved, that France had not only been acquainted with the emperor's intentions, but had interested herself in their success; and the duchy of Luxemburg, as well as the county of Namur, were no doubt to have been the reward of its obligingness; that it was inconceivable how the French ministry could think this small acquisition a reasonable compensation for the increase of power which the possession of Bavaria would have given to Austria, and that it should have consented, with such facility, to sacrifice the interest both of France and of the empire; and, in short, that as the emperor's imperious pretensions to Holland made a part of the plan, it threw a light on the ambiguous and versatile conduct of the court of Versailles towards that republic, which it was its place to have supported with its whole power, instead of allowing

it, by being threatened by Austria, to increase the burthen of its debts by the preparations for war, which might have been so easily spared; that, with regard to Holland, France had imitated the unfairness of those lawyers who act at the same time for plaintiff and defendant; and that the weak and prevaricating system of our ministry evincing, that prudence no longer allowed the members of the empire to expect any support from the French government, it behoved Germany to take speedy and effectual measures to prevent the execution of the emperor's plan.'— These measures the king of Prussia took in reality, by forming the Germanic league, in which the king of England the more readily joined, as it was of consequence to him to make France odious, and prevent her aggrandisement by any dismemberment of the Low Countries; at the same time, perhaps, that, in the error committed by our ministry in the plan of the exchange of Bavaria, he discovered a probability, more or less remote, of once more bringing back the United Provinces to the old system of the Britannic alliance, from the weight which Prussia could easily give in the republic to the endeavours of the court of London.

" M. de Vergennes, having strove in vain to prevent the confederation of the principal states of the empire, seems to have imagined, that he could retrieve his errors by pretending himself

the utmost zeal for the formation of the Germanic league, which, by England taking a principal part in it, was perhaps still more calculated to injure France than the emperor, whom Great-Britain fears less than us. But the thing was done, and all M. de Vergennes' protestations and measures failed. He could then no longer remain ignorant, that, by his having inconsiderately joined in a project, as unjust as impolitic, he had given the finishing stroke to our losing what the discussions on Bavaria and the treaty of Teschen, by which they were terminated, had yet left us of our former influence and respectability in the empire, and of which the king of Prussia had the address to despoil us, and become himself the possessor. This monarch, giving a loose to his natural disposition, spared no measures against us; and, in June 1785, said to the same French general*, to whom the year before he had used the jest of the *something* to *drink* for the emperor, 'I do not comprehend your M. de Vergennes: though I have found his hand in the bag, he still pretends I am a visionary, and that the affair of Bavaria is but a dream of mine: he wants also to make me believe, that he does not like the emperor, whom, however, he was going to

* M. de Bouillé: again in the king's hand-writing.

strengthen in a most alarming manner, had I not opposed it; but you may assure this minister, that such is my attachment to France, that I could not avoid defending its interests on this occasion, as zealously as those of the Germanic body.'

RUSSIA.

"There are two principal points of disagreement between France and Russia, which render their interests irreconcileable:—1st. The court of Petersburg wishes to gain an influence in the empire, destructive of that which it so much imports us to maintain there. 2dly, Russia intends to invade a part, at least, of Turkey in Europe, if not to seize the whole. It is our business to oppose both these views, to the utmost of our power.

"From the reign of Peter the Great, Russia has been constantly intermeddling in the affairs of Germany; and the marriage of two of its princesses with princes of the empire was with no other view. During the war, produced by the alliance of 1756, between France and Austria, and to which the court of Petersburg also acceded, it was the ambition of the empress Elizabeth to become guarantee of the new system, which seemed likely to result from the conquests expected to be gained over Prussia and

its allies, by the union of the forces of France, Vienna, and Russia. It is evident, as has been before remarked, that all the influence of Russia in Germany could only be gained at our expence.

" The success of Catharine II. against the Turks, during the war which began at the close of the year 1768, and was terminated by the peace of Kainardji, the 10th of July 1774, proved to this sovereign, that she was at liberty to extend her dominions, by successive dismemberments of the Ottoman empire, as far as her inclination and power might prompt her. She has already given repeated proofs of their extent, and seems very well inclined to reiterate the productive experiment.

" It is necessary to examine, whether the French ministry ever took into consideration the two incontrovertible principles laid down at the beginning of this article.

" No other court had any share in the treaty of Kainardji, which was *a stab in the dark*. The Russian general, as conqueror, imposed whatever conditions he chose on the conquered vizier, whose army was entirely routed. But the obstacles which soon arose to their execution, gave reason to expect a new rupture between the two powers. France, which ought then to have used all her endeavours to dispel the storm which threatened Turkey, thought of

TABLE OF THE POLITICAL CONNEXIONS

EXISTING BETWEEN THE HOUSE OF BOURBON AND THE HOUSES OF AUSTRIA, GERMANY, AND SPAIN; BEFORE AND DURING THE REVOLUTION;

Illustrative of the History of the secret Struggle subsisting in the Court of LEWIS XVI. *between the* QUEEN'S *Party and the Opposition; wherein may be seen the Austrian Factions regularly organized during a Ministry actuated by French Principles, and the French Oppositions organised by the National Genius against the Ministries devoted to Austria.*

1574. ANTI-AUSTRIAN *diplomatic system* of Henry III., who inherited in this respect the politics of Francis I.

1589. *Anti-Austrian diplomatic system* of Henry IV., the conqueror of the league.

1610. *Austrian diplomatic system* of the widow of Henry IV.—Subjection of France to Spanish and Germanic Austria.—Disgrace of Sully and the old court.

1620. *Anti-Austrian diplomatic system* of Richelieu and Mazarin.—The thirty-years-war, from which resulted, 1st, the German protestant league, excited by France against Austria; 2dly, the conquest of Roussillon, Alsace, &c.—The adherence of Sweden and the secondary powers of Europe to this league, who necessarily became by this treaty the friends of old France.

1643. *Anti-Austrian diplomatic system* of Lewis XIV.—Union of all the political and military talents of his time to carry on the dismemberment of German and Spanish Austria, and deprive it of Spain, Burgundy, and a part of the Netherlands.

1718. *Austrian diplomatic system* of the regent.—Unnatural alliance between England and Austria.

1723. *Anti-Austrian diplomatic system* of Lewis XV. till the treaty of 1756.

1756. *Austrian diplomatic system* of the abbé Bernis and madame Pompadour. The abbé signs the first treaty of 1756 with Austria.

1758. *Austrian diplomatic system* of the duke of Choiseul, and the second treaty of 1758 with Austria. Its conspiracy against Frederic, and the existence of the Prussian monarchy.—Monstrous accession of Sweden, the empire, and Russia, to the alliance against Prussia.—Marriage of the dauphin with an archduchess, to strengthen the alliance of 1758.

1771. *Anti-Austrian diplomatic ministry* of the duke of Aiguillon, who inherited his great uncle's hatred of the house of Austria, and was the late dauphin's friend.

1774. *Anti-Austrian diplomatic ministry* of Vergennes, pointed out to the king by the late dauphin as a good Frenchman.

1792. *Diplomatic ministry* (accused as Austrian) of Montmorin and Lessart, successors to Vergennes in the department for foreign affairs.

1792. *Anti-Austrian diplomatic ministry* of Dumouriez, Servan, Roland, and Clavières.—The treaties of 1756 and 1758 cancelled.—The revolution declares war against Austria.

1792. *Diplomatic ministry* of Chambonas and St. Croix, and the continuation of the Austrian committees according to the denunciations of Brissot.—The Austrian and Prussian armies arrive at Châlons to the aid of the king and queen.

1793. *Diplomatic ministry* of Lebrun, suspected by the mountain to be Austrian.

AUSTRIAN *opposition* of the leaguers who directed the assassination of that prince.

Austrian opposition of the leaguers, and of the queen, born of an Austrian mother. It was this party who caused the king's assassination on the eve of his departure to form an anti-Austrian league.

Anti-Austrian opposition of the French princes and grandees, who took arms against the new principles of the regent.

Austrian opposition headed by the two queens, enemies to cardinal Richelieu.

Silent and respectful opposition of the jansenists, the secret friends of Austria.

Anti-Austrian opposition, and conspiracy of Lewis XIV.'s children, of Spain, and of the old favourers of the diplomatic system in France, against it.

Austrian opposition of madame Pompadour, corrupted by Maria Theresa (the empress queen), and the abbé Bernis, who sold his country to the court of Vienna.

A double opposition, the one anti-Austrian of the dauphin, the Richelieus, and the old friends to diplomacy; the other, the Austrian opposition of M. de Choiseul, who, inheriting no fortune, and wishing to raise one at the expense of France, by serving his relation Maria Theresa, thought the system of the abbé Bernis too little Austrian; and, overthrowing it, enjoyed his post, and condemned France to pay the expenses of the Austrian conspiracy against our natural friend the Prussian monarch.

Anti-Austrian opposition of the dauphin, father of Lewis XVI., poisoned by Choiseul (according to the Richelieu party).—Opposition of the duke of Aiguillon and the anti-Austrian diplomatic party, who, headed by this duke and marshal Richelieu, heirs to the politics of the cardinal, cause the exile of Choiseul.

Austrian opposition of the young dauphiness, who, educated by Maria Theresa in the hatred of the diplomatic principles of France, on the death of Lewis XV. sent the duke to Aiguillon, and shut up madame Dubarry in a convent.—The duke of Choiseul's opposition, who raised the jansenists and the parliaments against him, whom Aiguillon annihilates.

Austrian opposition of Maria Antoinetta, Choiseul, and the Lorraines.—Vergennes (according to his party) was poisoned for secretly opposing the definitive plans of Austria, on the entrance of the queen and her influence into the council.

Anti-Austrian revolution in France, and the first revolutionary opposition which burst out against the Austrian diplomacy. The systems of Montmorin, Lessart, and the anti-Austrian committee, denounced by Peissonnel, Brissot, the Girondists, and the Orleanists. Lessart sent to the high court of Orleans.

Austrian opposition of Maria Antoinetta and the court, who dismissed the jacobin ministry a few days before the 20th of june 1792, on the approach of the emperor's army to the aid of Lewis XVI.

Opposition and revolution of the 10th of August.—A republic.—The royal family confined in the Temple. They perish on the scaffold.—Montmorin and Lessart are massacred on the 2d of September.

Opposition of the Jacobins, by whom, during the revolutionary government, he is beheaded.

[*To face p.* 90. *vol.* V.]

nothing further than interposing its good offices: a most easy expedient, which, however, M. de Vergennes thought proper to celebrate as a stroke of genius, and which was accepted by Russia and the Porte. The former plainly saw, that as we confined ourselves to mere civilities, we were in no state to oppose her, but should be the first to engage the Turks to yield, without resistance, all she might require, even however unjust; for the dispute with the former was but ill founded on her side. Yet it was through our mediation, that, on the 21st of May 1779, a treaty explanatory of that of Kainardji was signed, by which Petersburg obtained the free navigation of the Black Sea, and the other seas which wash the Ottoman shore; the independance of the Tartars, of whom the grand-signior, who had before absolute power over them, was only to be the religious head; with an extreme diminution of the sovereignty of the latter in Moldavia and Wallachia, that were in future only to pay a small tribute to the Porte every second year. This arrangement disgusted the Turks, whom it plundered, and restored only an apparent and short-lived peace between them and Catharine II.; for this pretended explanatory convention was in reality nothing but a sacrifice extorted, from the sultan's weakness and from ours, by that empress, who was fully

determined to begin a new contest whenever it should suit her interest.

" The error which our ministry then committed soon involved it in serious inconveniences. The court of Petersburg, having no apprehensions on the side of Turkey, turned all its attention to the affairs of Germany. And the king of Prussia, finding, by the little vigour and sound policy we had shown concerning the Bavarian succession, which it was his interest to terminate as soon as possible, that he could depend on no effectual assistance from us, invited Catharine II., who still remained his ally, to interfere in the discussion of that affair. This sovereign hastened to satisfy Frederic, by an energetic declaration, productive of the greatest uneasiness in the court of Vienna, which was unable to support itself against the Prussians and Russians united. She also demanded a suspension of arms on the 4th of March 1779, and the mediation of the latter, who thus took part with France for the termination of the war. This association, which produced the peace of Teschen, was the more injurious to us, as it established a rival influence in the empire; an evil which might have been avoided, by our opposing, in the first instance, as strongly as the king of Prussia did, the vain pretensions of Austria to the Bavarian succession. In that

case, it is probable, that the Prussian monarch, who had too much penetration not to be aware of the danger of suffering a new influence to get footing in Germany, would have rather shunned than courted the Russians.

" It may be remembered, that it was in June 1780, a year after the peace of Teschen, that the emperor, disgusted with France, made advances to Catharine II. at Mohilof, by means of prince Potemkin, her favourite, whose influence he had secured. From this, in the month of August following, resulted a treaty, the conditions of which seem to be but imperfectly known, as is the case also with those of the alliance entered into between these two powers about the beginning of 1784. It would be superfluous to repeat here the reflexions which have before occurred on the supineness and want of foresight in our ministry, to whom the union of the two imperial courts soon gave the most serious alarm.

" Russia, notwithstanding the inconsiderate service we had done her, in extorting the agreement of the 21st of March 1779, from the Turks, far from showing any gratitude to us, rather affected to prevent our interference in her affairs with the Porte, on which she formed new schemes of conquest, which she prepared the way for by her negotiations, as well with the

khan of Tartary, as the heads of the nations in the Cuban and the sovereigns of Caralemia and Imerita, to all of whom the court of Petersburg was prodigal of promises, without intending to keep any of them; and at the end of 1782 they consented to yield, for ever, to Russia, the property of the countries they governed, though they were not themselves possessed of it. It is evident, that Catharine II. had demanded the independence of the Tartars, in 1779, only to subdue them herself; for we shall find, that their pretended liberty soon became the most dreadful slavery.

"Russia and Austria, having certain information of the indolence of the Turkish government, and of ours in its support, thought this a favourable opportunity for the execution of their ambitious plans. The empress, accustomed to seize every means of harassing the musselmen, compelled the Porte, on the 10th of June 1783, to sign a treaty of commerce, by which its interests were essentially injured; sending at the same time her troops into the Crimea, the island of Taman, and the Cuban. The inhabitants of these countries, finding they had been deceived, rose in arms to throw off the yoke of the Russians, who then treated them as rebels; and general Paul Potemkin, brother to the favourite, had the barbarity to put more

than thirty thousand Tartars to the sword, without distinction of age or sex; by which horrible massacre the usurpation of Russia was established.

"A short time before this period, the emperor had made known to us the intentions of Catharine, his ally, whom he was determined to assist, if necessary, with an army of a hundred and twenty thousand Austrians. Yet in this conjuncture, when France ought to have exerted herself with the utmost energy and activity, she thought not even of concerting measures with England, who could not see with indifference the exclusive trade of the Black Sea, and perhaps of the Levant, in the power of Russia. Had such a step produced no effect, it could have done no injury; but M. de Vergennes, far from making known the king's resentment, and opposing the Russian aggrandisement, by means which are ever within the reach of an able minister, was contented to prevent the emperor from obtaining Moldavia and Wallachia, at the expence of the unfortunate Turks, whom he exhorted to submit to circumstances, and give the empress satisfaction. Mr. Bulgakof, her envoy at Constantinople, at the end of 1783, remitted to the divan a memorial in her name, containing in substance as follows:—'That the just causes of offence she had re-

ceived from the Porte had determined her imperial majesty to take possession of the Tartar provinces; and that, to avoid a war, it was indispensably necessary that the sultan should ratify her possession of the Crimea, the Cuban, and the island of Taman, as well as consent to the abrogation of the third article of the peace of Kainardji, relative to the Tartars, and the three articles of the agreement of 1779 respecting the same nation; adhering in other respects to the stipulations contained in those treaties.' To this memorial Mr. Bulgakof annexed a plan conformable to his demands. After numerous meetings of the divan, and bitter complaints from its members, the French embassador obtained the following concession:—'That four of the sultan's ministers should sign, conjointly with the envoy of Russia, at Ainali-Carack, on the 28th of December 1783, O.S. (corresponding to our 8th of January 1784) a treaty consisting of three articles; importing, first, the cession in perpetuity of the Crimea, the island of Taman, and the Cuban; secondly, the confirmation of the treaties and agreements of 1774, 1775, and 1779, as well as the commercial treaty of 1783, excepting only some articles of the explanatory agreement of the 21st of March 1779, respecting the independance of the Tartars, which articles were an-

nulled: Russia securing and guaranteeing to the Porte the possession and property of the town and territory of Oczakof: Thirdly, that the river Cuban should be henceforward the boundary of the two empires.' The Turks thus saw themselves once more disarmed and despoiled, through the mediation of their most ancient ally, from whom they had a right to expect effectual succours, and not pusillanimous advice. Our minister put the last stroke to all his former faults, by allowing M. de St. Priest, the king's embassador at Constantinople, to receive, as the conclusion of the fatal treaty, besides considerable presents in money and diamonds, the blue cord of Russia, which completely exhibited him to the musselmen, rather as an agent of that formidable power, than of a court in friendship with them.

"At the end of the article England, it was said, that M. de Vergennes precipitated the signing the peace in January 1783, in order to be more at liberty to oppose the plans of Austria and Russia, whose friendly intercourse, which, with so much blindness, he had allowed to take place, announced a community of interests between the imperial courts, calculated to give us the greatest uneasiness; and that this minister contemptuously rejected the advice of his colleagues, who thought it but fitting to observe

to him, that he was exposing himself to the double inconvenience, of infringing the peace with Great-Britain, and of being henceforward unable to foresee the intentions of Vienna and Petersburg. To which he vauntingly replied, 'that the future would show the wisdom of his measures.' And what has been the result? The treaty of Ainali-Carack, perhaps more shameful and humiliating to us, than to the Turks.

"Our impolitic condescension to Russia and Austria may, if persisted in, draw on the destruction of the Ottoman empire, which is the only power on the north-east of Europe capable of restraining these two empires, as well by means of a long established influence in Turkey, as by the fear of those diversions which, whenever our cabinet shall be well directed, it will be in our power to make in favour of the sultan. The ruin of the Turks involves that of our Levant trade, which alone gives vigour to our southern provinces, and which is threatened with a decline from the advantages already gained by the Russians in the Black Sea, and what they may still force from the remaining parts of the Ottoman dominions. The influence of their malignant insinuations, combined with those of England at Constantinople, already perceptibly affects our commercial interests, and tends to destroy the remains of the influence of

France with the Turks, who very justly impute all their misfortunes to the weakness of our conduct.

" The empress of Russia, appeased by the acquisition of the Crimea, took every possible step to console the emperor at not having himself obtained any thing at the expence of the musselmen, and openly showed the utmost zeal for the interests of this monarch, by repeatedly urging the Dutch, in 1784 and 1785, to yield to his pretensions; while, by the exertion of her whole influence in Germany, she endeavoured to support his project of the exchange of Bavaria for the Austrian Netherlands; a plan which, as we have before observed, to the astonishment of politicians, M. de Vergennes himself approved.

" Although, from the character of Catharine II., which makes her prefer splendor to utility, Russia has not gained all the advantages from her new acquisitions which she might have done, it is not the less true, that—the Turks being enfeebled and humiliated, the Tartars subdued, and, consequently, the bounds of the empire enlarged, the frontier of New Servia become useless, and the troops which guarded it at liberty to act elsewhere; the Polish Ukraine, by being added to the Russian provinces, securing magazines of all kinds to carry on a war

either on the Danube or in Poland, in the latter of which the despotic influence of the court of Petersburg will always secure an abundant and easy subsistence for its armies; the arrangements that have taken place among the Cossacks, who supply already a good and numerous body of troops; the quantity of horses to be obtained from these new conquests, as well for recruiting the cavalry as for other operations of war—all these advantages, which are so many augmentations of power, allow us to pronounce, that Russia, whose ambition will certainly increase with her success, will not be long without re-entering the lists, either to give the last blow to the Ottoman empire, or obtain any other end it may desire. Yet our minister, who ought surely to have learned something from the humiliating lessons he has received, seems to take no step on the occasion, but perseveres in his accustomed inactivity.

"Though experience has demonstrated the balance of commerce to be almost always favourable to the Russians, yet France has been employed, ever since the year 1785, in a treaty of commerce with them, without considering that, in the first place, the arrangements to result from it, which will probably be illusive as to us, may complete the distrust of the Turks, who, when they shall see us allied in every way

to their bitterest enemies, may alter the whole system of our connexion with them; for, though we should even continue to protect the Ottoman empire against Russia and Austria, is it not probable that the latter, and even England, will, from other views, endeavour to excite the ill will of the Porte against us, either to favour their own pleasures, or secure for themselves the advantages at present enjoyed by us in the Levant? And, secondly, that the Dutch, and still more the English, who have been so many years in possession of the most lucrative branches of the Russian trade, will not quietly allow of our interference, but will successfully employ the various means within their power effectually to thwart us? It is possible, that a treaty of commerce with Russia may offer us, on the score of our marine, advantages, which we have hitherto derived from that country only at second hand; and this is a subject which deserves the most serious reflexion: but, it seems evident, that the most beneficial commercial relations we can enter into with the court of Petersburg must not at present be directed to its northern provinces, but to those it has recently taken from the Turks; since, by that means, if we do not ameliorate our commerce in the Levant, we shall at least maintain it on the same footing as it was before Russia had

invaded the Crimea, and obtained the free navigation of the Black Sea. The measures however to be taken require to be conducted with equal foresight, secrecy, and address; since there is no doubt the Russians would oppose our intentions, if aware of their tendency.

TURKEY.

" The explanations entered into with respect to this power, under the articles Russia and Austria, leave but little to be said of it here.

" The treaty of alliance of 1756, between France and Vienna, was scarcely signed, when the latter, who, as well as the Russians, are constantly employed in weakening our good understanding with the Turks, neglected no means of inspiring them with a distrust of us; to succeed in which, the two imperial courts have exaggerated sometimes our ready compliances, and sometimes the articles of their treaties with us, in order to alarm the Turks, and give the stamp of insincerity to our character; hoping, that if they succeeded thereby in wholly destroying the influence which France has long enjoyed there, she would be for ever excluded from all interference in the interests of the Ottoman empire; an interference which has so repeatedly given umbrage to Austria and Russia. These perfidious insinuations have pro-

duced very lamentable consequences, and must have had their effect in the attacks which we have allowed to be made on the Turks, particularly since the king's accession to the throne; for we may, in reality, be said to have abandoned them, in affording them no succours but our good offices, which imposed on nobody, and were only employed in engaging the musselmen to injure themselves for the benefit of the Russians, whom they held in abhorrence.

"It is certain that the victories of Catharine II. have infused a weakness and cowardice into the Turks, the more difficult to counteract, as their ignorance of every kind (which must be the case with a nation, that can make no progress in civilisation, from believing that all human wisdom is contained in a ridiculous book, which serves at once for its civil, military, political and religious code) leads us plainly to perceive, in the character, as in the government of this people, the inevitable symptoms of decline. Yet if the vast resources it still possesses, according to the testimony of those whom we have reason to think the best informed, were well employed, and well directed, by a friendly power like that of France, it is possible the lustre of the crescent might still revive, which has been perhaps eclipsed less from internal

causes than from the disastrous effects of our indolence, weakness, and impolicy.

"It is equally surprising, and worthy of remark, that the Ottoman empire never suffered greater losses, or severer humiliations, than it has experienced since the period in which the king confided the department for foreign affairs to M. de Vergennes, who, having been embassador from France to Constantinople, from 1755 to 1769, that is for fourteen years, ought to know better than any other person, the proper means of rousing the Turks, of setting them usefully in action, and making their alliance of real consequence to us, both in trade and politics. But, unfortunately, this minister's two successors at the Ottoman Porte * assure us, that they have not found in his dispatches the knowledge in Turkish affairs which was naturally expected from him; and they even accuse him of having frequently rejected the advantageous measures they have proposed; a reproach which many of our agents in foreign courts have in like manner charged him with.

INFERENCES.

"Whatever be the length of this memorial, it is by no means proportioned to the importance

* M. de St. Priest, and M. de Choiseul Gouffier.

of the matter of which it treats; it is confined to general information, since the task of exposing a number of capital errors was too disagreeable to be prolonged by dwelling on an innumerable variety of inferior omissions, sometimes little essential in themselves, but of which the whole mass acquires very considerable importance. Meanwhile, all that has been said, however indisputable, will perhaps fail of its end, unless a summary view be given of the consequences resulting from it.

"It would be in vain to attempt concealing the rapid decline of the credit, consequence, and even dignity of France; since, to be convinced of it, we have only to examine our political situation impartially. It is plain too, that the evil daily increases, from the little attention shown by foreign courts to the French monarchy, which has lost, they suppose, its weight and influence in the balance of Europe, and consequently the rank it held among the first powers, and will henceforward, or at least for a long time, act only a passive and inferior part on the political theatre.

"From what has been exhibited in the preceding articles, it may be inferred:

"1st, As to England, that the treaty of 1783 has not put on the respectable footing they

ought to preserve, either our American fisheries, or our existence in India; that the intent of the peace was therefore evidently frustrated; and that, by imprudently allowing ourselves to be drawn into a treaty of commerce with Great-Britain, the balance of which must be inevitably against us, we risk the essential injury, of our manufactures in general, and the total ruin of some of them.

" 2dly, That after having induced the United Provinces to break their engagements with the English, we shamefully gave up the republic to their resentment, by not supporting with proper energy its interests at the peace; that since, though we persist in its alliance, we neglect doing what is necessary to strengthen and make it useful to the two nations; that, in short, far from testifying to the Dutch an active and earnest zeal for their welfare, we have suffered the emperor to molest and despoil them; we suffer also Prussia to interfere in their internal concerns, sowing dissention, and appear to behold with a degree of apathy the intestine commotions by which they are torn, and for which we offer no remedy but barren wishes, timid or trifling advice, vain official declarations, and negotiations, alike ill devised and conducted, which can produce no good effect, unless to Great-

Britain, who hopes, and with reason, to see the republic once more under the yoke which was broken by the duke of Vauguyon.

" 3dly, That we have no alliance remaining beyond the Rhine, but that of the court of Vienna, which we are on the point of losing entirely, as it is already in part separated from us; that if it be to blame with respect to us, we also have to repent having inconsiderately refused the advantageous offers it made us; that, instead of entering into a candid explanation with this court, we have silently opposed it, by underhand measures, calculated to irritate it, at the very time that we behaved with the most reprehensible compliance in its unjust pretensions, or plans, that were injurious to us, as those of the Bavarian succession, the differences with Holland, and the exchange of Bavaria for the Netherlands, &c.; that we have committed the unpardonable error, of suffering the emperor to unite with Russia, without our having taken care to form at least a counterbalance to that union, by being on a good footing with the king of Prussia; that the indolence and versatility of our conduct and motives have lost us a part of our influence in the empire, which was so essential, from the pre-eminence it secured us there; that, from similar causes, our preponderance in Italy has, in like manner, declined,

particularly since the intrigues of the emperor at the court of his sister, the queen of Naples, which might have been timely prevented, have introduced there the Austrian system, instead of that of the house of Bourbon.

"4thly, That we have suffered Russia to gain an influence in Germany, destructive of our own; that, instead of effectively opposing the plans of invasion, formed by that power against the Turks, we have constantly required of the Turks to despoil themselves, for the aggrandisement of their enemy and our own; and that even now we are employed on a treaty of commerce with the court of Petersburg, which will be illusory, since the sole end which ought to be proposed by it is evidently wanting.

"5thly, That the confidence of the musselmen, and their long partiality for us, which is already sensibly diminished, may be destroyed, without return, by the weakness, inconsequence, and inability, which we have shown, and, it is to be feared, shall continue to show, with regard to the interests of the Ottoman court, the most useful perhaps of all our allies.

"It is of less consequence at present to count the number of instances in which the French ministers have mistaken their way, than to know how wide they are from the path they ought to pursue: but, by once more casting an eye on our

real situation, we shall become fully acquainted with the successive diminution of our influence and reputation; two most powerful means in politics.

" 1ſt, then, It is as distressing to be without allies, as it is humiliating to have lost them by our own fault, or to have none but such as are equivocal, in whom we can place no trust, and who show us nothing but disrespect and suspicion.

" 2dly, The more instability and weakness we have shown in our measures, the more has the desire, really laudable and wise, which we have always shown for peace, been imposed on, by disrespect towards ourselves, and by harassing and plundering our allies, by means even of our own hands.

" 3dly, The French cabinet have been equally defective in their views, and wanting in foresight, energy, and activity; they have long been unable to conceal the extreme mediocrity of their talents, or to supply the qualities indispensably neceſſary in those who would govern well, by a pretended prudence or circumspection, which is only weakness badly disguised; by a timid routine, which has dictated so many dispatches and memorials in a familiarity of style, at once prolix and enigmatical, equally insignificant in their expression and effect, and

which the great Frederic used jestingly to call *the Versailles' narcotics*; meanwhile their paltry manner of conducting business has not been exempt from craft, for the uprightness and fidelity of our minister are as little respected as his talents.

" 4thly, The French cabinet have neither foreseen in time, nor seasonably given rise to any events, but have been almost always servilely impelled by those which have occurred; the sole resource of M. de Vergennes' capacity, and his favourite mean, consisting in the power of inaction.

" 5thly, It cannot be said, that the causes of the decline of our political existence have originated in too rigid an economy; for, by comparing the annual expences of M. de Vergennes with those of his predecessors in the department for foreign affairs *, it will be proved, that no

" * By comparing the expences of the department for foreign affairs, from the end of 1758 to that of 1770, during the administration of the duke of Choiseul; and from 1771 to 1774, when the duke of Aiguillon was at the head of affairs, with the expenditure during the administration of M. de Vergennes, from 1774 to the present day; we shall be surprised to find, that this minister, in war as in peace, has constantly spent more than either of his predecessors, the former of whom was by no means reckoned an economical minister. M. de Choiseul, before the period of his disgrace, had fixed the expences of his department, for 1771, at seven millions, which was even still further reduced, in 1773, by the duke of Aiguillon,

to

minister has expended so much money, with so little external show and dignity: from which it may be inferred, that, to all the other errors of his administration, may be added, that of secret squandering.

"6thly, The experience of twelve years affords the most indisputable proof, that the political system adopted by M. de Vergennes is as erroneous in the whole, as deficient in its parts; incapable of producing any thing either useful or honourable to the French name; so narrow, trivial, and confined, that it would be too circumscribed for even the principality of Liege, or the petty republic of Ragusa, and, of course, incomparably more so for a vast and absolute monarchy like France, which has accordingly, with all its resources, immense as they are, sunk into the second rank among the European powers.

to six millions; while M. de Vergennes has never employed less than ten, in times of profound peace (excepting in 1776, when the expences did not exceed eight millions 750,000 livres); and during the war, from 1778 to 1783, this sum was frequently more than doubled. In the above calculation, the subsidies, or other similar extraordinary expences, are not comprehended, nor the sixteen millions, which France, in the peace of 1763, agreed to pay to England, for the support of our sailors, prisoners in the war of 1756."

[*This note was added to the memorial on a separate piece of paper.*]

" 7thly, When ill-conducted, pusillanimous, and lethargic measures have plunged a state into the dangerous situation in which we are thrown, nothing can be more urgent, than to rouse it from its stupor, and to apply a remedy to the evil, after having maturely considered in what way to proceed, that it may act in future with that confidence, consistency, firmness, and particularly that perfect good faith, by which only the true confidence of other nations is to be obtained.

" The limits prescribed to this work, will not allow us to enter into a detail of expedients, proper for reforming, or rather totally altering, the defective system of politics followed by our court since the year 1774. Besides, such are the usurpations now meditating by the emperor and Russia, and so small is the power of France to withstand them, that she has perhaps no way left to escape, being herself involved in them, but that of dividing with the strong the spoils of the weak, taking afterwards the precautions necessary to avoid being a second time in so undesirable and disgraceful a situation. *The Reflexions on the present State of the Politics of Europe* * seem to contain the least objectionable ideas on what may be proposed under

* See this article, N° 3, at the end of the volume.

the existing circumstances, though many of them are at variance with the principles of sound policy and vigorous equity: but it is to be remembered, that we are in a violent and forced state, which leaves us scarcely at liberty in the choice of our means."

CHAP. II.

M. de Vergennes' Ministry—Relative Situation of the Queen and M. de Vergennes—Situation of that Minister between two opposite Parties; that of the Duke of Aiguillon, who projected the Ruin of the Queen, and that of the Duke of Choiseul, who had made her the Tool of his Ambition—M. de Vergennes temporises with every Opinion, and veers with every Faction—He is resolved to die in Office.—Plan of the Aiguillon Party against Maria Antoinetta—Progress of the national Hatred against her.

IF the foregoing picture of M. de Vergennes' administration, which is preserved here as a monument of patriotism and disinterestedness, be deserving the attention of every Frenchman, who wishes to know the political interests of the state, the truth of history also requires, that we should exhibit him as the minister of a weak monarch, governed by an artful woman, ever bold and watchful for the interests of the emperor.

It might, perhaps, have been possible to have reclaimed this princess to a sense of her true interest, to have attached her to a nation become her sole support, to have shown her, that, without any benefit to herself, she would only be the blind instrument of the ambition of

the court of Vienna, while, as queen of France, and in possession of many qualities agreeable to that nation, she might labour with honour for her own welfare and happiness and the ultimate benefit of her children. The Austrian hatred, which filled her heart in 1788, could not have existed there in 1774, the first year of M. de Vergennes' administration. She could at that time have had no prejudices against the French, but what she might have imbibed from infancy, or during her education. The affair of the ceremonial at her nuptials could have only given her disgust as to a few individuals, or at most a few families, whom it was still in her power to see at her feet, and in her court. But this unfortunate princess, instead of being surrounded with true Frenchmen, whose salutary advice might have saved her, had placed her confidence in M. de Choiseul's party, whose aim was to restore that minister to office, at the expence of M. de Vergennes. Here originated the evil.

The latter, meanwhile, saw all his actions observed by one or other of the two opposite parties, who constantly surrounded him, which prevented him from displaying that dignified tone, which the department for foreign affairs so naturally requires. The party of Richelieu and Aiguillon, though humbled by the fall of the latter, and the return of the parliament, had

still great power at court; and this party disliked the passiveness of M. de Vergennes, his adherence to the existing system of Europe, and his political indifference with respect to Frederic II. On another side, the duke of Choiseul's party equally opposed that of the Richelieus, and M. de Vergennes, and constantly harassed this minister with sarcasm, ridicule, and the most virulent accusations. Whatever line of conduct he pursued, he was sure to see one, if not two parties, rise up against him: sometimes he was persecuted in every way; while no one of his plans, treaties, or negotiations, throughout Europe, escaped opposition from some power or other, as must unavoidably happen to the political measures of a great state like that of France. Thus situated, M. de Vergennes found himself compelled to treat with all systems, and veer with all parties, in order to avoid a continental war, the precipice fatal to almost every minister who declares it himself, or allows it to be declared. M. de Vergennes was greatly attached to his post; "I have sworn," said he, "to live and die a minister." This was the chief error of his government. Had he possessed more firmness of character, by following the policy of Richelieu, he might have succeeded in having the queen confined at Val-de-Grace, or might have sent her back to her brother, and

declared war against Austria, on the first idle insult in which that power should indulge itself; as she defied him to do in the affairs of Cologne, Bavaria, and the Scheld. The queen was vulnerable only through the heart of the king, whom it was necessary to attack on the weak side, of his filial attachment to his name and ancestors. But M. de Vergennes was unable to navigate in so stormy a sea; though the plan was no new one, for it had been conceived by the duke of Aiguillon, and was known to, and at that time disclosed to me by, a man of great skill and political knowledge belonging to one of the duke of Vauguyon's embassies; a plan, in which the duke might have induced the court to concur, had he remained in the ministry, and which was known to the Choiseul party, who, in 1774, endeavoured to undermine it, and constantly put the queen on her guard against it. The nature of things afterwards effected, what intrigues had failed to produce; and the queen, by striving against the sense of the nation, already made violent by her conduct and politics, so inimical to its interests, became in reality one of the most immediate and active causes of the revolution. "We lie-by for the queen," said the Aiguillon party, "when she is forty years old, and when the king will be taken with some young beauty.

Who then will support a favourite, the queen's natural enemy, if not the party of Aiguillon?" The queen never reached that period; the complaints of the French, some advantages gained by the emperor in Europe, his mysterious journies into France, together with her influence and his own ambition, accelerated the fatal moment which united against her, resentment, hatred, revenge, and every accusation the most atrocious.

In this situation, which became every day more critical, the queen compelled the French nation, by every means which her character, her credit, and her intrigues could command, to show so much respect to the new system of foreign politics, that the old systems of the cabinet were no longer remembered, but by a few of the principal families, the Richelieus, Aiguillons, Broglios, and Vauguyons; and a few able individuals of the diplomatic party, such as Favier and Peysonnel, who were obliged to conceal their principles, or risk every possible disgrace, while the Austrian system continued to prevail in France, supported by those in power, the count of Vergennes excepted, who was hourly employed in preventing its encroachments. It has been seen, that Joseph II. blushed not in these circumstances to exact from France either a sum of money, or the

opening of the Scheldt; nor to seize on Bavaria, which he would perhaps have retained, but for the declaration of Frederic II. who possessed more energy on the verge of the grave, than M. de Vergennes at an age best fitted for business. Joseph II., depending on the busy and intriguing temper of the queen, and the imbecillity of M. de Vergennes, established the archduke Maximilian in an important post at Cologne, and was desirous of being the instrument of England in the dissolution of the natural coalition of France and Spain during the colonial war. In like manner he ventured on a project for the dismemberment of our most faithful friend, the Ottoman Porte; and, by his confederacies, factions, and intrigues, and the assistance of his sister, made such good use of M. de Vergennes' dread of a war with the empire, while France was governed by a daring and Austrian queen, that he gained more by the apprehension in which he kept us, than by all the victories he obtained over us. Hence originated the resentment of the French to the queen; her situation in France being that of a foreigner, who compelled the French to act contrary to their natural character, to sacrifice the principles and politics of their ancestors, and to be silent upon subjects in which their dearest interests were involved, from the con-

fidential minister of Lewis XVI. to the lowest of his clerks. Hence, in short, the burst of discontent, so general and so natural, against Maria Antoinetta, which took place in 1787, 1788, and the subsequent years.

It is time to bring together, in a regular and digested form, the results of the struggle which had taken place in France between the system of politics of the house of Bourbon and the Austrian system, which the queen maintained with all her might, and so successfully, that our cabinet was believed to be totally subjected to that of Vienna, which was the cause in reality, and the pretence of the first revolutionary insurrections.

CHAP. III.

Connexion of M. Vergennes' Ministry and System, relative to the House of Austria, with the prior and subsequent Systems.—View of the general Result of the Formation of an Austrian Party in France, during the Reign of the Bourbon Dynasty, and a French opposite Party.

THE future tranquillity of the French and Austrian nations depends so much on a thorough knowledge of the general system of their past relations, that it is the duty of a good Frenchman, to bring them minutely to light, that it may be seen, on what basis the repose and destinies of the two nations are founded. Sooner or later, republican France will sign a peace with the head of the house of Austria, the only European power that can put its forces in the balance against ours; and hence we may safely pronounce, that if the future relations of the too powers, to whom the revolution may have respectively revealed the secret causes of their disagreement, are not more favourable to their mutual peace, than when they were rival monarchies, our descendants may expect calamities of more than one kind. Let us then present to the two nations the picture of their

past miseries, and let us hope, that the cabinets of Paris and Vienna will come to a resolution favourable to their respective tranquillity, and will acknowledge the necessity of having recourse to some rule of conduct, hitherto neglected; since their friendship and their enmities have been alike so mutually prejudicial.

From the series of facts enumerated in the table annexed to this chapter, it follows:

1st, That before the year 1789 there had taken place in the house of Bourbon three marriages with Austrian princesses, three regencies, and six kings, three of whom were assassinated by Damiens, Ravillac, and Clement, and one conducted to the scaffold. Lewis XIII. and Lewis XIV. only died peaceably in their beds. These crimes were the works of the two systems, which, for the last two centuries, distracted the administration of the government.

2dly, That for two centuries there has been in France, either an Austrian diplomatic system pervading the government, or an opposite French diplomatic system. But in the first of these cases, there always existed at the same time a most violent national opposition; and in the second, an Austrian opposition, directed by the court of Vienna.

3dly, That in this series of kings and dauphins, it is a French opposition that has ha-

rassed or destroyed the head of the government, constantly suspected of becoming Austrian; as in the trial, for instance, of the last king and Maria Antoinetta; the assassination of Lewis XV. by Damiens; the conspiracy of Cellamarre, and the armed opposition against Mary of Medicis.

4thly, That at the times of political re-action, in a contrary sense, an Austrian organised faction existed in France, conspiring against the French government, whenever it supported the interest and ancient principles of the nation, as in the reign of Henry III. Henry IV. Lewis XIII., &c.

5thly, That if it were dangerous to the French government to be hurried into an Austrian party or system, it was still more so for it to espouse its principles, the state being then opposed by the state, as under Maria Antoinetta; in the decline of Lewis XVth's reign; under the regent; Mary of Medicis; and all that has been vicious or feminine in the government for the two last centuries; for it was only in such circumstances that the house of Austria could ever succeed in establishing its systems in our cabinet.

6thly, That the Austrian opposition, organised in France against our territorial diplomacy, has been constantly an artificial compound of

confederacies, factions, conspiracies, and turbulent associations against the French government; while the French opposition against the government, when become Austrian, was always a national and natural business, founded on the most genuine diplomatic knowledge, and on principles that are eternal and invariable, on which depends the preservation of the state, whether under a monarchy or a republic; for they are the cementing bond of every society existing in the whole extent of territory comprehended between the Rhine, the Ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, whatever form the government may assume.

7thly, That the means employed by Austria to establish the Austrian factions in France were: 1st, the marriages of its archduchesses: 2dly, the influence and profligacy of those archduchesses, become queens of France: 3dly, the regencies of the princes of the blood, and the widows of kings*: 4thly, the unprincipled and depraved in those regencies, of which not one was ever distinguished for national spirit: 5thly, the malcontents of all periods: 6thly, the cardinal ministers, such as Dubois, Bernis, Loménie, and the king's mistresses, as madame Pompadour, &c.

* With the exception, however, of the widow of Lewis XIII. who, when regent of France, appears to have faithfully made war against her own house.

8thly, That during the monarchy, Austria, for two centuries, was acting upon a regular and well-combined system against us. This consisted in encouraging attempts against France, whenever the cabinet was anti-Austrian, and in ruining our ministers and their advocates, who were inimical to its interests. From the year 1757, all our ministers, one or two excepted, have been banished, imprisoned, or executed. The court of Vienna has long adopted with respect to us the deep-laid plan of the prince of Kaunitz, in whom, for forty years, its confidence was reposed—the profound, the immortal, the creative Kaunitz, who, without committing a single error, has brought about, in that period, the following important events. In 1750, he metamorphosed the *French* court of Versailles into an *Austrian* court: he organised the Choiseul party there, which prevented the anti-Austrian reign of the dauphin, and degraded and pursued to destruction the party of Richelieu: he gave us Maria Antoinetta: in 1757, he formed a league against Frederic, that was calculated to extirpate that monarch: he effected the dismemberment of Poland: and lastly, but for the violence of Joseph II. he would probably have obtained the opening of the Scheldt, and secured to him Maestricht and the sovereignty of Bavaria.

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In France, on the contrary, during a similar period, anterior to the revolution, we find a series of ignorant, ineffective, and unpatriotic ministers, succeeding each other like Chinese shadows.

Austria, for forty years, wisely supported the prince of Kaunitz, who had a plan to act upon, which he maintained against the attacks of Frederic II. and the other contemporary powers; while we, who had for many ages a French diplomatic system to govern us, have in a few years degraded and destroyed it. The old anti-Austrian system had given compactness to our territory, and enriched its finest provinces at the expence of the court of Vienna: the Austrian system, on the contrary, introduced into our cabinet, has torn from us the long-established alliance of Poland, and put Turkey in danger.

9thly, That the Austrian power finds itself, 1st, in a state of decline, since the extinction of the Spanish branch: 2dly, that its whole external policy, as far as respects us, is confined to defending itself against this gradual but evident decline of its power: 3dly, that its remaining strength is still formidable to France, from the immense military population it can command, as has been proved in the war of the revolution: 4thly, that Austria is also in a state of decline with regard to Prussia, victo-

rious and successful in the war of 1740; again victorious in the seven-years-war; and in 1774 and 1793 sharing in the division with her resulting from the war in Poland.

10thly, That a peace, which should leav the court of Vienna in possession of its remaining population, would be a peace by which the republic and Prussia would remain exposed to the same dangers in future, with the same population to be subsidised by England against us, and new expectations and means to the remaining branches of the house of Bourbon; beside an infinite variety of contingent circumstances. All which has been here said of Austria, relative to France, may be applied to that power relative to Prussia, who might, in the present war, have seized upon and kept Bohemia, had it been desirous so to do, by persuading Russia it was her interest to balance Prussia against Austria, by an equality of power.

11thly, That England, by her organising at the time of peace a slow, gentle, gradual, and almost insensible bankruptcy; by imitating our past vices, in the art of paying the national debt, and abolishing paper-money; will, in eight years of reduction, reform the palliated bankruptcy, restore her affairs, and, at the end of that period, find in the house of Austria a mili-

tary population still at command, and sufficiently numerous for the recommencement of war, unless France and Austria, struck by the picture of their past calamities, shall come to a resolution, never to be departed from, to avoid, in future, all subjects of dispute.

From all these consequences, flowing out of the political organisation of France, Austria, and England, it farther results:

12thly, That we must either destroy the association of the subsidising system of England in the military one of Austria, or that this alliance will continue to harass us; since a peace signed at the gates of Vienna will not be the result of conversion and repentance, but of force and terror, of which the carrying on the war to such an extremity is a convincing proof.

13thly, That during the memorable epochs of the 18th century, in which France and Austria have been allied in a manner offensively and defensively, England through jealousy, and Prussia through fear of this preponderating alliance, armed and leagued against us as in the seven-years-war; while the secondary powers, taking alarm, lost their natural confidence in the great nation, the protector of the weak, and France receded from its rank in Europe.

14thly, That, contrarywise, France being attached to the powers only second in considera-

tion, obliged Austria and England to suffer the same evils.

In short, France being the ally of the Turks, Swedes, Danes, Prussians, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, and Naples, kept Austria within bounds, could attack it in all parts, and dismember it either for her own advantage or that of her allies. On the contrary, Austria become the ally of the French, has twice dismembered Poland, has threatened the Turks, and continued its plan of aggrandisement. In the situation in which it stands, at the moment I am writing, after the treaty of Campo Formio, it has acquired in Poland and Italy possessions nearly equal to what it has lost elsewhere, and is become too a maritime power, the territory and ports of Venice having been bestowed on it.

Such has been the end of the struggle between the two systems, particularly that of the house of Bourbon, who gained the two kingdoms of Spain and Naples from Austria, as well as twenty provinces, without losing, in the course of two hundred years, a single foot of ground; but it performed this by harassing and wearing out the nation, and hastening its ruin, from the animosities and wars that ensued. May this retrospect prove a lesson to the two governments! May the good genius of France

and Austria, at length, enlighten these powers, by showing them the danger of trusting their interests in the hands of men like our Belleisles, Choiseuls, Aiguillons, Brissots, and Mirabeaus; and the necessity of distrusting every minister who shall delight in dissension and war! May their better destiny give to France and Austria rather Fleurys and Vergennes, men cautious and circumspect as to foreign politics, a branch of administration that requires, for the repose of the two nations, a calm and observing mind! And may you, my countrymen, affected by the melancholy picture I have drawn, agree with me in exclaiming, that if, for ages past, our treaties of peace have been truces only, it is time, at last, that we should think of the consequences so destructive to the two nations, of these wars and animosities!

ANALYTICAL TABLE

OF THE

ANARCHY INTRODUCED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE DURING THE REIGN OF LEWIS XVI.

Wherein is exhibited the destructive Alternation of the French Administrations of the Department of Finance counteracted by an Anglo-Genevese Opposition, and the Anglo-Genevese Administrations counteracted and overthrown in their turn by the French Oppositions; with the Proscriptions of both Parties.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE FINANCES OF FRANCE.	OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FINANCES.
1774. FRENCH *administration* of the finances by M. Turgot, after the general plans of Sully, Vauban, and the economists; intended to perfect the system of receipt of a great agricultural nation.	OPPOSITION of the Anglo-Genevese system of Mr. Necker, who, in concert with his other enemies, contributed to the fall of Turgot.
1776. *Anglo-Genevese administration* of the finances, by Mr. Necker, the author of the system of loans and transfers, the father of jobbing, and the inventor of the English system, publication of the accounts, &c.	*French opposition* of the old finance and the Turgot party, who alternately and mutually attack his doctrine, particularly that relative to the nature of the receipt.
1783. *French administration* of M. de Calonne, who proposes to the notables the plan of Vauban, of Sully, and the economists, on the subjecting all lands to the impost, and on the improvement of the receipt.	*Open opposition of the Anglo-Genevese system of Mr. Necker* by the notables and parliaments assembled. They prevent the execution of Calonne's system of receipt, and attack this minister on his errors in the expenditure. He is succeeded by the archbishop of Toulouse, who, sinking under the weight of affairs, points out to the king Mr. Necker, the head of the opposition, for his successor.
1788. *Anglo-Genevese administration* of the finances during the second ministry of Mr. Necker.—Continuation of the system of the publicity of the accounts.—Democratic organisation and formation of the states-general.	*French opposition* manifested on the first opening of the states-general.—Opposition of the plans of Montesquiou to those of Mr. Necker, who finally retires to Coppet.
1790. *French administration* of the finances, according to the plans of Montesquiou, who obtained the leading influence in the committee of finances in the national assembly.	*Anglo-Genevese opposition* of the jacobins, Clavières, Brissot, and their associates. Clavières and Brissot obtain a decree of accusation against Montesquiou, who is compelled to emigrate.
1792. *First Anglo-Genevese ministry* of Clavières, a revolutionist deputed from Geneva in 1782, by the military orders of M. Jaucourt, commanding the armies of Lewis XVI. before that city—a refugee in England in 1783—a distributor of the English subsidy of fifty thousand pounds sterling, granted to the Anglo-Genevese revolutionary party banished from Geneva by France—a colleague in the committee of administration of this subsidy with d'Ivernois, and four other exiled Genevese, lord Grenville, and eleven other Englishmen, members of the privy-council of George III., or of the parliament—named minister of the finances in France, in consequence of a secret treaty concluded between the court and the Brissotins.	*French opposition*, consisting of the Feuillans party, attached to the constitution of 1789, and the royalist party of the ancient school.
1792. *Ephemeral ministry* of Beaulieu, and Leroux-Laville.	*Anglo-Genevese opposition* of the party of Clavières and Brissot. They direct the motions of the 20th of June and the 10th of August against the government.
1792. *Second Anglo-Genevese ministry* of Clavières, elected by a majority of the Brissotins in the legislative body, after the 10th of August.	*Opposition of the royalists of the ancient régime.—Opposition of the mountain* till the 31st of May. Clavières, confined in a dungeon, destroys himself, to avoid being executed, on hearing that the aristocratic party of Geneva, whom he had hurled from the government in 1782, had sent to Robespierre and Fouquet-Tinville an extract of the instrument by which George III. named Clavières administrator of the subsidy of fifty thousand pounds sterling.
1794. *Administration* of Cambon and his committee—its influence on the regulation of the finances—his endeavour to preserve the imaginary value of the assignat—he conducts the war with four thousand millions of livres for several years.	*Opposition of the Anglo-Genevese party* of the Brissotins, Johanot, &c.—Cambon is outlawed in his turn.
1795. *Anglo-Genevese administration*—plans, reports, and influence, of Johanot, the Genevese, member of the convention, and one of the notables in the committee of finance, the only one of the national convention allowed by his countryman d'Ivernois to have any probity—he contributes to the bankruptcy of the paper currency—favours the exportation of species, and all the opinions of the Anglo-Genevese system. During this administration, England admits as a fact, that there is scarcely any species remaining in France; and in principle, that France will be ruined the instant of the depreciation of its paper currency.	

[*To face p.* 107. *vol.* V.]

CHAP. IV.

While Austria gives Inertness to the Department of our Foreign Politics, the English Systems revolutionise our Finances.—Table exhibiting a View of the French Administration under Lewis XVI, opposed by the Anglo-Genevese Administrations, and the Anglo-Genevese ones opposed by the French.—Considerations on these Oppositions in the Financial Department.

THE politics of France have been hitherto exhibited as palsied by the influence of the queen, the chief instrument in the hands of Austria, during the whole reign of Lewis XVI., for depressing our energy to the advantage and furtherance of the projects of that power.

In the present chapter will be seen the finances of France subverted and desolated by the several Anglo-Genevese administrations.

It was the fate of Lewis XVI., that, during his reign, the nation, ever confident and credulous, strong from the consciousness of its power, should be seen putting its trust in strangers, who boldly exhibited their plans for the public prosperity, undertaking to ameliorate its lot, abolish abuses, and enrich and regenerate the nation. Such was the system held out by the

four administrations of Necker and Claviere, and the other Genevese, all burning with zeal for the reform of ancient France, and all destined to be its scourges and destroyers.

The first, not contented with the real wealth of the country, which had provided for the splendor and the wars of Lewis XIV., as well as the dilapidations of his successor, delivered over the nation to the pest of bankers and their loans, overthrowing the structure of the finances, and despising the *trivial resource* of the revenue, as well as the well-tried system of loans, secured by the assignment of the imposts. In his second ministry, he brought things to such a point, that France, by the subversions made under his first administration, lost all her credit, without retaining even the ephemeral one of the bankers, which, of course, was a credit of circumstance, depending on the power of the minister to whom it had been granted, and who had not been able to retain his office. Lewis XVI. was thus become the mere sport of the criminal or ignorant plans of his ministers, and Mr. Necker convoked the states-general, to advise on the means of satisfying his engagements for forty millions of increased annual expenditure, and the dilapidations of his successors.

It was written in the book of fate, that there

should never be wanting a Genevese ministry under Lewis XVI., or that, when expelled, it should still continue to disturb the kingdom. The second Genevese, who was also for reforming France, was originally in the opposition, but contrived to rise to the head of the administration. I mean Claviere.

This celebrated adventurer began to make himself known at Geneva in the anarchy of 1783. At that period banished from thence by Lewis XVI., one of the three sovereigns who mediated the peace, he and his party raised an interest in the court of London, whom in the next chapter we shall see recruiting all the banditti and malcontents of Europe, to make way for the revolution. Escaped from the desks of the British ministry, we find him proposing to the jacobins the doctrine of the assignats, and the demolition of all the institutions of France Comprehended with Brissot, the companion of his adventures, misfortunes, and disgraces, he offered the queen, in a plot of the Girondists, the alternative of risking against herself a national accusation for the forging of assignats, or of placing him in the ministry; and such was the terror both of the king and his consort, that this adventurer, who had been banished from Geneva in 1783, after having been accused by the army of the combined powers, and their

leader, of having intended to blow up that city by gunpowder, became, in 1792, actually the minister of Lewis, then a prisoner in the Thuilleries, against whom, however, on the 20th of June, he directed the efforts of the mob of St. Anthony, and prepared the way for the 10th of August. Such was still the fatality attending France, that both Necker and Claviere, twice displaced by the wishes of the nation, were also twice restored to the ministry.

A third Genevese, less celebrated than the two former, ventured to appear on the scene, but at a period when England, victorious at sea, was destroying our internal security by the execution and success of all its plans. In the third year of the republic, France had neither a financial minister, nor any administration. Vile committees of finance spread devastation through the country by bankruptcies, disowned by the good faith of the nation. It was in these circumstances, that Johanot obtained his influence in the committee of finances of the convention. On one hand, he beheld England boasting, that the specie of France was nearly exhausted: our magazines of corn were still full, the scarcity was only factitious; and Johanot proposed parting with the remaining specie to get bread from without, when the stupid and senseless Bourdon de l'Oise detected him. D'Iver-

nois, who supposed there was no man of purity in the convention but Johanot, professed at London the doctrine, that France is lost the instant of the fall of assignats; and Johanot, by his influence in the committee of finances, accelerates that fall.

To confine myself at present to the explanation of one part only of the plans of the Genevese ministers, it will be sufficient to observe, that they have all one object in common relative to our finances. Necker advances, in his writings, that the abundance of specie in France is not effectively an abundance of wealth; Claviere, that our wealth consists in our assignats; and Johanot, who favoured the exportation of specie, contributes to the degradation of the very paper, which is, at London, said to be our last resource: so that each seemed to emulate the other in destroying the basis of our wealth, whether national or provisional. The first opposed the system of loans to that of taxation; the second paper money to real money; and the third, desirous of exporting specie, contributed to lower the value of its substitute.

But what was the result of the measures and systems of these three foreigners? The first left France, with an increase of forty millions in its annual expenditure; the second, becoming a party with Mirabeau, brought us to the issuing

of forty thousand millions of assignats; while the third contributed to the organisation, as to these assignats, of a fraudulent bankruptcy. Such was the result, nor could it be otherwise, of the introduction, so dangerous, of the Anglo-Genevese systems in the heart of our affairs.

The French nation did not bear without complaint the anarchical proceedings by these ministers in the receipt of our finances; and the patriotic resistance to their plans was always in proportion to the ambition they manifested to interfere in our concerns. The two administrations of Necker, and the subsequent ones of Claviere, did not insult with impunity the principles of taxation established in France for the maintenance of her government. We have already seen the intrigues and efforts of the opposition, consisting of all ranks of men, which was raised against the administration of M. Necker in 1781. We have seen also the miserable end of Claviere, and the resentment which burst out in 1792 against the evil tendency of his first administration. As to the third, confounded in a revolutionary administration and committee, the obscurity of his retreat is equal to that of the progress of his ambition.

The ministers who were in office between the administrations of Claviere and Necker, never failed also opposing the dangerous or baneful

tendency of their principles. The more the three Genevese had forced the nature of our receipt from its natural bent, the more the French financiers were engaged in perfecting it. Turgot, who had been mistaken in his views, was followed in his errors by Necker himself. Calonne, who, after Necker, obtained great reputation, employed himself anew in improving the receipt; and Mr. Necker, under pretence of defending a book already condemned, exerted against his plans the whole force of his genius. Thus the Genevese financiers were, at all times, the declared enemies to the nature of our receipt, which, rising from the product of our soil, gives us a superiority over all other nations; while that of England, who alone, in this respect, can pretend to rival us, is wholly artificial, depending, not on the seasons, but on the result of its national industry.

The same plan of finance, so foreign and hostile to our real wealth, was brought to act also against our revolutionary paper. No sooner had Clavière established it on the ruins of the system of real specie, than this revolutionary expedient, which was suggested by England and her partisans, was destroyed by other partisans of the English system. One man whom, as well as his associates, posterity stigmatis-

with the most heinous revolutionary actions and opinions, had at least the morality to guard this temporary wealth, and preserve it from the attacks of its enemies. Cambon and his predecessors supplied the expences of several campaigns, and several years, with four milliards only; while, under the influence of Johanet and his associates, the Thermidorians, made away with forty milliards of paper in a few months: a system of peculation, which had been preceded by the extremest parsimony during the hideous administration of Cambon.

It has been the misfortune of France to suffer under Lewis XVI., by the alternate opposition and prevalence of the French and Austrian diplomatic systems, which had their share in the revolution; at the same time that she was condemned to be the sport of the struggle of the Anglo-Genevese and French systems in the administration of the the finances: so that two leading departments, that of foreign affairs and general controul, were continually affected by influence from without, the more dangerous, as it produced a revolution, whose effects are as yet incalculable. This truth had been so thoroughly studied, and is so well known and appreciated at London, that the Genevese refugee, D'Ivernois, one of the writers employed by the English cabinet,

openly acknowledges the establishment of the English and Austrian systems in the heart of the government, and threatens France with their permanency, in these words (page 372 of his pamphlet, published in 1795, on France and Geneva):—"It is necessary," says he, "to have the courage to tell the French, without disguise, that they can only secure themselves from the spies of England and the house of Austria, and restore their independence without, and tranquillity within, by returning to the august family of their kings, and restoring it to its hereditary throne." From the manner in which D'Ivernois writes at London, one would suppose it was not known in that capital, that England herself has most conduced to the dethroning of the house of Bourbon, by arming many of our revolutionary factions against it; and which it would raise again, should its intrigues succeed in restoring the crown, which Mr. Pitt boasted in parliament it was his desire to do, though at the expence of England. Surely all good Frenchmen, who read this extract from the writings of an adventurer favoured by an enemy, will feel the necessity of providing against the ambition of a cabinet, that will succeed no better in subjecting us to its spies and those of the court of Vienna, than it has in the dismemberment of the possessions of the house of

Bourbon. Our government has too much national spirit and patriotism not to secure its administration at all times from the influence of these two courts.

CHAP. V.

Division in the Republic of Letters, effected by Frederic II. and Catharine.—The Clergy of France, struck with new Dread at the Progress of Philosophy, humbly throw themselves at the Feet of Lewis XVI., repeating their Intreaties to this Monarch, to suppress the Writings of the Philosophers.—Model of a new anti-philosophical Legislation presented by the Clergy to the King.

IN the two last chapters, we have seen Austria and England exciting commotions in the political and financial departments of the state. That no part of our ancient government might be free from this disturbing principle, Frederic and Catharine, finding all the other posts occupied by Austria and England, took upon themselves to infect with it the republic of letters. They strove with each other, who should best succeed in exciting Voltaire and D'Alembert against the first order in the state, our national worship, and our religious opinions: Catharine acting warily, and Frederic with more boldness.

After the death of these philosophers, Condorcet obtained their confidence, not as the most able, but the most daring literary charac-

ter in the nation, and the most avowed enemy of every institution France had been accustomed to revere. To such young persons as declared themselves atheists, he gave his confidence, his influence, and his friendship. He reckoned it half way to philosophy to deny the founder of the Christian religion; but whoever wrote against the Deity, was, in his eyes, a great man, and an exalted genius. He was eager to gain proselytes, and succeeded in ranking them, each according to his merit. Almost all other writers were, in his estimation, comparative fools.

M. Condorcet had made a general classification of the fools of France; and the analytical table we have drawn from it would well deserve publication, had not the misfortunes of France reconciled the majority of men of letters to religious opinions, and the consoling idea of a supreme and beneficent being. In this table, which is wholly composed of extracts from the eulogies and philosophical works of Condorcet, would have been found the whole mass of folly, in all its extent, discovered by him in society, in France. He reckoned, indeed, Frenchmen such fools, and wisdom so rare, that he confined the latter to the small number of philosophers and ministers who shared his opinions.—Unfortunate man! he did not live long enough to see the extent of the errors of that handful of mad

revolutionists, who brought him to his deplorable end; he was not aware of the danger of the opinions he professed; those, for example, which I find in his last production, where he speaks of the disorganisation of society, and of the philosophy of the day, in the terms to be found in the note *.

* A class of men speedily made their appearance in Europe, whose object was less to discover and investigate truth, than to disseminate it †; who, pursuing prejudice through all the haunts and asylums in which the clergy, the schools, governments, and privileged corporations, had placed and protected it, made it their glory, rather to eradicate popular errors, than add to the stores of human knowledge; thus aiding indirectly the progress of mankind, but in a way neither less arduous, nor less beneficial.

In England, Collins and Bolingbroke, and in France, Bayle, Fontenelle, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and the respective disciples of these celebrated men, combated on the side of truth with all the weapons that learning, wit, and genius, were able to furnish; assuming every shape, employing every tone, from the sublime and pathetic to pleasantry and satire, from the most laboured investigation to an interesting romance or a fugitive essay; accommodating truth to those eyes that were too weak to bear its effulgence; artfully caressing prejudice, the more easily to strangle it; never aiming a direct blow at errors, never attacking more than one at a time, nor even that one in all its fortresses; sometimes soothing the enemies of reason, by pretending to require in religion but a partial toleration, in politics but a limited freedom; siding with despotism, when their hostilities were directed against the priesthood; and with priests, when their object was to unmask the despot; sapping

† I would ask these modern philosophers, what the discovering and investigating truth, rather than disseminating it, is, unless it be deceiving the people?

In France, every writer who employed his time in defending the altars of his country, was

sapping the principle of both these pests of human happiness, striking at the root of both these baneful trees, while apparently wishing for the reform only of glaring abuses, and seemingly confining themselves to lopping off the exuberant branches; sometimes representing to the partisans of liberty, that superstition, which covers despotism as with a coat of mail, is the first victim which ought to be sacrificed, the first chain that ought to be broken; and sometimes denouncing it to tyrants, as the true enemy of their power, and alarming them with recitals of its hypocritical conspiracies, and its sanguinary vengeance. These writers, meanwhile, were uniform in their vindication of freedom of thinking, and freedom of writing, as privileges upon which depended the salvation of mankind. They declaimed, without cessation or weariness, against the crimes both of fanatics and tyrants, exposing every feature of severity, of cruelty, of oppression, whether in religion, in administration, in manners, or in laws; commanding kings, soldiers, magistrates and priests, in the name of truth and of nature, to respect the blood of mankind; calling upon them with energy, to answer for the lives, still profusely sacrificed in the field of battle, or by the infliction of punishments, or else to correct this inhuman policy, this murderous insensibility; and lastly, in every place, and upon every occasion, rallying the friends of mankind with the cry of *reason, toleration,* and *humanity!*

Such was this new philosophy. Accordingly, to those numerous classes that exist by prejudice, that live upon error, and that, but for the credulity of the people, would be powerless and extinct, it became a common object of detestation. It was every where received, and every where persecuted, having kings, priests, nobles, and magistrates among the number of its friends, as well as of its enemies. Its leaders, however, had almost always the art to elude the pursuits of vengeance, while they exposed themselves to hatred; and to

screen

branded by these philosophers with the lowest appellations: he was "a blockhead, an ignoramus, a Jeremy ‡." Voltaire had introduced the custom of persecuting them under these appellations; yet there has never been wanting in France men of merit of the opposite party, who had the courage to point out to the nation the ends and views of the new philosophy.

The abbé Aubert, a distinguished literary character of this class, has often depicted them by laconic sentence, a single word, or an ingenious allegory. Luneau was the intrepid

screen themselves from persecution, while, at the same time, they sufficiently discovered themselves not to lose the laurels of their glory.

It frequently happened, that a government rewarded them with one hand, and with the other paid their enemies for calumniating them; proscribed them, yet was proud that fortune had honoured its dominions with their birth; punished their opinions, and at the same time would have been ashamed not to be supposed a convert thereto.

These opinions were shortly embraced by every enlightened mind. By some they were openly avowed, by others concealed under an hypocrisy more or less apparent, according to the timidity or firmness of their characters, and according as they were influenced by the contending interests of their professions or their vanity. At length, the pride of ranging on the side of erudition became predominant, and sentiments were professed with the slightest caution, which, in the ages that preceded, had been concealed with the most profound dissimulation.

‡ A character in *Love for Love*. The word in the original is *quiestre*.—(*Translator*).

defender of the state, its worship, and the genius of our literature; as also were Pompignan, Piron, and others. Freron carried desolation to the heart of the patriarch of Ferney. The abbé Sabbatier opposed eight editions of his *Three Ages* to the multiplied ridicule and letters of the opposite party. Clement rigidly analysed and developed the causes of the depravation of taste and decline of letters. Linguet defended, inch by inch, the ancient social organisation. The religious phalanx, and the atheistical one, each surrendered itself to all the exaggerations which the warmth of party spirit is sure to inspire. Those writers, who were religious preservers of the established authority and worship of the nation, were *miserable hirelings*, *garreteers*, and *pedants*, according to the philosophers; while the philosophers, according to them, were the friends of anarchy and sacrilege, men without a country, and enemies of the altar and the throne.

These enemies of the altar and throne were, however, the correspondents and pensioners of kings, and members of the most eminent academies; they had always one friend or partisan, at least, in the French ministry; and they ruled despotically in society, where they affected a decisive tone, and gave the stamp to every reputation. On the contrary, the religious

writers, the humble observers of the progress of human affairs, associated only with their own party, and were despised by the opposite one. I have seen Gilbert die obscurely in the Hôtel Dieu (an hospital), and philosophers close their career in the lap of abundance and pleasure. It is at the commencement of the nineteenth century, that the writings of the two parties, published about twenty years since, ought to be read. Reading them now, we shall be convinced of the truth of these observations, and justness of the remarks of that small band of courageous critics, who opposed the modern philosophy, contending with Raynal, Marmontel, Delille-Desalles, Lacretelles, and other celebrated writers, who, on witnessing the effect of their works, have acknowledged the general mind to have been mistaken during half the last century, without that acknowledgment destroying the anti-revolutionary enmities.

The French clergy was overwhelmed with affliction at the sight of these dissensions; it felt its end approaching, and, like a man enfeebled by disease, and struggling with death, it demanded, in vain, a remedy for the evil. Nothing less than the reiterated remonstrances it made for five years to the court, at the meeting of its assemblies, can express the increasing apprehensions it suffered at the emboldened

progress of philosophy and French protestantism; but the more it complained, the less the court affected to attend to its prophecies and remonstrances. If the house of Bourbon was blind to the daily decay of its lustre, if it beheld not the last precipice but when on the eve of falling into it, it was not for want of having been pre-informed by the observations and entreaties of the clergy, the parliaments, and the religious writers. But such was the blindness of the court, and the propensity of the age, that the sovereigns of remote nations, like Catharine; the most absolute monarchs, like Frederic; those kings, who, by the constitution of their state, were most catholic, like Joseph and his brother Leopold, began themselves the revolution in their own states; and George III., with all his piety, finding that Rousseau had no royal pension, and was in poverty, offered him one, which he refused to accept.

How little then does it become the English, the Germans, and the other potentates of Europe, to insult France, by reproaching it with the revolution? They began it in their own countries, and supported it by money in ours. There is this difference, however, between us and them; we were led into our misfortunes by the hope of amelioration, while the potentates, whom we have opposed and conquered,

had the audacity, the wickedness, and injustice, to form the plan, vain plan, of dividing our territory amongst them. But the lesson the French people have given them will not easily be forgotten.

Thus, towards the end of the 18th century, royalty itself in Europe was so mistaken with regard to its true interests, that it laboured indirectly for its own ruin, by degrading in France, in the heart of Europe, in the centre of social institutions, those opinions, which were the guardian spirit of the ancient system, by stirring up our most celebrated writers against the well-weighed principles of two centuries, essential to the harmony and well-being of all. I remember having discoursed on all these subjects with the first men among the French clergy, the only body who never ceased remonstrating at court in these times of dissolution, which threw them into the utmost consternation. Let us hear their expressions, and reflect a moment on the insensibility of the court of Versailles, and on the nullity of the prince, who received such remonstrances, coming from the first order of men in the state, to no purpose. The king wrote his remarks in the margin of these complaints, and was himself well informed on the subject; yet, like a man blind, he kept on his way towards the revolution, though they pointed it out to him so clearly.

Remonstrances of the Clergy to Lewis XVI., in 1780, *on the Dangers which threaten Religion and the Church.*

" Sire, the clergy of France would wish never to approach the steps of your majesty's throne, but to renew with just solicitude the solemn tribute of its praise and good wishes; but the sad recital of the misfortunes of the faith cannot be indifferent to its august protector. With what respectful confidence may we not declare our sentiments before a sovereign, who shows already, in the spring of life, the highest wisdom, professing a profound veneration for our mysteries, and placing his true glory in the happiness of his people.

" Yes, sire, a most dangerous scourge threatens the vast extent of your dominion with the most dreadful calamities. Anti-christian and seditious productions, spreading with impunity from the heart to the extremities of the kingdom, circulate the destructive poison of irreligion and licentiousness. The strong measures already adopted by the clergy in its preceding assemblies, far from having suspended the progress of so dangerous a contagion, has not prevented new injuries from signalising the revolution of each year. There exists a writer, less known by the splendor of his genius and superiority

of his talents, than by the persevering and implacable war he has had the misfortune to carry on, for sixty years, against "the Lord and against his Christ." The public seem never to be weary of offering him homage, not merely as if he were the glory of literature and a model for those who cultivate it, but the benefactor of mankind, and the restorer of all the social and patriotic virtues. Subscriptions have been more than once entered into for the sale of works, which breathe a spirit of unlimited independence, and an implacable enmity to all authority; and by a crime which has reached the very sanctuary itself, a man still holding the sacred books of our church, and even honoured with the sacerdotal profession, is publicly mentioned as the author of a work replete with the most dreadful impieties*. His name and portrait appear in the front of a recent edition, without any disavowal having appeared from him, to give comfort and courage to the faithful. Such dreadful progress has the dereliction of principle made: so profound is the slumber of all elementary ideas of propriety and decency.

* The abbé Raynal, whom the party of Maurepas denounced to the parliament for his connexion with Mr. Necker, in revenge for the harsh picture he had given of M. Maurepas, in his *History of the two Indies*.

"It is time, sire, permit us to say, with the apostolic freedom of our sacred office, it is time to put an end to this dreadful and deplorable insensibility; since, a few years more of silence, 'and, the shock become general, will leave nothing to be seen but ruin and desolation.' Your majesty should endeavour, then, to save religion, morals, and authority, by immediately addressing to all the courts of justice a beneficent law, calculated to restrain the noblest of all arts, *the art of writing* within the bounds of a wise and generous freedom. Your august predecessors have left many regulations upon the subject*; but these regulations, as far as respect the printing and sale of prohibited books, are scattered in a variety of acts difficult to be referred to; while the greater part of them, consisting merely of simple orders of council, remain unexecuted. There are some ordinances, indeed, registered in the courts, upon this important point, and one even so recently as the 16th of April 1757, in which the penalty of death is pronounced against those who shall be convicted of having written, printed, or published any

* It is in vain to multiply laws and restrictions. If the clergy do not themselves attract the respect they desire, it is impossible to secure it to them by any other means. Respect to a body of men can only proceed from their own virtues. —(*A marginal note of Lewis XVI.*)

work tending to vilify religion. Without meaning too rigidly to blame acts emanating from the sovereign power, we yet cannot approve such sanguinary measures. Ministers, as we are, of a gospel of peace and charity, the sword thus suspended over the heads of delinquents, compels us to overlook the most glaring infractions of the law; and the same consideration, no doubt, has often restrained the activity of the magistrate. More insurmountable barriers, springing out of a code of laws less severe, but more strictly executed, might easily be found. Your majesty, by enforcing penal laws on this head, will not, as some have attempted to prove, at all infringe on the rights of the divine scrutinizer of consciences; for neither the opinions nor thoughts of men would thereby become subject to the civil laws, but merely the public manifestation of them, voluntarily and licentiously made by publications, tending to agitate mens' minds, and disturb the harmony of society. No laws had ever a better foundation; but the great art of government consists in proportioning punishments to crimes, or, rather, in preventing a transgression, by indefatigable vigilance and preservatory measures. A false love of fame, or some motive of interest, is almost always the incentive to irre-

ligious writings*. It is then for you, sire, taking advantage of these motives, to restrain our youth from being wrecked on these shoals, by holding out pecuniary punishments to deter them, and the powerful means of disgrace and humiliation. If the fault be repeated, let the culprit, if a foreigner, be compelled to quit the kingdom; and if a native, let him be excluded from the posts, honours and privileges of a citizen, with reserve, on repeated transgression, of being treated as a person infected with a contagious distemper. The proper proceedings having been drawn up by the usual judges, let him be confined, so that it might be out of his power hereafter to spread his pestilential doctrines in society: the judges, however, to be restrained from enforcing these penalties, except in the case of works exhibiting a complete and established course of impiety.—Far be it from us, sire, to wish to extinguish the flame of genius, or impose chains on the noble emulation of learning. Letters will always flourish round the sanctuary of religion. Authors were never more encouraged than under the princes most attached to the faith of our ancestors; un-

* Were there not granted at this very time letters of nobility to Gresset, whose writings are so perfectly unexceptionable? (*Marginal note by the king.*)

der Charlemagne, St. Lewis, Francis I. and Lewis XIV. The church requires from its children only a reasonable obedience. In like manner as the abyss of doubt and despair opens more immediately beneath the feet of superficial reasoners, so the more we explore the depths of learning, the more clearly do we see the firm and immoveable rock on which the holy city is founded. Thus the measures we presume to recommend originate in no desire of robbing the garden of literature of the fruits, which enrich and adorn it, but in extirpating weeds, which disgrace and injure it. At the same time, sire, that you enact laws to suppress the abuse of talents and learning, it will be worthy the great views of your majesty to heap benefits and honours on those extraordinary men, whose profound researches daily extend the bounds of reason, without weakening the empire of faith.

"As to printers and booksellers, whom avarice may lead to print or publish indecent or irreligious works, they might be punished for the first offence with a six months' interdiction only; should they repeat their fault, they might be irrevocably deprived of all functions and privileges, and the shop belonging to them walled up with the utmost formality, as an example to others; while it might be left to the prudence and piety of the judge to punish the extremes

of this crime, by penalties more or less severe, according to the exigency of the case.

"As the new works which daily teem from the press are chiefly disseminated in the towns and through the country by the venal hands of inferior agents, without character or respectability, policy seems to require, that a total stop should be put to these hawkers, who prove so often fatal to the morals of our fellow subjects, and are of no use in the progress of knowledge; or, at least, that they should be subjected to some invariable and salutary regulations. No one should be allowed to hawk about or sell books, who could not himself read and write, and was not provided with a permission *ad hoc*, drawn up gratis by a clerk of a court of justice, which they should be obliged to produce as often as should be required by the proper magistrate, who might be empowered to inquire into his conduct, his place of abode, and punish hi imalversations by fine, disqualification, and even mprisonment.

"In short, with what scandalous profusion do we not behold those wretched productions of libertinism and impiety displayed in all our fairs and markets, in the catalogues of the effects o persons deceased, and other public sales, and even in the libraries, opened in various towns to the curiosity of every reader for a trifling con-

tribution! Frequent unforeseen and rigid visits would soon shut up these pernicious channels of communication. But it would be in vain that every source of public corruption were stopped in the kingdom, if your majesty's subjects were still at liberty to procure foreign productions, and particularly those which are poured out from the press of an enterprising nation, whose writings are a thousand times more dangerous to our minds, than their arms ever were to our possessions. To expel this monstrous kind of contraband goods from your majesty's dominions, it would be sufficient to put former regulations in force, which confine to a small number of places the right of importing books from foreign countries; the books however should be submitted, before their delivery, to all the rigour of examination, and to other forms, the violation of which should be punished by fine, seizure, and confiscation *.

" In proportion as such regulations are necessary for gradually destroying the root of the evils, which disgrace our literature, the more

* M. de Malesherbes always maintained, that extreme rigour as to publications would only oblige writers to resort to a foreign press, and that the work, whether of good or bad tendency, would always then have another impression in France: yet some restriction is certainly necessary.—*(Marginal note by the king.)*

necessary it becomes to public happiness, that their execution should be made permanent and inviolable, by allowing the zeal of the priesthood, and the vigilance of the magistrates, to concur in their support. An inspection into the circulation of bad books is one of those mixed objects equally essential to civil police and ecclesiastic discipline; and, in conformity to ancient rules, the ordinary of the place may be called in to the aid of the lay magistrate. Such is the wise intention of the decree of the parliament of Paris of the 1st of July, 1542, and the edict of Chateau-Briant, of the month of June 1551, in the 15th, 16th, and 17th articles. By this sort of joint concurrence, the depositaries of the two powers mutually inform and support each other, and the bonds are drawn closer of that most desirable union, which is the best pledge of national prosperity. If, however, the modern jurisprudence, perhaps too easily alarmed, should refuse our offered association, there are no considerations to prevent the nominating ecclesiastical inspectors within the circle of each syndical chamber, to be pointed out by lay inspectors, already established by the last regulations, with similar rights and authority for whatever relates to religion*.

* It might in that case be truly said, that the French had established an inquisition in disguise.—*(Marginal note by the king.)*

" Your majesty might, at the same time, announce that you expect from the zeal of your prelates, that, in conformity to the duties of their respective offices, they will watch carefully, both by themselves and their representatives, over the distribution of books of evil tendency, that they will give notice of such books to the proper magistrate, who shall be obliged in consequence to pay the necessary attention, under pain of being personally answerable for the consequences.

" May we, sire, venture to add to this sketch of legal and judicial suggestions, a few other circumstances relating simply to the same department of administrative justice. The clergy, in its latter assemblies, has already largely insisted on the practice and danger of tacit permissions. If higher reasons, which we are bound to respect, will not allow that they should be altogether and for ever abolished, we may at least intreat your majesty to allow no permission of the kind to be in future given, without the work, whatever be its nature or object, having been first seen and approved by one of the censors to be appointed for the examination of books of theology and religion *. It is need-

* Theology and religion have such distinct departments, that it does not appear that a general inspection of this kind could

less for us to say, that the most scrupulous discernment in the choice of these censors will be more than ever necessary; and as the venom of new opinions taints every work, however foreign its subject may be to religion, it seems indispensable further to ordain, that the censors of the other departments of literature, whenever, in the perusal of a manuscript, they find any articles relating to religion, shall be bound to submit such articles to one of the censors of the theological and religious department.

"While some audacious writers, however, are exerting all their efforts to shake the sacred foundations of obedience and dependance, we have at least the consolation of seeing others of the learned raising valuable and durable monuments to the honour of our ancient tenets. To these, sire, allow us to turn your beneficent regard. What men have a juster claim to the rewards of their country, or can with more propriety be called to a participation of the treasures of the sanctuary, than those whose labours have so nobly avenged the cause of God and of kings, essentially inseparable?

"Such are the various measures that seem, in our eyes, best calculated to calm the vivid

could be reasonably allowed, without the greatest inconveniences to both parties.—*(Marginal note by the king.)*

apprehensions which have taken place in the hearts both of the pastors and the people. Deign, sire, in the wisdom of your councils, to take them under your consideration. Religion demands it of you, in the name of the sovereign disposer of empires, whose tutelary hand has placed you over us for the glory of the Christian world. All the ministers of Christ, humbly prostrating themselves at your feet, most earnestly conjure you to comply with them: they conjure you, by your unshaken attachment to the faith of our fathers; by the tender love, in which you can never fail, that you bear to your people; by the blood of St. Lewis, united in your sacred person, with that of so many other Christian heroes; and, lastly, by the eternal remembrance of the pious example of your august father, that great prince, who never reigned but over our hearts, and for whose loss France would still be inconsolable, were the wise government of your majesty less calculated to wipe away the tears of the nation.

" (Signed)

" *D. Cardinal de la* ROCHEFOUCAULT,

" *President.*

" *Abbé de la* ROCHEFOUCAULT,

" *Elder Agent, Secretary.*"

CHAP. VI.

New Terrors of the Clergy assembled in 1780 *against the Non-execution of the Laws against Protestants—Remonstrances of the Gallican Church against their Worship, their Boldness, and their Enterprises.—The Clergy of France propose new Regulations for the Increase of Conversions—They declare to the King, that the Annals of Calvinism present an uniform Series of Conspiracies; that this Sect is Republican in its Maxims, and even in the very Essence of its Constitution; that the Altar and the Throne will be endangered the Moment the Fetters of Protestantism are broken.*

IT was enough that the clergy of France had been repeatedly and grievously unjust to the protestants, especially in the reign of Charles IX., of Lewis XIII., and in the old age of Lewis XIV., for them to dread their restoration. Oppressions of past times made them consider a continuation of oppressions to be necessary, as a matter of safety; accordingly, this was an object which, during the whole reign of Lewis XVI., they unremittingly pursued. At every new meeting of their assemblies they renew their lamentations; they have other complaints to make, and other dangers to dread. The prince had con-

stantly avoided giving his opinion; but this year, for the first time, he gave it in writing on the same paper which transmitted to him their lamentations: from which it appears, that his heart inclined to a gentle spirit of toleration; and this, no doubt, made way for the amelioration of the condition of the protestants, who, before his reign, had been constantly refused when they requested a legal mode of certifying the births, marriages, and deaths of the individuals of their sect. It was thus that the clergy of France expressed themselves in 1780, on the conduct of the protestants.

"Sire,

"It is the duty of our function to call your majesty's attention to the deep and dreadful wounds, which the whole body of revealed religion has received, by a doctrine inimical to established worship, and destructive of all authority. Nor is this, alas! the only calamity which has befallen our holy mother, the Gallican church. Heresy, becoming every day bolder and more daring, from the long impunity with which it has been suffered, is never weary of rending her tender and afflicted breast. During the best days of the reign of your august grandsire, a strong and penetrating government, by measures purely repressive, circumscribed and even en-

lightened our mistaken brethren. Innumerable conversions gave rise to the flattering hope, that all the sheep of Israel would be gathered into one flock, under the guidance of one shepherd; when these salutary restraints of wisdom and policy became insensibly relaxed *.

" By comparing with each other, however superficially, the successive complaints made by the assemblies of the clergy since the year 1745, it will be seen, how alarming a progress has been made by the bold advances of these religionists; while the new excesses, recited in the *proces verbal* of the last provincial assemblies, seem to predict so violent a storm, that our confidence would be shaken by it, if we were not placed at the helm under the eternal protection of that being, whose word commands the winds and the waves.

" The protestants were formerly, sire, excluded, by the existing laws, from public employments, and municipal and other situations, which could give them influence and authority in the country.

" But infractions of these laws daily increase.

* Several bishops, highly deserving my confidence, have assured me, that no conversion, into which men were surprised, cou'd be conformable to the true spirit of religion; and that, to be laudable, it must be the result solely of a free and enlightened conscience.—*(Marginal note by the king.)*

These men, admitted as attornies, registers, notaries, or advocates, sometimes sit in the seat of authority, in the heart of cities, or appear in the public offices as acting magistrates, and in many places have even the direction of public schools; so that nothing hinders them from sowing their prejudices in young and tender minds.

" Formerly these nonconformists held no assemblies on the subject of religion; or, if they held them, they were secretly convoked in remote and solitary places. The ministers and preachers exercised their functions but seldom, and then clandestinely, carefully avoiding any public act which might reveal their situation.

" Now these assemblies are regularly and notoriously held; preachers, established at the very gates of our cities, and even in the neighbourhood of our churches, insult our worship by their tumultuary chants and noisy ceremonials. The kingdom is overwhelmed with a multitude of false pastors, who are not afraid openly to administer the holy supper to their sick, to scatter printed papers in the form of instructions and orders, on the great events of the nation*,

* It is singular, that complaints should be addressed to me, because the protestants are pleased to express their joy for Providence having bestowed a son on me, or for my having

and to hold numerous and frequent conventicles at fixed periods and stated places.

" These pretended pastors have been threatened, to no purpose, with juridical proceedings against them. In some provinces they have presumed to deliver in their registers of marriage and baptism, drawn up with an appearance of authenticity, by virtue of higher orders given in the commencement of 1774; orders which are not yet revoked, notwithstanding the indignation expressed at them by the last king. And so far does the toleration of this sect extend, that there are even annual levies of money on your majesty's subjects for the purpose of paying the salaries required by their ministers and preachers, who are thus, in a manner, rewarded for their violation of the laws, and their attempts against the tranquillity of the state.

" Formerly, they refrained from dogmatising in public, and treated with external respect the processions and other solemnities of the catholic church. Now each day is marked, as it were, with some new want of reverence to our institutions and our mysteries. In one place, the venerable sign of our redemption has been destroyed by a licentious populace. In another, the most

having gained a victory over the English. To what length will prejudice lead men!—*(Marginal note by the king.)*

dreadful impieties have been uttered against the adorable person of Jesus Christ, present in the holy eucharist. In a third, the descendants of catholics are seen releasing themselves from the painful yoke of our morality, to embrace the tenets of a free and independent sect; while the ancient precept of abstinence from meat, and the holy observance of the festivals of the church, are every where openly trodden under foot, and treated with the most insolent contempt. In short, when we reflect on the enterprise of the protestants, conducted with new boldness, and of which there has long been no example in our history; when we look at the crowd of writings in their favour, and which are distributed with such singular profusion; when we listen to the general cry, which resounds from one end of France to the other; the church appears to be threatened with a rival, that is, to share in her empire, and the country with the grief, of once more beholding altar rise against altar in its bosom.

" But, sire, amidst ideas so distressing, tranquillity returns to our hearts, when, looking to the throne, we consider your majesty's zeal for the support of the catholic faith, and the wisdom which presides in your glorious administration. Many palpable exaggerations have been made respecting the mass of the protestants,

from a hope, no doubt, that the interest, which these unfortunate victims of error inspire, would increase in proportion to their numbers. Were the true state of our mistaken brethren to be candidly represented, from calculations actually made in several parts of the kingdom, we have the consolation to say, that this fastidious display of numbers would be reduced by more than a third. Be this however as it may, the catholic religion is indisputably, in this respect, the predominating, and the national one. This holy religion bears in her countenance the stamp and seal of her divine founder. Her morality, her tenets, her discipline, her worship, the whole system of her legislation, have no other tendency than to make men wise and happy. Seated on the throne from the days of Clovis, she unites, at the feet of her altars, the monarch and his subjects. Her peaceful standard is the only one freely and publicly unfurled through the kingdom. The more, sire, we see you worthy of the high rank in which heaven, for our happiness, has placed you, the less reason have we to apprehend, that the illustrious inheritor of the faith and sceptre of St. Lewis should betray the creed of his ancestors, scatter delusive ideas among his people, sacrifice the whole of the nation to a part, and, by a voluntary dereliction from the laws of the state, allow

public temples to be raised, and solemn worship to be paid to error as to truth.

" One victory obtained by this encroaching power would prepare the way for still more dreadful innovations. Those sacred barriers, so necessary against human passions, would insensibly give way to a criminal indifference on the score of religion: a state the most dreadful, which withers the very root of virtue, extinguishes the flame of sentiment, and can produce nothing but destruction. By following the course so clearly pointed out to us by the immortal bishop of Meaux, an observing eye will constantly discover this modern infidelity to be only a shoot from the fatal tree, planted in the sixteenth century by the reformers. No counterpoise being then left to the elasticity of ambitious reason, it mutually fell, step by step, till it was overwhelmed and lost in the chaos of doubt, impiety, and anarchy. Without dwelling on the notoriety of the fact, or taking advantage of the indiscreet acknowledgments made by several celebrated calvinists, have we not seen the school of Geneva itself, three years since, exhibit the scandalous spectacle of a public and uncontradicted thesis, in which it did not blush to state the divinity of Christ as problematical—that immutable boundary, which has always separated deism from true christi-

anity *? We must not therefore conceal, that the protestant religion, once authorised among us, would soon become the refuge of a throng of miscreants, who disbelieving in their hearts all revelation, while they thought not of daring openly to avow their wicked apostacy, would artfully disguise this want of faith under the deceitful mask of protestantism.

" Were it, sire, allowed to the sacred function of our office, to seek support on considerations of policy, we would venture to call to your majesty's mind, that a diversity of public worship is almost always a source of dissension. The government of France, so purely monarchical, and the ardent and very able character of its people, would contribute to render the shock of this diversity still more dangerous. Let us suppose, that the memorable event which took place in the last century, under a monarch so skilful in the art of reigning, has really been productive of the ills which its enemies impute to it, by pouring our treasures into the lap of

* No doubt the protestants reproach, in like manner, the theses of the abbé Prades. While these animosities continue, can any alliance between the catholics and protestants take place? It should be the study of each of these religions, to emulate each other in goodness, and not to irritate its opponent by offensive accusations, be the accusations true or false —(*Marginal note by the King.*)

other nations, laying the foundation of flourishing colonies, and bestowing on them the knowledge of our arts and manufactures. After the revolution of nearly a century, can the error be repaired? Would it not tend rather to open, than close the wound, should we now, by new measures, deprive ourselves of the great advantages which were our comfort in the former ones; we mean the unity of our religious worship, and the stability of civil society? What claim to the patronage of kings has this congregation of independent spirits, who formerly boasted, in their seditious writings, that they had discovered the source of regal power to be merely human; while the catholic doctrine places its origin in heaven, and represents it as covered with the beams of the divinity. All the annals of calvinism present an afflicting and uninterrupted series of conspiracies, civil wars, and popular commotions. One would almost imagine that the attention of Providence has only permitted a renewal of these sanguinary scenes in a neighbouring island, to open the eyes of other governments on the stubborn perseverance of their republican sect, flowing alike from its tenets and the form of its constitution. With us the altar and the throne would be equally endangered, should heresy ever be permitted to throw off its chains.

" It is right we should pour forth, as we have done, our apprehensions into your paternal bosom: it remains, sire, for you, in your wisdom, to determine on the means of dispelling the false hopes of the protestants, and to put a stop to the fermentation, not more dangerous to the church than to the state. Suffer us only to remark, that the ministers of this sect maintain, in the midst of your people, the wretched system of schism and rebellion; and, that the source of the evil can only be effectually stopped, by punishing for ever these preachers, and taking measures to prevent them in future from interfering in the pretended character of pastors, the exercise of which is as fatal as the principle is irregular.

" By thus, sire, laying open the progress of error, we do not, however, mean to raise the avenging arm of your power against the persons of these mistaken men; in vain do they persist in despising our warnings, and treating us with contempt; they will always be our fellow-creatures and fellow-citizens, our brethren, and even our children in religion, whom we must ever tenderly love and cherish. Far from us be the very idea of the sword. The warfare to which we are called is wholly spiritual. Luminous and affecting instruction, persuasive example, fervent prayers, gentle, prepossessing, and universal benevo-

lence, are the apostolic weapons we are to use. The ecclesiastical state is, of all professions, the furthest removed from measures of severity. Such is the unsullied delicacy of its regulations, that even admission into the sanctuary is forbidden to the warrior, who has fought in the most upright cause, and the magistrate, who has had a share in condemning even the most atrocious criminal *. Under the peaceable shade of our altars, every thing breathes moderation, patience, brotherly love, and the most noble and heroic sacrifices; there the great lessons of christian charity, far superior in its fortitude and energy to the feeble and fleeting emotions of mere human sensibility, are cherished.

* How then did it happen, that formerly, among the whole clergy of France, John Hennuyer, bishop of Lisieux, was the only one of the Gallican church who took the protestants under his protection, when the court had ordered them to be all massacred in one day?—Whoever drew up this remonstrance, is mistaken in advancing, that admission into the sanctuary is denied to every general who had led an army, and every magistrate who had condemned a criminal. The canons of the church do not prohibit their entrance into the sanctuary or the church; but merely their promotion to holy orders, the spilling of blood, or passing sentence of death, having rendered them for ever laymen. If such canon, however, always existed, was it enforced? To satisfy us in that particular, let us look to cardinal Ruffo, at the head of massacres and military expeditions, and, in France, the *dragonades* of Lewis XIV. and the orders of Charles IX.

The less the old sacerdotal spirit is weakened among us, the more will the bowels of our compassion and pity expand; for, in contemplating the multitude of those children of error, we shall always see a God expiring for their salvation. Let the protestants then draw near with confidence; from us they will meet with the zeal of the apostle, and the tenderness of the parent; our hearts and our arms will be open to them; our tears shall be shed over their frailties; and, like faithful shepherds, gladly would we pour forth our blood for this scattered part of the flock, if at length it will be induced to pay its homage to the sacred claims of our mission.

"While, sire, with the tenderest apostolic solicitude, we endeavour to extend our conquests over heresy, your majesty will condescend, we trust, to second our endeavours, by bestowing on the new converts your special favours and gifts, not from the idea of setting a price on the human soul, for it is only for falsehood to have recourse to means so disgraceful, but in order to support those generous proselytes who have not hesitated to sacrifice the riches of this world for the treasures of the faith. A part, sire, of the royal temporalities, reverting to you from the vacant archbishopries, bishopries, abbeys, and other consisto-

rial benefices, is alre. dy dedicated to this pious use*.

"May we venture to represent to your majesty, that this interesting branch of the revenue might prove of still greater advantage to religion, would your majesty, in employing the allotted portion of temporalities in favour of the new converts, further ordain:—1st. That every bishop, before fixing the state of the funds of his diocese, should be first heard and consulted. 2dly. That pensions and gratuities should be bestowed the most freely in the provinces where the sectaries are most numerous, as Dauphiny, Languedoc, Guienne, &c. 3dly. That no pension should be granted in future but for an abjuration in form, or something amounting to it, with an obligation on the part of the convert to present yearly a certificate of his catholicism, drawn up by the ordinary of the place: the whole, however, to be effected without taking from the sums allotted for the education of young protestants of either sex, brought up under our pastors in the principles of our faith. The concurrence, sire,

* The reign before the last, which adopted this method, was severely blamed. It would certainly be proper to prevent considerations of interest having any influence on conversions, without, however, deserting those who may require aid in such circumstances.—(*Marginal note by the King.*)

and influence, which we venture to recommend in these kinds of distinction, appear to us the more proper, as these new catholics may be said to be enriched at your majesty's expence. In reality, by letters patent issued in December 1641, Lewis XIII. took upon him the solemn and irrevocable engagement of leaving to the new incumbents of the bishopries and archbishoprics the entire enjoyment of the whole revenues that may have arisen during their vacancy, without distinction or reserve; an engagement which was fulfilled in its utmost extent, even to vacant priories and abbeys, till the year 1675. A third of the said products was then deducted for the support of new converts. A modern regulation, still more favourable, allots them the whole revenues accruing from the moment of vacancy till the date of the installation of the successor, which is prescribed, in the form of a general regulation, by an order of council of the 31st of March 1734. By comparing this regulation with that made in 1641, it is evident, that the whole revenues of benefices during their vacancies ought to be divided between the successors to them and the new converts. The deceased king retrenched the emoluments of the former, to increase those of the latter; but every regulation which should neglect this double object, would be contrary to the spirit and

letter of the laws promulgated by the beneficence of your august predecessors. And the more, sire, we are convinced that the same sentiments fill your majesty's mind, the more confidently we venture to solicit the execution of those valuable laws.

" (Signed)

" *D. Cardinal* ROCHEFOUCAULT,

" *President.*

" *Abbé* ROCHEFOUCAULT,

" *Elder Agent, Secretary.*"

The king's official reply to his clergy was in the same spirit as his marginal remarks. There appears in it the same toleration as to the present, and the same disregard of the future. He bends, indeed, in his answer to the principles of the day; but his inertness is such, that he suffers patiently every blow aimed by the spirit of innovation at the throne, without defending himself from a destructive party, that undermines and ruins his power.

" The clergy," said the king in his reply, " can have no doubt of the attention I shall always pay to every thing that relates to the well-being of religion, and the cares I shall ever employ to put a stop to all books that are inimical to it, and punish such authors as shall dare attack it, or publish any works injurious

to our morals. I shall willingly receive any memorials, and listen to any projects on the subject which the clergy may wish to present: I will order them to be reported to me; I will examine them with seriousness; and will gladly adopt regulations, which, reviving the spirit of old laws, may tend more effectually to the furtherance of my wishes for good order in the state."

The king's official answer to the remonstrances of the clergy on the progress of protestantism breathes the same spirit of toleration.

"The clergy," said this prince, "are right in acknowledging the anxiety I shall always feel, in conformity to the example of my predecessors, for the maintenance of the catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion. I shall always second the peaceful and charitable aims of the clergy for bringing back to the purity of the faith those of my brethren who have the misfortune to be separated from it. I shall always exert my authority to hinder the establishment of any public worship different from that of the church. I shall continue to take account of the revenues allotted for the relief of converts; and my liberality in this respect, as well as my zeal, shall be no way inferior to those of my predecessors."

But nothing could exceed the uneasiness of the clergy, when they saw the works of Rousseau multiply in France, by the tacit approbation of the government; and Beaumarchais' famous edition of Voltaire's works was published in all possible forms. The loss of some of our ships, and an unsuccessful naval engagement, having called forth expressions of attachment from every part of the kingdom, the clergy assembled in 1782, to concur, by a new offering, in the re-establishment of the marine: and this they thought a favourable conjuncture for obtaining officially or privately, and by capitulation, the effectual succours of the state against the continued exertions of philosophy. But the king, who had remained a quiet spectator of the ravages made by new doctrines from the commencement of his reign, was equally unconcerned as to the publication of a complete collection of the works of the patriarch of philosophy. The clergy in vain represented, that M. de Voltaire had been all his life employed in the degradation of our worship, by the composition of licentious productions. The government allowed the circulation of the various impressions of a work printed at Kehl, under the direction of Condorcet, and a man also of real merit, citizen Ruault. Even in the assembly of the clergy there was a party of prelates tainted by the

new philosophy, who rendered abortive all the zeal of the pious members, and who informed the proprietors of the work, that the clergy were disposed to take no violent measures respecting it. The clergy of France were thus at this period divided into two parties upon the subject of its dearest interests. The king, at every assembly of the clergy, had eluded the proposals of the devout party against the protestants and philosophers; and what the Neckers, the Turgots, and Calonnes, dared not attempt to execute in favour of the protestant religion, an archbishop, M. de Loménie, become minister, completely effected. Notwithstanding these divisions, the clergy presented a memorial against the new edition of Voltaire, in which they observed, that the pen of the writer was sullied by the most *abominable* obscenities. M. de Maurepas, ever ready at a jest, replied to the king, "It is no friend of the clergy, sire, who has dictated these remonstrances: your prelates have already the reputation of not reading their own mandates; and it will now be said of them, that they employ their time in studying *the abominations of the Maid of Orleans.*"

The king could not help smiling at this malicious remark, but determined to persevere in his plan of toleration; and, less minute in mentioning particulars than the French clergy had been,

he contented himself, without expressly naming the works of Voltaire, with the following general reply to their remonstrances.

" I have given the most exact orders, to prevent the introduction of all books injurious to religion and morality, to forbid the printing of them in my kingdom, and to apprehend their authors, whenever they are known."—Yet the edition of Voltaire's works was sold openly at Beaumarchais'; and one of the heads of the clergy, who inclined to toleration, carried his complaisance so far as to accept a set from him, which I saw, till the year 1789, displayed in the library of that prelate.

The clergy on their side agreed to set apart thirty thousand crowns annually, to be given to writers in defence of religion; they advanced forty thousand livres to the editor of Fenelon's works; and bestowed their first pensions on Para, Sorert, Gerard, Pey, Auger, Berthier, and Houbigant; but such was the state of the public mind, that when it was known that rewards were bestowed on the authors of polemic productions, it was said, that religion was become a mere pecuniary warfare, since those who wrote in its defence were paid for their labours. Thus the monarchy and its chief pillars were gradually mouldering away; while the prince, still ad-

vancing to the precipice, was blind to the danger of his situation. The manners of the day, and the perfidious intentions of foreign powers, inimical to France, had each their share in introducing a change in the politics and ancient morals of the nation.

CHAP. VII.

Consequences of the Influence of Foreign Powers in the internal Affairs of France—Conversation on that Subject between Benjamin Franklin and the Writer of these Memoirs—The Mention of two Phænomena in the Revolutions of the Globe leads Franklin to speak of the Revolutions planned by England, of which the Author of these Memoirs had discovered existing Proofs—The Interest taken by Franklin in their being made public—His Reason for it.—The Protestants, so far back as the Reign of Lewis XIV., had entertained the Idea of erecting an independent Republic in the Heart of the Southern Protestant Provinces—Franklin mentions the Discovery to M. de Vergennes, and gives him a Letter from Soulavie—M. de Vergennes' Reply—Result of the Author's Inquiry on that Head—Franklin's Resolution of publishing this English Project in the Paris Journal—Extract from that Journal.—The Insurrection, called the Insurrection of Masks in the Cevennes, organised by the English, in the Reign of Lewis XVI.—Tranquillity of the Protestants.

IN the foregoing chapters we have seen our finances, our diplomacy, the state of religion, and the first class in the monarchy, wearied, influenced, thwarted, or turned out of their natural current by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. In 1781, an article in the *Courier de l'Europe*, which attracted the curiosity of Dr. Ben-

jamin Franklin, M. de Vergennes, and the king, revealed plans of another nature on the part of the court of England against France. What I have to offer on this head is so well worth recording, that I shall relate the facts, word for word, as I noted them down after my conversation with Franklin, which was on the 12th of August, 1781, and nearly in the following terms:

FRANKLIN.—In the last number of the *Courier de l'Europe*, I see the third volume of your natural history of the south of France announced. Have you seen the article? You will find it favourable and friendly. Here is the paper.

SOULAVIE.—I shall be glad to read it.

FRANKLIN.—In your next volume I could wish, after you have well reflected on a phænomenon, little understood by naturalists, that you would give the public some satisfactory explanation of it. It is said by some, that the sea retires; by others, that it diminishes and loses its level; and by others again, that the mass of its water rises and increases. I can assure you, however, that the rocks of Derbyshire abound with oyster-shells, and are greatly above the level of the sea; while the rock of the coal-mines of Whitehaven, covered with vegetation, is as much below as the former are above the same level. How are we to understand two

revolutions so contrary to each other, in the same neighbourhood? That which once lived in the air is below the waters of the sea; and that which existed under the waters of the sea, is now stationed above them. Let us reflect in silence on effects so opposite.

Dr. Franklin was exceedingly deliberate and wary in his mode of speaking. His answers were frequently preceded by several minutes of meditation and silence. At such times the collectedness of this celebrated man was admirable; his countenance and manner were full of dignity; and his silence was sure to be followed by observations replete with good sense, or by a sentence containing the solution of the difficulty proposed.

FRANKLIN.—In the case in question, either
1st, The sea has preserved its level: or
2dly, It has risen above it: or
3dly, It has sunk below it.

In the first case, it must be the rock of shells that has risen, and that covered with vegetation that has sunk down.

In the second case, the rock, covered with vegetation, may have retained its place, but the rock of shells must have risen above its original situation.

In the third, the inverse of the second will have taken place: if the sea has subsided, its

shelly basòn, gradually uncovered, has remained in its station; but the other rock clothed with vegetation must have sunk. In all this, it happens as in the moral world; one continent becomes old, another rises into youth and perfection. But the perfected continent will in its turn correct the other. Monarchies, by way of restoration, become republics; republics sink into monarchies; and the author of the *Courier de l'Europe*, as curious as myself, and my tea party, desire to learn from you, who is the natural enemy you mention of the French monarchy, that wished to raise a protestant republic in the heart of your southern mountains.

SOULAVIE.—I will put into your hands the several papers relating to this project, which makes us lose sight of your beautiful phænomena of rocks impregnated with shells above the level of the sea, and another covered with verdure below it. You have passed your early years in scrutinising the secrets of nature, which are as familiar to you as those of politics. You have developed the relative construction of the descent or ascent of different rocks. To enter satisfactorily into this subject, it appears to me, that it would be necessary to dissect the question, so to speak, to consider every part separately, and examine all the possible cases and alternatives.

FRANKLIN.—This investigation requires reflexion. Let us then each inquire what is the most natural supposition in this business. Is it most natural, that the earth should have sunk or risen? or, is it rather probable, that it has undergone a variety of changes?—Franklin, absorbed in reflexion, was silent about eight or ten minutes; after which, entering fully into the question, he displayed the observations, theory, and general views of an ingenious and profound philosopher, but which it would be foreign to our subject to insert here. Having given his opinion freely on this topic, he resumed the political question, and required of me an explanation as to the intentions of England, which had been mentioned in the *Courier de l'Europe* *.

SOULAVIE.—It is certain, that France and England, for ages past, have signed no treaties

* This paper, printed in London, had expressed, in the following terms, what had raised the curiosity of Franklin:—"The people of those elevated regions," the protestants of the mountains of Cevennes, "had been in a state of rebellion for two centuries: they had listened to the natural enemies of France, and, assisted by them, had endeavoured to establish a republic in the very centre of the nation, defended by inaccessible rocks, and the loftiest mountains.

"..... We would gladly know the history of these endeavours of the natural enemies of France to excite a rebellion among a part of the French, ever submissive to their king, and distinguished by their zeal and attachment."—*Courier de l'Europe for* 1781, *Friday, Aug.* 3. vol. X. p. 76.

of peace, but merely momentary truces; and, if I had possessed any influence with the minister of foreign affairs, I would have advised him, for his own credit, not to have entitled his convention, *a treaty of pacification*, but rather *a truce agreed upon*. France, at a time of perfect peace, made in reality a secret war on England, by privately assisting the insurgents there; and England, for ages past, has done the same by us, in exciting the protestants to revolt, whom it was her wish to make republicans and independent, on the high mountains of Cevennes, and my native country, the Vivarais.

FRANKLIN.—I cannot conceive that M. de Vergennes would hear this account with indifference. The king, who is fond of the history of his own country, and of England, and pays attention to it, would receive satisfaction from a work of this kind.

SOULAVIE.—But the protestants, and England, could not just now approve it.

FRANKLIN.—The protestants, as is said by the author of the article in the *Courier de l'Europe*, are now good citizens; they are obedient to the king, lovers of genius, and impartial judges of their history, which, for ages past, has been tumultuous.

SOULAVIE.—But you yourself, Dr. Franklin, who, as the friend of freedom, must love the pro-

testants—you, who are the founder of republican liberty in America, who profess yourself the friend of France, that is now exerting herself to the utmost to raise the standard of freedom and independence in the new world, you cannot but internally approve the desire England has shown of dismembering France, for the benefit of liberty, by establishing, as she has endeavoured to do, a protestant republic on the summit of our mountains.

FRANKLIN.—Were I a Frenchman, a Cevegnol, a mountaineer, a protestant, subject of Lewis XVI., and harassed by his dragoons, I should prefer the safety of my country to the disagreeable alternative of seeking in a foreign land the protection of an English or Prussian monarch; but we are at a period already remote from this, a relation of which may serve to show the justice of the present war, by way of reprisal on the part of France; since it is but repaying the injury which England has already committed against her, by interfering in her internal concerns, and raising up a religion in the state which dissents from the head of the state. I certainly love liberty, and esteem a republican government; but a republican minister, though devoted to his country, may know how to forget his own predilection in favour of a friendly monarchy. Therefore, considering this attempt

of the English as equally rash and criminal, I shall thankfully receive your papers; and if you will give me a letter to M. de Vergennes, I will present it to him, and recommend the papers with the force which a matter of so much importance merits.

SOULAVIE.—I will do so: I will send you a letter. But I cannot agree in opinion, that the intention of the English, as to the protestants here, is so remarkable for its rashness as you imagine. The protestants are now quiet and live peaceably, because the government leaves them to themselves. But we have protestants of another kind in France; the ignorant class of the lower people, who are burdened with imposts, and the more enlightened, who are malcontents. Upon this subject I have something to say, that, perhaps, will not be deemed unworthy of the profound meditation and ten minutes of speculative silence, on the part of the minister of the United States of America. The party that desires, and the party that dreads, a new order of things, agree in this, that France will one day suffer a greater revolution than that which America has experienced. I speak of the clergy, who said officially to Lewis XV. before his death, that a revolution was preparing in the state, similar to the English one of 1688; and I refer to the philosophers, who long

for a revolution, and are preparing one against religion. I refer particularly to Buffon, who said to me in December 1778, that this revolution would direct its first efforts against the French clergy, and who advised me to take care of myself.

FRANKLIN.—France is a state strongly constituted, and, I doubt not, will long resist the spirit of innovation that overturns government. I therefore think, that neither you or I shall live to see the changes you speak of, and for this reason, that the continent is equally old in all its parts, and France the youngest and most robust of all its states. At the same time it must be owned, that the protestants are no friends to a government, at the head of which is the body who have treated them so ill; but they would hardly expose their frail existence to the danger of a sedition. They possess no longer that characteristic turbulence by which they were marked prior to the reign of Lewis XIV., who polished all degrees of the French: nor do the government or the clergy carry their intolerance to the same excess to which they extended it in past ages. The time is come when history can record the faults of both parties; and, in my opinion, a narrative of the attempts made by England to raise a revolt among the French protestants under Lewis

XIV., would be a point of history truly interesting.

SOULAVIE.—In the memorable reign of the king you mention, so devoted to the jesuits, and so violent against the protestants, it was the chiefs of the latter party that England employed for the purpose of a revolt in the Cevennes. The prophet Jurieu, in 1689; the English emissaries in 1702; Cavalier, the leader of the Camisards in 1703; Ravanel, in 1705; Dupont, four years afterwards, and Justet of Vals, received and distributed the sums set apart by England for encouraging the armed insurrections that ensued. The disturbances at Vernoux, in 1740, had the same origin; but, under Lewis XIV., it was the insurrection and independence of republicans that was aimed at.

FRANKLIN.—I shall expect from you a letter to M. de Vergennes on this topic.

The letter was given, a few days after this conversation, by Dr. Franklin to Vergennes, and the latter expressing a desire to be acquainted with the work, Soulavie sent him the following account.

"When I was studying the natural history of our mountains in the south, I did not forget to extend my inquiries to the historical records, ancient and modern, which I conceived might

be of service to the history of this part of France. My local researches were the means of bringing to light a series of original manuscripts, relating to our civil wars, and containing many circumstances hitherto unknown, and of great importance to our history. From these manuscripts I shall extract, in haste, a few anecdotes respecting the enterprises of Great-Britain, which will not fail to remind you of the system constantly followed by the English for more than a century, to produce a rebellion in these provinces.

" From 1627 till the beginning of the eighteenth century, they (the English) lost no opportunity of sowing dissensions there. In 1627 the protestant general, in their pay, published a printed manifesto, wherein he endeavoured to justify himself for having had recourse to the king of England, and taken arms for the defence of the reformed church. It is well known, that the English then made a descent upon the island of Rhé, besieged the fort and citadel of St. Martin, and were defeated in 1628.

" In 1629, the king, through the mediation of the republic of Venice, made peace with England: but, irritated against the spirit of revolt evinced by the Cevegnols and the inhabitants of Vivarais and Languedoc, he laid siege in person to Privas, the capital of the district of

Boutieres, an almost inaccessible spot, where the protestants had entrenched themselves. He kept the treaty he had entered into with the English secret, till his arrival at the camp before Privas, where he had peace proclaimed on the spot, and, to induce the inhabitants to urrender, informed them they had no longer any expectation of relief from the English. The town was sacked and burnt, and the king proceeded to the siege of Alais, and other places in Languedoc.

" Cromwell afterwards kept up an intercourse, more peaceable it is true, with the heads of the protestant party, who, having revolted and being threatened with punishment, had recourse to him to mediate their pardon; and the monarch, obliged to yield to the wishes of the protector, recalled the order he had issued against them.

" The court of London, towards the close of the century, maintained with them a much more dangerous correspondence. The celebrated prophet and protestant minister of Geneva, Jurieu, was the emissary and instrument of that court in 1689, and sent apostles into the Cevennes, on whom he found means to bestow the gift of prophecy or rather of fanaticism, and begun the war of the Camisards, the plans of which he formed and conducted.

" In 1702, the same system was pursued by

the court of London, and a hundred emissaries in its pay traversed the mountains, and sowed the spirit of the rebellion, which took place there in that year.

" In 1703, Cavalier put himself at the head of the revolted troops, and was even so daring as to assume the title of prince of Cevennes. He became the general of an army he had himself formed, and was assisted by the English.

" In 1705, Lewis XIV., who had given law to all Europe, tired of fighting with rebels, was obliged to make peace with this too famous general, to whom he gave a colonel's commission, the privilege of enlisting his troops in the regular service, and a pension. Cavalier ended his career in London, where the history of his adventures was printed.

" In the same year Ravanel put himself at the head of the malcontents, still at the instigation of the English; and a gentleman of the name of Desollier received a pension of six hundred florins. The queen of England sent over a considerable sum of money. I have a paper containing all the particulars of this business.

" In 1709, the English sent three Camisard refugees, Gui, Dupont, and Mazet, to stir up the people once more. They had a conference with a gentleman of Vals, named Justet, who was the exciter of it. I am in possession

of his correspondence, both with the Dutch and English.

" The Camisards were, however, defeated by the duke of Roquelaure; but the English still encouraged the spirit of rebellion. They exhorted the protestants not to lose their courage; they promised shortly to make a descent in their favour in Languedoc; and Holland and England together contributed sixty thousand florins to support the revolt.

" The chief object in these commotions was to fix on a spot in France noted for its attachment to the protestant worship, and to make that spot the central point of an independent republic, to be divided into provinces, and to have cities, and a capital, at the expence of the rest of the kingdom."

In the year 1782, Dr. Franklin wished me to publish these discoveries. A party had arisen in the heart of France inimical to the American war, and Dr. Franklin was of opinion that this publication would show them the necessity of retaliating on England. " The *Journal de Paris*," said he, " will readily insert an article so curious; which, however, must be written in a form, that, while the truth due to history is observed in it, the protestants may take no offence at it."

Soulavie.—I had rather draw up an account

of these manuscripts, than publish my sentiments respecting them: at the same time, I cannot help thinking the French government too well informed, not to know the relative situations of the two nations; and that the publication you wish will neither alter the English plans, nor influence the fate of France. According to the clergy and the politicians, great events are preparing in France, of which the English are not ignorant. They will be avenged of us for having secretly assisted your countrymen in throwing off their yoke. If you look at those who wish, and those who dread, a catastrophe in France, you will find each party alike believing it to be at hand: the latter even warns us every day of its approach. You do not read, I presume, the *Annee Literaire*; it is too obscure and contemptible a publication. It contains, however, an account of the apprehensions of the archbishop of Paris, whose council is the centre of all the clerical business of the kingdom, and receives complaints from every quarter of the gradual decline of religion and the increase of a spirit of independence and republicanism. Those who most dread a revolution are fanatics, who persecute even the quiet observers of its approach; and those who wish for it, believing me in the plot, will consider me as a false brother, who unveils it to the

public. England, in the opinion of the best-informed politicians, is the natural ally of our philosophers, and supports a party by means of which she punishes whoever dares to oppose her opinions in France. She carries her fanaticism on this head, and her patriotism, so far, as to be the ruin of every Frenchman who is attached to his king, when the sentiment interferes with her wishes. And it is said, that the French minister, after he has noticed and countenanced a man of this description, abandons him to the danger to which he has exposed him, and suffers him to become in Paris the secret victim of British influence. It is also said, that the same policy is observed in France towards Austria. If this be true, a policy so unnatural and disgraceful is very likely to throw France into a state of apathy; since the intrigues and activity of the cabinets of London and Vienna are the most prominent features of their system of diplomacy. Be this as it may, I will draw up the article in question for insertion in the *Journal de Paris*. I am acquainted with cadet Devaux, who will insert it; and I shall execute my task the more willingly, as, in opposition to the republican and political commotions aimed at by England, you agree with me as to the propriety of pointing out at the same time the moral remedies to be attempted by

a wise and prudent government to the miseries of the revolution and anarchy, of which the clergy and the philosophers so eternally warn us.

Extract from the Journal de Paris *of Wednesday 26th of June 1782, upon the Subject of the former Plans of England for erecting our Southern Protestant Provinces into a Republic.*

" M. Voltaire, and the other historians of Lewis XIV., have not entered at large into the clandestine attempts of Great-Britain for fomenting rebellion in the French southern provinces, and erecting them into a republic, which was the plan heretofore laid down by the cabinet of that country. The Upper Usegoies, the Vivarais, Velay, and Gevaudan, were to form this republic, defended, for the most part, by inaccessible mountains. The country had not then the advantage of the beautiful high roads which the states of Languedoc have since made. This plan of the English court was followed up for more than a century. Lewis XIII., having made peace with England in 1629, reserved the publication of the treaty till he was in the camp before Privas, to which he lay siege with the cardinal Richelieu. When it was proclaimed, the king informed the inhabitants, they had henceforward no succours to expect from that nation. England, however,

disregarding treaties of peace, pursued, in the reign of Anne, the same system. She paid the rebels, who rose five times against Lewis XIV.; she kept up a secret correspondence with the discontented nobility, and had money always ready to be conveyed to them. I have in my possession an account of the different sums employed by queen Anne in this extraordinary business. The particulars of this secret history are still unrevealed; it is only known, that Lewis XIV. agreed to the treaty concluded by his officers with the too celebrated Cavalier, who required, as the price of his submission, that his troops should form a regular regiment, who received a pension and military rank, and ended his days in England.

"The good understanding which took place between England and the regency put an end to all dissensions; and the whole of these counties, placed in later and happier times under the care of the duke of Richelieu, the prince of Beauvau, and the count of Perigord, has been since changed. Messieurs de St. Priest, the intendants, father and son, have greatly contributed to the alteration which has been quietly and insensibly introduced. Academies established in its principal towns have circulated there the learning of the capital; whilst the encouragement given to arts and manufactures

by the archbishops of Narbonne, Toulouse, and Aix, who preside in the states of these provinces, have given a new turn to the minds of the people; commerce and agriculture flourish in the plains and least elevated mountains of the Cevennes. The spirit of fanaticism is extinct, and the enemies of the nation can never more make use of that dangerous instrument of insurrection: the energy of the inhabitants of these southern provinces no longer exists, but for the defence of the country, and the glory of their monarchs, against all her enemies. Lewis XV. was beloved; Lewis XVI. is adored by them.

"If, in publishing my *History of the Establishment and Progress of Protestantism in France and Europe*, I shall solve the following political problem, my time will not have been wholly lost.

"When a portion of a great monarchy has, for many ages, experienced intestine commotion and religious wars, and the rebellion raised in the state has opposed the monarch, what are the means, most conformable to humanity, which reason and experience dictate, for the restoration of public tranquillity?

(Signed) "SOULAVIE."

The article concerted between Dr. Franklin and the author of these Memoirs appeared exactly as it is published, except that the political

remedies against anarchy, drawn up, at the same time, for the *Journal de Paris*, were sent back with an observation, that France having never been more perfectly tranquil, or in a state more remote from revolution, the remedies were an episode wholly foreign to the purpose of the journal. I shall here insert these remedies against anarchy, in the form in which they were written for the journal. They were to have followed immediately after the problem stated above.

"The most effectual way to alleviate the tumults of a state, is, to divert the attention of the parties from the subjects. This may be done by directing their minds—

"To a species of learning that has no connexion with any thing seditious, nor with polemical writings and factions, which are the pests of a state.

"To a system of general commerce.

"To the study of the fine arts.

"To great undertakings, such as national buildings.

"To the ridicule of past violences and errors, political or religious, (but this with the utmost caution).

"To pleasure, festivals, amusements, fashions, dances, and luxury.—And, lastly,

"By softening the manners of the turbulent; taking every means of gaining the surviving leaders, and especially the means of negotiation."

Dr. Franklin agreed with me in opinion, that, to divert men's minds, was the only way, after great

events, of allaying the seditious spirit of a people *. But he did not fully approve the last mean, that of softening their manners. He said, that the societies established in Europe were already too much softened. He acknowledged, however, that fanaticism, anarchy, and all the vices of an impetuous class, originate in a state of mind, which force and violence tend to increase rather than correct; and, he observed, that the very best way of softening those who laboured under them, was to treat with the factious. He was of opinion, that attachment to kings, and the love of liberty, were two powerful and laudable springs of action, which had produced great effects; and, though in this country the republican and royal parties had entered into a struggle for superiority, he felt the utmost veneration for Lewis XVI., whom he looked upon as the founder of the liberties of the United States.

The event has proved, that England, blinded

* The French revolution would never have lasted ten years, had not the partisans of each faction imagined they could only secure it by some constitution, oath, commission, revolutionary tribunal, assassination, proscription, imprisonment, bankruptcy, form of worship, or clubs of their own. From the massacre of Delaunay, to the proscription of *Fructidor*, the chain of these revolutionary means has been never interrupted.

by passion, had judged ill of the protestant party in France. It is true, that this party, in 1789, joined, in the constituent assembly, the party of the philosophers and levellers, the Orleans party, that of the jansenists among the clergy, and of the French presbyterianism, for the overthrow of the ancient constitution of France. But this party was at that time a French one; and, though the protestants were partial to their religious brethren the English, they had been long incapable of being made the tools of that foreign power. They contributed to the revolution, not on account of another, but on their own account; and the English were then too wise to address themselves to the protestants, merely as protestants, to foment troubles in the bosom of the state. They had formerly negotiated with them, because they were malcontents, oppressed, persecuted, and in a state of opposition to the government. For the same reason they addressed the catholics of Bretany, when harassed by the state. England will always be ready to join every party, every sect, and every opinion, to which the government may not be equitable; these it will raise up, torment, and throw into a state of opposition to it. Observe the craft of the cabinet of London: in the war of 1741, it exercised incredible cruelties on the jacobite catholics, while it received the French

bishops and refractory priests to its bosom. Should the government of France again give umbrage to the protestants or the constitutionalists, the same intriguing cabinet would enter into new negotiations. What a lesson is this for the toleration of religious rites and opinions?

These observations are so well founded, that when England wished to stir up the Cevennes under the ministry of Amelot, it was not to the protestants she addressed herself. This minister requested me to draw up a memorial on the local reasons that were favourable to insurrection in the place where it broke out. This spot had been long known to the court of London, as well adapted to its views. It had been the theatre of the war of the Camisards in 1703, and has become celebrated in the revolution for the camp of *Jalès*. The English emissaries, availing themselves of the discontent of the people in this country against the lawyers, raised a company of masked robbers to throw it into confusion. These masks entered the houses of attorneys, advocates, and farmers of the revenue; burned the titles to estates, the roll of proceedings, and particularly the registers of the notaries. But the insurrection went no farther; the king suppressed it by diminishing the customs, which had been its pretence; and the government was informed

by the protestants themselves, of the first respectability, that the court of London was in possession of political and geographical information on the subject of our different provinces susceptible of troubles or insurrection.

CHAP. VIII.

Continuation of the secret War carried on between the French and English Cabinets—Their Treaties of Peace are only Treaties of Falsehood.—The two Nations secretly encourage the opposite Parties in either Government.—Progress of the French Nation towards a Revolution, by Means of the private Intrigues of the English, and the secret Resentment of the two Nations to each other.

AT the accession of Lewis XVI. to the throne, England, on her side, had complaints of another kind against the house of Bourbon. For ages past, the cabinets of London and Versailles had carried on two kinds of war; the one open, and the other concealed.

The nature of the latter was such, that, notwithstanding an official peace, the intestine war of *louis-d'ors* and guineas was constantly carrying on. Peace had been signed in 1714; yet France, who had not forgotten the good understanding between the English and the protestants, annually expended immense sums in the support of the jacobite party. Peace was again signed in 1718; and England did not then forget that France had raised Edward Stuart and his party, against the house of Hanover,

constitutionally established on the throne. France paid an army in Scotland, which would have dethroned the king, but for the prudent conduct of the duke of Cumberland. England was without an army in the interior; and the young pretender had spread such terror through the nation, that the royal army, the court, and constitutional party, in their alarm, had recourse to acts of cruelty against the conquered jacobite party, highly unworthy a nation that boasts, with reason, of its philosophy and humanity. Scarcely was England recovered from her terror, or had put a stop to her cruelty, than she seized the first opportunity of avenging this outrage of the house of Bourbon. She surprised it in its state of degradation, sleeping in the lap of pleasure, under the government of madame de Pompadour, and she compelled us to carry on a war, and sign a dishonourable peace.

France, indignant at the peace she had made, resolved, under the ministry of M. de Choiseul, to be revenged in her turn, for a treaty which all Europe regarded as ignominious. She had failed in her plans during the war of 1741, against the reigning family of England: the jacobite party in Scotland, and the catholic party in Ireland, had been subdued. She then attached herself to the party of the patriots in

America, and succeeded in dethroning the English monarch in the new world.

England was truly sensible of an injury, which was so much the greater, as France had thus given the neutral powers an idea of arming indirectly against her; and had gone so far as even to reproach her, in its manifestoes, for the execution of Mary Stuart, and Charles I., and the expulsion of their lawful king. At this conjuncture, the observers of the open and secret misunderstandings of the two nations made no hesitation to compare their situation to that of Rome and Carthage, fighting for their preservation, and even for their very existence. The dismemberment of the British empire inspired its cabinet with the desire of recovering its strength, and making use of that strength to support its last public quarrel against the house of Bourbon; and soon it ransacked Europe for recruits, gained from among the individuals and parties inimical to France, for the purpose of declaring the most deadly of all wars, that of anarchy. It was not without reason, that the mother-country abandoned the loyalist party in America in the last treaty. This party, which had been indirectly dispossessed of its property by France, became a useful tool in her hands. In Holland, the English redoubled their endeavours to secure the attachment of the

stadtholder's party: that of the anarchists at Geneva had long been devoted to them. We shall soon have an opportunity of seeing the latter one of the chief agents of the social disorganisation directed by England against France. I have said, that England had beaten up for recruits all over Europe, among the individuals and parties inimical to France. I ought to give, at least, one example as to individuals: the parties and factions she enlisted and paid, the course of history will naturally exhibit. In 1770, the court recalled M. de Modave from Madagascar, where he had formed a settlement. Beniousky was appointed to succeed him. Instead of fixing on a spot free from foreign influence, and favourable to commercial intercourse, this Beniousky, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of the colonists, fixed on the most unhealthy part, and treated the neighbouring natives with the utmost tyranny, so that they fled into the interior of the country. After having ruined the colony, Beniousky returned to France, to boast of the success of his plantations. M. Laserre being sent out to take the command, and to inquire into the truth of these representations, he found, instead of such settlement, the most complete disorganisation effected in the space of two years. His perfidy being thus revealed, Beniousky left France; and, going

to London, sailed from thence to found an English colony in Madagascar, and achieve the destruction of the few remaining settlements of the French, which had survived his treachery and his government. The French settlers, seeing him return, were obliged to take arms against his anarchical proceedings and hostilities. Beniousky, at the head of the English, armed on his side, and marched to combat; but he died in the first action, without having succeeded in establishing an English colony, or entirely destroying ours. Alas! there were many Beniouskys in the French government, even during the American war. If men like these had not neutralised the most brilliant expeditions, at a time when the English were without friends or allies, either by sea or land, how great had been the glory of France!

CHAP. IX.

Sketch of the Genevese Government—Two opposite Factions harass that Republic—Character of its Aristocracy—Of its Democracy—The Qualities common to both Parties—Striking Difference of its Worship to that of all other Protestants; of its Politics, to those of every other Government; of the Tenets of its famous Men, to established Doctrines, and of the Principles of its Ministers, to the most admired Governments—How far this Diversity is dangerous to France and the other States of Europe; and how far favourable to Knowledge in the natural Sciences.

THE republic of Geneva, situated between France, Switzerland, and Savoy, is one of the first modern states that, in the 11th century, expelled from its bosom its nobility, clergy, and prince. While legal equality was established by this revolution, the ancient hierarchy was succeeded in reality by a true inequality, and Geneva exhibited the appearance of a people, who, in search of liberty, fell periodically from one revolution to another. The real inequality being constantly opposed to the legal equality, the relative situation between republican and aristocratical manners were the perpetual cause of the most violent struggles between the two factions.

This small nation, so admirable for its genius,

its qualities, and its industry, presents two distinct characters to the view, equally famous in history for their respective excesses. On one hand, we observe a description of manners bearing a striking resemblance to those of the ancient Athenians. Among a part of the inhabitants of Geneva, the graces, taste, levity, and easy character of the country of the fine arts in ancient Greece are to be found: while, on the other hand, we perceive a Lacedæmonian severity, a revolutionary spirit, and all the inflexibility and distrustfulness of the popular system.

Yet, notwithstanding this opposition of interests in the two parties, their hereditary hatred to each other, and the uninterrupted chain of sanguinary revolutions which have been the consequence, they have this feature in common, that their industry in trade and the fine arts, their national spirit, their love of independence, a respect for republican manners, an opposition to the religious and political opinions of all the governments established near them, and an attachment to all distant governments, have made of this small number of men, settled on the borders of the Leman lake, one of the people most celebrated in history. The spirit of their democracy, badly tempered by a false aristocracy, their philosophic and intestine disputes, their dispo-

sition and character so destructive of established society, have kept on the watch, and given a vigilance to the greatest nations; while in religion, by opposing the catholic worship, the English episcopacy, the rituals of Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, they have become the primitive model of all the protestant churches, and, if we may be allowed the expression, the Rome of calvinism.

The general opposition of the Genevese institutions to all other governments and modes of worship is apparent even in the works of its writers and philosophers. The Genevese authors affect, in general, a universal dissent from all the doctrines of Europe. While I am writing, Geneva still possesses illustrious men, though within a few years it has lost several. That stamp of opposition, which characterises their works, against the most celebrated contemporary writers of other countries, has principally contributed to their fame, particularly in the sciences.

Jean Jacques Rousseau owes much of his fame to the strange opposition of his genius to the politics which were professed in the middle of the eighteenth century. Rousseau, disliking all existing social institutions, approved of none but the ideal government he had himself conceived and created in his *Social*

Contract, a work which began to operate a revolution in the public mind.

The inflexibility of Necker's genius, and the contradictoriness of his ideas of government to all those received in France, prevented him from yielding to circumstances, places, and persons. When he accepted the ministry, it was an imaginary France which he meant to govern, instead of the existing one; as it is another doctrine he holds out in his writings, and another order of finances which he is desirous of regulating in his works on government. He executed, as far as was in his power, the theories of his countryman Rousseau; and he organised in France all the revolutions attempted by England at Geneva*.

In natural philosophy, several of the greatest geniuses seem to have employed themselves on the study of nature, with no view but to deprive the French Pliny of his fame. Contradiction in this instance led to truth; and the Genevese naturalists gained a brilliant repu-

* "Necker in France," says d'Ivernois, the corypheus of the Genevese democrats, "was the vigorous pupil of a republic, and he inspired this monarchy, in its distress, with patriotism, a public spirit and influence, which he raised on two great principles drawn from free states—the moral reputation of its ministers, and the publicity of their operations."

tation by the art of confuting. M. de Saussure, by analysing the mineralogic system of Buffon, reduced it to nothing by a long series of demonstrations. Bonnet acquired glory by his opposition to Buffon on animals; and Dutremblay, by his work on polypi.

Tronchin carried the same spirit of contradiction into the art of healing; and it is remembered, that, on his arrival in France, both the rules he explained, and the practice he pursued, were different to all that had been before taught or practised in medicine: he was happy when he found any defective method to oppose.

Thus religious worship, opinions, politics, morals, and literature, were, in general, at Geneva in direct opposition to every thing then established in Europe. A mode of proceeding so new gave to this handful of industrious republicans, at the same time ingenious, enlightened, and laborious, a renown which many states of the second and third rank have failed to obtain, and a situation the most flourishing, which commerce and the arts daily embellished.

The solidity of all natural sciences depending on the truth of the bases on which they are raised, and the political edifice of old institutions having no foundation but on the fictions adopted by the people in past ages, it became

evident, that the policy of Geneva, founded in nature, when introduced into the ancient European societies, must shake their foundations; while the Genevese method, from a contrary reason, when applied to the sciences which have nature for their basis, must produce the most remarkable effects in practice. The following is an example of this, worthy a place in the history of the eighteenth century.

"Behold," said an old and illustrious magistrate of Geneva to me, "the admirable effect which the natural principles of our republic of letters have produced even on the amelioration of the human species. This fact, which constitutes our glory, is apparent in our population. Observe the declining generation, and you will find in it all the vices resulting from the old mode of education. Our women formerly, by intrusting the care and nourishment of their children to the poor Savoyards, frequently left us a deformed, diseased, or lame progeny, the result of want of cleanliness, wretched sustenance, and a stranger's milk.

"Cast, on the other hand, your eyes on the Genevese lately brought up on Rousseau's principles, and you will there see the effects of an education conformable to nature. You will admire our youth, become remarkable for beauty and elegance of form, because our women now, di-

daining to intrust the duties of a mother to strangers and foreigners, have altered, embellished, and perfected two generations; for which humanity is indebted to the ideas of our celebrated moralist."

Unfortunately for the repose of surrounding governments, the Genevese, with their system founded in nature and democracy, diffused every where maxims tending to disorganise all established societies. Blotted from the list of military states, they possessed a tactic of opinions and a philosophical theory more dangerous and destructive than the cannon of warlike nations. The whole of the eighteenth century passed at Geneva either in open revolutions or in intervals in which they were dreaded; and these alternate situations produced polemic writings, which, spread over France and Europe, contributed, like the works of Montesquieu, Mably, and Voltaire, to corrupt our manners and national genius, to introduce into the greatest empire of Europe the frail constitution of Geneva, to establish it in France, as on the borders of the Leman lake, on the ruins of the priesthood, nobility, and monarchy, and to subject it to all kinds of dangers and conspiracies, like that of Geneva, the original model of all organised anarchy in government.

France had formerly established a resident

minister at Geneva, for the sole purpose of observing the progress of political ideas among this handful of aristocratic and democratic citizens, who were in continual danger of destroying each other. The active spirit and violent passions of the opposing parties would not allow them to acknowledge the necessity of a preponderating intermediary authority, to balance their relative interests, to hinder factions from destroying each other, and prevent the dreadful and periodical spectacle, now of a government commanding the exile or massacre of its principal persons, and now of a people menacing the like to its government; a people, whom England stirred up three times in the space of a century, by paying its leaders: a government then unable to maintain itself without the interference of the French and Swiss military: a people, in short, who never suspected itself to be the blind and passive tool of a few ambitious men in its bosom, who were themselves only that of the secret or apparent enmity of England against France.

Fortunately, the neighbouring powers supplied the defect of this irregularity in the Genevese government; and, whenever there appeared to be real danger of a subversion of the social order, France and Switzerland, and afterwards the court of Turin, hastened to arms.

to give their assistance to the Genevese, and deliver them from the oppression of a party, who have for so many years laboured for its destruction.

CHAP. X.

Attachment of the Government and Aristocratic Party in Geneva to France.—Attachment of the Leaders of the Democratic Party to the Court of London.—The latter demand of the former the Collection and Publication of the Laws of the Republic—The Government sees nothing in this Request but a Plan of overthrowing, to its Prejudice, the existing Laws of the State, and of establishing the obsolete ones.—Reasons alleged by the Popular Party against the Government, and by the Government and Aristocratic Party against the Popular one—A Committee, composed of the two Parties, to digest the Plan of a new Code —Its Debates and dilatory Forms—Broken up by the Executive Power, and covered with Ridicule.—Portrait of Reybatz, a Writer of the Popular Party, and of Clavieres, Duroveray, d'Ivernois, Janot, Gasc, Anspach, and other Leaders of the Popular Party, published by d'Ivernois himself.—Clavieres and Duroveray are placed by Mr. Necker near M. de Vergennes, to influence and soften that Minister.—Regulations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs relative to the revolutionary Genevese Party.—Regulations of M. de Maurepas.

THE zeal which Lewis XV. had shown in the various pacifications of Geneva could not restrain the agitation of the general mind in this republic during his reign. Scarcely had Lewis XVI. acceded to the throne of his grandfather, when differences broke out between the popular and aristocratic factions. The government

of Geneva, friendly to France, remembered with gratitude and hope, that the king had many times delivered them from danger, when threatened with subversions by the democracy. Such was its attachment to the house of Bourbon, that it refused to receive a minister from George III., that the resident of France might not have at Geneva a neighbouring power to be upon his guard against, and that England might not have also a representative and an observer at the very gates of France. "It suffices," wrote one of the old Genevese government to me, "that the representatives (the democrats) are the secret friends of England, for us to refuse the request of George III., of receiving an English resident in the heart of the republic. We wrote to his Britannic majesty with every expression due to his rank; but we observed to him, that, from the situation and narrow extent of our republic, we could not consistently with its interests behold with indifference a British deputy in our little state. The king of England appeared to yield to our reasons, and showed neither anger nor resentment in consequence."

France was no less persuaded than the old government of Geneva, that the popular party of the republic were friends to the English; it was therefore enough for this party to express

a wish upon the subject, for it to be disagreeable both to its own government and that of France, as well as to the aristocratic party of the cantons of Berne and the republic of Zurich, the friends, allies, and protectors of Geneva. Consequently, the demand made by the representatives or popular party, of a digest of all the laws of the republic, was considered as insidious in France, Geneva, and Berne, tending to the overthrow of laws long respected, reviving those which were become obsolete, and destroying the union which the Genevese government, France, and Switzerland had effected for the republic in prior pacifications.

The tricks for delay, and the aristocratic resistance made to the digest of new laws, soon awakened the popular party, and they showed their anger, by making use of their constitutional right of removing four of the magistrates most inimical to their views. The two parties had named a legislative committee for the revision of the laws. Eleven commissioners, elected out of the aristocratic party, and ten from the popular one, met for this business; and France notified by its minister resident there to all parties and to the citizens, that she was answerable for the tranquillity of Geneva; that she had a right to keep it in peace; that the plan respecting the laws of

this committee tended to the overthrow of the constitution, which she had guaranteed in 1738; and that it was not in the midst of sedition and the violence of intestine divisions, that Genéva could expect to frame a code of laws productive of the happiness of the state.

"No doubt," said the count de Vergennes to the French resident at Geneva, "the republic is at liberty to make its own laws; but there are powers who have solemnly engaged not to allow any individuals whatever, even of its own citizens, to impose them."

The heads of the popular party, with the pride of ancient Romans, took offence at these pretensions of the monarch and the expressions of his minister. "We are," said they, "every where considered as useful citizens, and, as such, are respected among foreigners. At home we are kings, and it is no doubt a great consolation to reflect, that there is a spot on the surface of the globe where we are sure of finding a retreat; where, our own sovereigns and masters of our actions, we live far from the wars and commotions which disturb other governments, far from the despotism by which they are crushed, and from the haughtiness, insolence, and vices, which degrade and destroy them: and when this spot is in one of the most charming situations possible, it may be conceived how fondly

we cherish a share in its government, and the right of dwelling in its precincts. We wish for a code of laws, because we have endured all the vicissitudes that have so often convulsed the Roman republic; and because, *without having, like Rome, a body of hereditary patricians, we have a senate, under the title of the two hundred, tending to aristocracy*, and popular committees under the name of a *general council:* accordingly we are anxious that the rights and relative powers of the senate and the people should be defined and promulgated.

"The council of two hundred is our executive power: aided by a lesser council, it regulates the finances, police, and public force; it executes the laws; it is the arm and the mouth of the sovereign; and there never was in Europe a prime minister whose power invaded more rights or provinces.

"The council-general is the assembly of the sovereign; its province is to establish the imposts, institute laws, decide upon peace and war, as well as form alliances; the supreme power resides in it, and yet it has scarcely ever been any thing more than the subject of the delegated executive power; it can neither act, nor make laws, nor promulgate its decrees, till after a previous agreement of the lesser council and the executive council of the two hundred. The sovereign power of Geneva is therefore a paru-

lytic, unable to move any further than as it is allowed by a part of its subjects.

"Hence the frequent and periodical dangers of our country. The rights of the two parties being neither acknowledged nor fixed, they run to arms, and a civil war arises in the heart of the city.

"We had selected a committee for drawing up, in a time of quiet, a collection of all our laws, and proposing them to the acceptance of the sovereign. What was our surprise to find, that the aristocrats had caused the party of the people to be excluded from this commission, the party of the sovereign power charged with assisting in this digest! The Genevese nation was thus condemned to be reduced to the mere prerogative of admitting or rejecting the plan of the laws.

"The aristocratic part of the government became, however, ashamed of the mutilation of this legislative committee. It was then agreed, that two members of the executive council of two hundred should be admitted into it, well known for their attachment to democratic principles; and hence the debates which took place in the committee during the two years limited for the digest of the code, the withdrawing of some individuals, and the discouragement of others.

"On the expiration of this period, in the month of September 1779, the committee re-

quired the executive council of two hundred to obtain from the sovereign people a prolongation of its powers. The two hundred answered only by breaking up the legislative committee, and loading it with sarcasm and reproaches. Thus the executive council of two hundred carried its despotism at Geneva so far as to put an end to a committee constituted by the republic itself, and thus evade the code. Where then, in this instance, are the factious, if they are not in the executive council, or rather the aristocratic part of the government interested to strengthen its own despotism?"

Such were the grievances of the popular party. The partisans of aristocratic power were not without their reasons with which to oppose them. They declared, "that the plan respecting the code tended to overthrow the constitution guaranteed by the neighbouring powers, and to which Geneva was indebted for its prosperity and fame. We will never," said they, "allow of conceding to the people prerogatives, which they require without knowing the danger that would be incurred. What right have the popular party to insult the aristocratic institutions of the republic? It is to the wise combination of two interests, that of the rich and of the poor, that we owe our flourishing condition. Does it become the people to insult the friendly assistance of its neighbour, secured

to the republic by the mediatory powers? Ought we not rather to esteem ourselves happy, that at a moment so deplorable, when the people and the government have run to arms, when the country is in danger, and tottering to its fall, a friendly hand is extended to offer its mediation for us? We have seen France interpose to influence the discussions of the greatest potentates. Can there then be a greater glory or honour to the republic of Geneva, than the interference of this monarch, who condescends to penetrate even into our intestine factions, particularly when our independence is respected by France, and every neighbouring nation friendly to our internal prosperity and peace? All power is doubtless derived from the people; its assembly is the sovereign, who expresses its legislative will in the great council; but because it can will, give orders, and is the source of all power, does it follow that it cannot be inimical to the state, nor ordain its subversion? It implies, that the whole people govern the people; but it is necessary, that the whole people delegate the power which they cannot exert in mass. The syndics, the council of twenty-five and of two hundred, constituting the executive power, are orders constituted by the state for the administration of government. Their existence and power cannot depend on the will of a general council, because the sovereign cannot refuse to support a

government, and the preserving order in the state. Each order of government *exists* of *necessity*: if they did not thus exist, the sovereign power could certainly create others; but were it to use this privilege of creating anew, Geneva would no longer be *that interesting Geneva, the country of liberty, literature, and arts*; but the aggregate of a people, calling itself sovereign, ever revolting, ever degraded, and promoters of anarchy, making use in its caprice and blindness of that disorganising power, which it cannot exert by any right in any circumstances, the wish of the people being always their own happiness, and not the destruction of society. This disorganisation then can only be the wish of a few factious individuals, malcontents, or idlers, who, unwilling to follow the natural road to wealth, wish to invade by force that which the economy of our citizens has already got together; and, as the neighbouring powers share not in these furious passions, they are interested to suppress the embers of discord, which have been so many years smothering in our country, and which it is the wish of the friends of anarchy to relumine. The leaders of these commotions, the factious who ask a code of laws, are but tyrants who conceal an intention of overthrowing all established authority, and subjecting the very party which gives them

their influence in the republic. Tyranny is thus the natural result of their plans; for, when they have subdued the government and the aristocracy, where will be the necessary counterpoise in the state for the maintenance of that wealth which can alone, by money in hand, give prosperity to that part of the people who are deficient in foresight or conduct, or unable to advance any thing to the general fund? The new planned code is then evidently used only as a pretence for the overthrow of the state. Fatio, who, at the commencement of the century, had thrown Geneva into the same confusion by the demand of a code of laws, fell a martyr to his attempt. The aristocratic party of Geneva is resolved to do every thing to prevent its execution.

A minister of the gospel, of the name of Reibatz, wrote at Geneva, in 1779, the apology of the leaders of the popular party. In 1794, he sent to the committee the apology of the effect of their principles, that is to say, a mutilated history of the tyranny, massacres, proscriptions, and pillage of the victorious party, of which he was the minister at Paris. Among the popular party was likewise distinguished the young advocate Duroveray, well known for his factious sentiments. "He had been remarkable," says d'Ivernois, "from his infancy, for the ardour and inflexibility of his

disposition; a friend to political liberty, carrying his contempt for the pride of the rich so far, as openly to brave it, and rejecting, as the effect of a weak complaisance for them, the common forms of politeness; endowed with popular eloquence, and beloved, as men are ever sure to be, who, possessed of youth and talents, are perfectly devoted to their country."

This portrait of Duroveray, drawn by one of his companions in the revolution, is a general one, which may serve for d'Ivernois himself, as well as Clavieres, Flournois, Vieusseux, and the rest who led the city of Geneva to its ruin. Clavieres and Duroveray were the chief among them; they went to negotiate in person the neutrality of two cantons, allies and friends to Geneva, of whose interference their party were afraid; then, carrying their boldness still further, they presented themselves to M. de Vergennes at Versailles, on the invitation of Mr. Necker. This was but an unfortunate introduction for the deputies of the Genevese democracy, considering the opposition existing in the cabinet of Versailles between the minister of finances and the minister of foreign affairs.

The count de Vergennes, however, received them with so much allability as to inspire them with confidence. He observed, that it was not suited to the dignity of his master to treat with a

changeable and popular government, which was liable every year to be overthrown by cabals; nor could he allow a small state on his frontier to be a scene of continual discord. He observed, that in Geneva lay the security of Burgundy, and that such a place would be ill defended by a democracy. He declared to them, that, by blockading Geneva, means would be found to prevent such a government from being established there. He further observed, that the king had no wish to make war upon them; that he would not besiege it as formerly, but do every thing in concert with his friends the Swiss. "I will give you one piece of advice," said he, "which is, not to endeavour to raise partisans among men of letters: some of the best of them may have notions very good for republics, but in France they are of no weight, and we do not follow their advice. For myself, I wish to take no other concern in your affairs but such as may establish peace among you, and shall be happy if you can point me out the means."

The count de Vergennes did not speak as a politician: he told them only what he wished, and addressed them in the language of truth. What he did not tell them were secrets of state: he did not therefore add, "You are a party purchased by England; or you are protected by Mr.

Necker, who sent for you hither; for which reason I wish to ruin you, Genevese patriots, for the advantage of the aristocracy of your country; for the very same reason that I raise the American patriots to the rank of princes, and make war against the royalists." Neither did M. de Vergennes tell them his apprehensions as to their commotions and their writings; but he expressed them to others. "I study," said he, "the Genevese disputes as a politician; for it is to be feared that, after their writings have sown discord at home, they may spread the fanaticism which characterises them abroad, and their neighbours may pass from curiosity to imitation."

But M. Hennin, who had been clerk to Vergennes when he became the French resident at Geneva, very expressly informed the deputies of the popular party, that he advised them to endeavour to restore tranquillity to their country, because, by losing the present opportunity for doing it, they would be obliged to be regulated from without, and Geneva would be no longer any thing but what the powers who are guarantees for its tranquillity might please: and he added to Clavieres, "Take care of yourselves, for it is no longer the age of republics." This was the same Clavieres who was to pay for the 20th of June out of the royal

treasury, and prepare the way for the 10th of August against Lewis XVI.

Young d'Ivernois, eminent amongst the popular party, seeing the inflexibility of the count de Vergennes, and that the exertions of Duroveray and Clavieres had been to no purpose, thought fit to address M. de Maurepas, the confidential minister of Lewis XVI., to dispel the storm which threatened his party.

M. de Maurepas gave them the wisest advice: "Believe what I say, my children," said the old man, who was on the verge of the tomb, "do not cause yourselves to be talked of: your rulers say now, as in my first ministry, that their clockmakers may esteem themselves happy that they choose to govern them at all. The bad hand we before made of it in 1738, ought to have cured us for ever of the itch for meddling with republican constitutions. My own opinion is, that we have enough to do in our own government, without interfering in yours. The first protection we owe you is not even to take notice of you. I am surprised that we are not yet tired of caring for you, and have not yet found out the means, by leaving you alone to the disputes in your own municipality, to shut them up within the small circle within which they arose."

CHAP. XI.

The French and Genevese Governments strengthen the Aristocratic Party by joining that Part of the Natives who were flattered with the Hope of new Concessions.—Considerations on the Utility of a third Party in all States ill organised and liable to Revolutions.—Extreme Distrust of the Popular Party.—It flatters the People, and robs it of its most valuable Prerogatives to adopt them itself.—The Natives, formerly no better than Helots, are flattered by both Factions—They despise the Popular Party, and side with the Government.—Resentment of the People of Geneva.—The Attorney-general Duroveray denounces the Head of the Natives, the French Envoy, and France itself.—Anger of Count de Vergennes—He demands that this Denunciation be burnt by the Hands of the Executioner, and its Author displaced.—First Insurrection of the Inhabitants of Geneva—They take up Arms, and seize the Military Posts of the Town.—Mr. Necker's Conduct in this Conjuncture—He favours the Genevese People, and warns them to shun the Effusion of Blood, if they would avoid the Anger of Lewis XVI.—Mr. Necker retires from the Ministry, and M. de Vergennes prepares to punish the Heads of the Genevese Democracy.

THOUGH France might have sent an army against the popular party, such was its opinion of the boldness of this faction, that it resolved to strengthen the aristocratic one by adding to it that of the natives, who had disturbed the republic in all antecedent revolutions. The

eight chiefs of the natives remained still in exile during the progress of the existing revolution; and though the government had allowed to many of them the right of citizens, they were still an oppressed party. In the present conjuncture, their numbers gave them an advantageous opportunity of joining either side; that of the government proved the quickest and the most expert; for, being engaged in a dangerous disagreement with the people, they thought it best to grant the natives those privileges from industry, which the *citizens*, till then, exclusively possessed, and which, by putting them on a footing with the natives, would favour a dissension in the state, which would be useful to the governing party, by giving them at least an increase of power and authority.

Geneva, perhaps, in the present circumstances, might have thought of the necessity of introducing three orders, and consequently three interests, into the organisation of the state, since it is observable, that in governments where three interests are established, the coalition of the intermediary party, either with the nobles or the people, prevents those acts of violence which bring on the dissolution of the government. But men's passions were at that time in a state of fermentation, and the parties of Geneva were too opposite to the government for even

the wisest men in the republic to be aware of all the vices in the social institutions, and the permanent dangers produced from a hated and turbulent democracy, ever acting in presence of a timid and ambitious aristocracy.

France and the government of Geneva hoped, therefore, to make that use of the natives, which a legal intermediate authority would in the same circumstances have produced; and they gained over this party by flattery, promises and concessions. From that moment, the aristocratic party talked no longer of treating on the rights and customs of the people. The government, by attaching the *natives* and *discontented inhabitants*, gained over a third of the population of the republic. This increase of force and means immediately gave hopes to the count de Vergennes of more easily subduing the democratic party, the natives and inhabitants being descendants of French, Helvetic, or German families, who were more attached to France than the ancient Genevese popular party, long since misled as to France by the factious, or rendered independent.

The latter bethought themselves a little too late of their inadvertency, in overlooking the natives. Duroveray, on his return from Versailles, got together about a thousand citizens of the popular party, to gain for the natives still further concessions from government. Such

then was the fate of the natives and inhabitants at this juncture, that, regarded before in Geneva as the Helots were formerly in Sparta, deprived of the rights of citizens, condemned, on their last application for redress, as a seditious body, and exiled in the persons of their late chiefs, they now found themselves courted by all parties; so that the democracy, from pure hatred to the government, consented to make the greatest sacrifices in their favour, and carried their generosity so far as to give them hopes of being admitted into the general assembly, and honoured with the dignity of *citizens of Geneva*. Never before had the natives found themselves so advantageously situated, for never before had the two opposing parties of Geneva united in their favour. In this remarkable moment, they might have restored tranquillity to the republic: by accepting the concessions granted, they might have negotiated a peace between the two parties, either by remonstrances, or by threatening with its vengeance, if necessary, whichever of the two should have refused to sacrifice its revenge for the happiness of their country. But the natives, finding themselves in danger from the resentment of France, if they joined the people, whom that power had resolved to suppress, thought it better and more prudent to share the fate of the

Genevese aristocracy, strong from the protection of France, than to fall in with the popular party, whom the chiefs of the natives despised.

Clavieres, Dentand, Janot, and the attorney-general of the republic, Duroveray, disconcerted by the conduct of the natives, believed them to be admitted into the secrets of the count de Vergennes, and expected the most disastrous consequences. They had wished to extend to an oppressed part of the republic its greatest immunities, and they found their offers despised. Seeing the danger at hand, they began to despair: in this crisis Duroveray demanded admission to the council, and announced "the criminal and deep-laid intrigues of the French resident, and Cornuaud, the leader of the natives, upon matters which the republic of Geneva had to answer for to itself, and to itself only." Duroveray, and his colleagues Gasc and Janot, in 1794 represented, that the house of the French envoy was a tribunal from whence the French minister took upon him to give a secret bias to the affairs of Geneva, delivering his instructions to the party favoured by him, and obtaining thereby the power to dictate his wishes in the heart of a free and independent state. This was always the language of the English party when desirous of ruining a French minister devoted to his country.

The council replied to Duroveray, "that the declaration he had made was highly dangerous both to himself and the republic, and advised him not to make it known."

"Let the council," replied Duroveray, "yield to the urgency of my representation, and complain to France of the irregularity of her proceedings. The office would be dangerous for me to undertake, though not so to your body: but should your hearts be frozen with fear, when your duty requires you to act, it becomes me, in my forensic capacity, to fulfil it: I will then watch over the independence of Geneva, and render myself worthy of the office I hold."

Duroveray attacked the count de Vergennes only in an indirect manner in this denunciation. He appeared still to doubt whether the minister corresponded with Cornuaud, the leader of the natives, and bestowed praises on the latter, that he might with the more force and irony declaim against the court of Versailles: but neither M. Hennin nor the count de Vergennes was deceived; and Geneva, expecting and dreading some extraordinary event, saw the fatal courier arrive, with the demand of satisfaction for the conduct of the attorney-general. The term of four-and-twenty hours granted by France expired, without any determination having been

adopted. The French messenger, irritated and impatient, declared himself ready to set off, if the desire of France was not complied with; and the Genevese government ordained, that the remonstrance of Duroveray should be suppressed, that its author should be suspended from his office, and put under arrest, till such time as the king of France had declared what further he required. The count de Vergennes was not yet appeased; a second courier arrived, with the information that he required Duroveray's remonstrance to be burned by the hand of the common executioner; and that its author, struck out from the roll of the citizens of Geneva, should be declared unworthy of filling any office. This is the same Duroveray who, by the treaty of union between Geneva and France, was also expelled from the class of French citizens. Thus, under the ancient regime and M. de Vergennes, he was despoiled of his rank of citizen in one country, for his attachment to England; and under the French republic and M. Talleyrand, he again lost the same privilege in another. So true is it, that if England aims secret blows in France against its enemies, those of France, under every form of government, will find themselves struck at in the face of the world.

But the severity of France, and the humiliation of Duroveray, inflamed the popular party.

The government began to talk of the necessity of making still more striking examples, if the latter proceeded to violence. The most prejudiced supporters of authority cited the instance of Fatio, who suffered death in the obscurity of a prison for having demanded a new code; while the most factious of the people were for throwing off the yoke, and destroying their tyrants. In the terror naturally resulting from this state of things, each party named its committee of defence; apprehensions every day increased, and Geneva beheld the crisis of its fate approaching. But among the party of the people appeared the utmost daringness and the most invincible courage. The government party then exhibited a greater share of prudence and timidity. On the 5th of February 1781, a dispute happening between two of the natives, a crowd soon gathered round. In the tumult which ensued it was rumoured, that the patriots had seized the pretence to take up arms; and at night the popular party went to the lower part of the town, and the opposite one to the arsenal for arms. The commandant, who was unfriendly to the popular party, mistaking these young aristocrats for popular rebels, fired on them; two were wounded, and a third killed on the spot. In a moment the dread and disorder became general: at the noise of arms, the people ran to the

town-house, where they found only a few aristocrats assembled, commanded by Genevese officers in the French pay. These the people suffered to retire by night, and in small companies. The insurgents got quietly in possession of the gates and military posts, and found themselves, without resistance, masters of the republic. In the moment of surprise they offered, as to criminals, a general amnesty to the conquered aristocratic party; but on two conditions: "first, that they should by law sanction the concessions made to the natives; and, secondly, that they should renounce all interference whatever of foreign powers."

The vanquished party knew better than to give up its strength; it promised to agree to the concessions for the benefit of the natives, but evaded that respecting the mediation of foreign states. But the popular party determined notwithstanding to pursue its end, and make use of its power for forming a code, by which a hundred natives were to be called to the rank of citizens, for legally sanctioning the other concessions, and proclaiming an amnesty. The opposite party despised the offer, protested against every law made in the present state of the republic, and declared, that they wished only to hold their security *from those august powers who were its guarantees*. The general assembly of the sove-

reign people sanctioned, almost unanimously, a law disapproved by the government and the allied powers.

The Genevese people at once created and legalized the work; it was, therefore, but natural to expect, that the government, who had not concurred in drawing up the law, would refuse to enforce the edict whenever it should have the opportunity. The people had scarcely laid down their arms, before the government protested against the edict. The people, on the other hand, protested against the protestations; and the government replied, that they could not execute the edict without betraying their country. They declared, that the edict "was but a justification of a plan for subjecting the state to a demagogue democracy, and an act of oppression which ought to be struck out of the Genevese code." The people, on this reply, made new remonstrances; and the senate returned, "that they looked on the edict as null." Rage and despair seized on the natives; they ran to arms; the democrats joined the natives, and they took possession of the gates of the town. The post which surrendered without firing a gun was spared; that which resisted was instantly stormed. The people, scattered, without leader or general, became in the night, and in a few hours, masters of the city. In the tumult

one of them ordered an old woman to leave her window. She was deaf, and, not hearing him, was instantly killed.

During this miserable and sanguinary night, the senators and syndics, like the senate of Rome on the irruption of the Gauls, awaited their fate with calmness and dignity in the town-house. The populace, uttering a volley of imprecations against the government, advanced with the utmost fury to destroy them. It was in vain that a handful of armed citizens endeavoured to stop the progress of the banditti. They were all disarmed and repulsed, and the insurgents made their way into the senate-house. The magistrates were instantly dragged from their seats, and conducted to prison. Their families were guarded. The dawn of day alone terminated this disastrous and bloody scene. There was no longer any government in Geneva, but many committees of general safety and clubs. The syndics, degraded from their rank, were become nothing but hostages, which gave impunity to the victorious party. France need no longer wonder at its 10th of August and 20th of June. Clavieres, become minister of Lewis XVI., who prepared the second and directed the first, had tried the same means against his own magistrates. D'Ivernois, the chief mover of the whole, called this revolution a popular excess,

which he attributed to Cornuaud, the leader of the natives; whilst the latter, who was absent, retorted the accusation on the heads of the popular party.

Meantime, M. de Vergennes was endeavouring to ruin Mr. Necker, then minister of finances, with the king. All the accounts of the chiefs of the patriot party prove, that this minister was much less attached to the party of the Genevese government, than to that of the people who were in arms against it. The information conveyed to Lewis XVI. even announced the director-general to be the principal author of the commotion; yet the veracity of history requires it to be said, with regard to this celebrated man, that if he maintained the right which the democratic party naturally possessed to be heard by France, who were determined on its ruin, he did not fail to threaten the leaders of the popular party with the utmost resentment of Lewis XVI. if they allowed a drop of blood to be shed. And so well were Mr. Necker's sentiments on this head known to the insurgents, that I cannot doubt but they contributed to repress, in 1781, the sanguinary and violent passions of this party, which broke forth again, under my observation, in 1794, when they found themselves in similar circumstances supported from without.

The opinion of the democratic party of Ge-

neva respecting Mr. Necker deserves to be recorded, since it is necessary to the history of the reign of Lewis XVI. that the character of this minister should be thoroughly known: "The first and most irreparable of all the misfortunes of the popular party," say d'Ivernois and its other leaders, "and the forerunner of every other, was the retreat of the illustrious Necker, to which their great enemy, M. de Vergennes, did not a little contribute. How much reason had they then to mix their tears with those of the French! tears which were every day embittered by the calamities of which this was the prelude: yet who will believe, that in the retirement to which Mirabeau pursued this virtuous man, he was accused of having forgotten his native city, and of having been unwilling to risk his credit to preserve it from the opprobrium destined for it by the count de Vergennes? Those who accused him did not know, that, six months before his retreat, the Genevese minister had entered into an explanation with M. de Maurepas on the danger of any interference in the misunderstanding of his countrymen. Mr. Necker reserved his strength for the moment when his colleague should pass from threats to action. And what proves the ascendancy of the former in this business is, that it was only on his re-

treat, and immediately after it, that M. de Vergennes ceased to negotiate, and induced the aristocratic party to come to extremes with the popular one. To conclude, Mr. Necker's refusal to take an oath to the new constitution ought, one would imagine, to impose silence on his calumniators." Notwithstanding this, the aristocratic party in the government had unanimously elected Mr. Necker a member of the council of two hundred; and I cannot imagine how a person of his humanity could preserve any attachment to a party which had taken arms against the government, who wished to reign exclusively, and whom he believed so capable of violence, that he had threatened them with the anger of one of the greatest potentates, if they proceeded to any sanguinary excesses.

M. de Vergennes' opinion as to Genevese insurgents was still more decisive. Scarcely were the aristocratic party in prison, and the people under arms, than he discerned the whole commotion to originate merely in their resentment against France, who had only insisted on the punishment of Duroveray, and prepared for the chastisement of the leaders of the insurgents, in order to restore the aristocrats in full power, tempered by the popular authority of the sovereign council, and to suppress the revolutionary

spirit in Geneva, which alarmed him, from his persuasion, that they were only making an essay at Geneva of the revolutions intended in France. He therefore negotiated with the Swiss, still balancing, as to the state of affairs in the latter, with the king of Sardinia, who watched them with anxious curiosity; and with the king of France, who had his doubts on the propriety of interfering in quarrels of this nature. This prince, after having read various memorials for and against this intestine war, was apprehensive of disturbing the independence of a sovereign state, whose weakness he respected, and by his hesitation greatly incommoded the minister for foreign affairs; nor did Lewis XVI. resolve on sending troops into Geneva, till informed that the government was only abandoned and made prisoner from its attachment to France, a situation in which he thought he ought not to desert those who adhered to him.

CHAP. XII.

The Swiss join with France and the King of Sardinia to suppress the Popular Party, and to deliver the Genevese Hostages from Prison.—Private Opinion of Lewis XVI.—M. de Vergennes calls the Genevese Revolution an Epidemic Disease.—Protest of the Genevese Fugitives—Revolutionary Party in a State of Terror—Their Negotiations with the British Ministry.—The Activity and Preparations of the Genevese for maintaining a Siege—Threats of the Generals of the three combined Powers.—Anecdote of Womerat.—Military Summonses of Geneva.—Exile of twenty-two revolutionary Leaders.—Anspach's Speech in his Club.—Entrance of the three Armies into Geneva.—The Delivery from Prison of the eleven Magistrates—Suppression of the eleven provisionary Members.

THE Swiss had evinced to the Genevese their wish for toleration, friendship, and pacification, previous to the events just related: but when the revolutionary writers had spread abroad those works in which they boasted of the destruction and captivity of their government, justifying themselves by the sovereign power of the people, and declaring this revolution to be as legal in Geneva as the removal of a minister in France, the Swiss party, which had till then been favourable to them, became neuter, and raised the aristocratic party against them, who

had as yet restrained within bounds the resentment of the court of France. "By what right," said Steiguer to the minority of Berne, "by what right do a faction of the Genevese dare to rise in arms, seize on the authority, and freeze with terror men's minds by the most dreadful assassinations, and the imprisonment of the administration*? Is is not in the nature of things in all places, and at all times, that the people should submit to those who govern? Will Switzerland, so famous for its love of the laws, for the respectability of its government, and the good order predominating among the people, be a peaceful spectator of the anarchy introduced by a few individuals in Geneva? Let us allow the doctrine to be propagated in Switzerland, that a small part of the people, and even a popular assembly, may destroy the government; we shall soon see one part of our cantons overthrown by the intrigues of a few individuals, whose eagerness for the wealth and offices of the state will induce them to dye those peaceable regions with blood."

* They had murdered the mother of an aristocrat, who was looking out of her window at a revolutionary mob, and who, being deaf, did not hear the orders given for her to withdraw; and there is no doubt, if the aristocrats had not had the prudence to give up every thing, that a general and dreadful massacre would have been the price of their resistance.

The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, and the revolutionary execution of the system of that sovereignty, incensed the count de Vergennes so much, that he sent reiterated couriers and remonstrances to the court of Turin and the government of Berne, to accelerate the march of the troops against the usurpers of authority, to deliver the imprisoned administration, and chastise the commission. It was a private and immediate remark of Lewis XVI. which determined the courts allied to Geneva to resort to military measures; a remark which M. de Vergennes was very careful to communicate to them. "While the political differences at Geneva were confined to matters of mere dispute, it was to be doubted," said the king, "whether France had any right to take notice of them. But now, when principles, destructive of all society, have established there one set of people, who tyrannise over and imprison the other; now that this usurpation has seized on an authority disputed by all classes; I owe it to the Genevese government, whose ally and protector I am, as my ancestors have ever been, to give them relief and assistance in their distress." The king thought beside of the security and preservation of his own government. M. de Vergennes had persuaded him, that the Genevese revolution

was a contagion which might make its way into France, and had before said so to Clavieres, when the latter was at Paris. Prior to the dissolution of the Genevese government, the revolutionists had treated M. de Vergennes' accusation of their intending to overthrow it as a calumny only; and now, when it was overturned, and the calumny realised, they still treated as such the reports at Paris of their intention to propagate their violent passions in the heart of France, as was averred by M. de Vergennes. It was necessary to wait for the 20th of June and the 10th of August, to be allowed to say, that the Genevese revolutionists intended the destruction of France. It was necessary to have in hand the act of the British government, by which 50,000*l.* sterling is granted to their party, to be able positively to assert, that the Genevese revolutionists were a faction in the pay of England *; as if it were not before known, that England had at all times assisted the revolutionary party in Geneva; as if the Deluc, Delolmes, and other expatriated heads of that party, were not even now in places of the utmost trust and confidence in England, such as

* M. de Vergennes said, "It is much to be feared, that the Genevese and their writings will disseminate in other countries the political fanaticism which inspires them, and induce their neighbours to pass from curiosity to imitation."

Memoirs of d'Ivernois.

that of Deluc, lecturer to the queen. We ought to have waited for the siege of Geneva in 1794, the excesses against the French legation, the massacre of the patriotic party, the pillage of the pocket books and plate of the rich, the imprisonment of one fourth of the Genevese nation, and the proscriptions which ensued; to have calumniated the jacobins of Paris, the revolutionary tribunal, and private character of Robespierre; and to venture to say, that Geneva was governed by a banditti, who waited only a favourable moment to stain the city with the blood of the vanquished, and deliver it up to plunder.

Yet all these miseries were foretold by M. de Vergennes. He had done more, he had announced them to the senate of Berne: so that, with equal firmness and foresight, he obtained from Lewis XVI. the departure of his troops, to blockade Geneva, to deliver the oppressed party, and destroy the oppressors, should they persist in their usurpation.

Meantime, the interior of Geneva exhibited a scene of the utmost cowardice on the part of the conquerors, and fortitude on that of the conquered. The administration, to whom Geneva principally owed its flourishing state, wealth, and fame, degraded in the eyes of the revolutionists, had now lost all its titles

and honours. They were no longer called by any other name than *the hostages of the scales*, from the name of the inn where these magistrates were crowded together. The national pity had proposed their being in one place, to lessen their misfortunes, by their sharing them together; while the ferocious conductors of the revolution unwillingly granted any alleviation to its unfortunate prisoners*. However timid and pusillanimous, yet, in the time of danger, no sooner were the hostages confined, than the nation showed the utmost courage and attachment to their authority. It said, that the revolutionists imprisoned them in order to murder them, should France persist in its intentions against Geneva. It even rumoured, that they had done still worse, by heaping up the gunpowder of the republic in the cathedral and

* We can judge of the plans and intentions of these leaders of the revolution, by what M. d'Ivernois has written on that head. His ideas, ten years afterwards, have a refinement of cruelty which exceeds all the inventions our own revolution has produced. "This first step," that of guarding the aristocratic leaders, says d'Ivernois, "dangerous at first from its violence, was equally mistaken in the imprudence committed by placing all the hostages in one spot, where they could communicate with each other, where fear had imposed on the timid, and recovered them by degrees from their dejection. *It is certainly true, that, had they been put in separate dungeons, they would have had no communication with each other.*"

that part of the town near the aristocrats, in order, according to some, to blow it up, in case of a siege, or, according to others, to compel the government party to share the danger. These hostages, at the same time, wrote to M. de Vergennes, expressing their desire that their situation might not prevent him from pursuing his intentions for the deliverance of Geneva; declaring at the same time, that they esteemed themselves honoured in being the victims chosen for the safety of their country, and that they should die gloriously for the maintenance of Genevese liberty; while it was their wish neither to oppress the predominating party, nor to be oppressed by them, conformably to the constitutions of all free states.

The Genevese fugitives who had settled at Lausanne and in the Pays de Vaud, protested against this usurpation. "In the night, between the 8th and 9th of April of this year (1782)," said the emigrants, "a faction, composed of the representatives, citizens, natives, and inhabitants, got possession of the chief posts of Geneva, its artillery, squares, streets, and town-house, committing unheard-of excesses, shedding the blood even of the unresisting, of one of its syndics in particular, and massacring those who were defenceless. This faction made the city a theatre of horrors, such as had never before disgraced

our unfortunate country, which has been so often convulsed." They concluded by observing, that the evil intentions of the party were manifested by the violent detention and cruel outrages of the factious against their magistrates; by the destruction of their lesser and greater council, who formed a part of the constitution of the state; by the illegal formation of new councils, into which their adherents were introduced; by the institution of a secret committee, a tyrannical tribunal, composed of eleven of the factious, and possessed of powers the most alarming to the safety of the citizens, and wholly opposite to the spirit of the republic, being nothing in fact but an inquisition, who kept the lawful magistrates in bonds; that, beside, the existing government of Geneva being nothing less than the most decided tyranny, all that such a government might decree was null, and incapable of receiving the legal sanction of the republic. They concluded, by protesting, in the face of Europe, against every law and measure of a government of this kind, addressing their protest to the French government and the allies of Geneva.

The Bernese continuing to look on them as a mere faction, carried their resentment so far as to forbid its subjects holding any communication with Geneva, in its revolutionary state.

The factious who governed the republic adopted various measures for dispelling the approaching storm. They had formerly inspired terror in the Genevese administration, they now suffered from it themselves. Three armies were at once advancing, not against the republic, but against their party: already, in imagination, they beheld the aristocracy they had imprisoned re-established and victorious, and dreaded the retaliation they ought to suffer: already, according to the writers of this party, d'Ivernois and Duroveray were negotiating with England for their favourable treatment; and, according to M. de Vergennes' memorials presented to Lewis XVI., they were willing to become useful to Great-Britain, to the injury of France. D'Ivernois, in his dispatches to London, earnestly intreated lord Abingdon to protect the fortunes of their little state, ready to fall a prey to the maxims of tyranny. This leader of tyrants detained his own government in prison, while he intreated lord Abingdon to deliver him from despotism. Daniel Laroche, Siordet, and Duroveray, carried on the negotiation at London; and d'Ivernois intreated lord Abingdon to present them to the English ministry in the character of envoys, provided with the necessary authority for acting in the name of the Genevese with the ministry, and all those at London

whose generosity might induce them to take interest in their situation. The jailors of the imprisoned government took upon them the character of Genevese envoys to the court of London.

It was natural that the oppressors of the Americans should be the protectors of the Genevese revolutionists, for the same reason that France was the persecutor of the latter, and the abettor of the American insurgents. Lord Abingdon replied *to d'Ivernois, secretary to the commissioners, citizens, and burgesses, representatives of Geneva,* " that there was a time when the English fleets carried the mandates of justice round the globe. Those times are altered," said their English protector, while he regretted his inability " to make the voice of his country heard, in its usual tone of authority, against the enemies of the liberties of the human race."

It is pleasant to remark, that in the whole of this negotiation, while the revolutionary Genevese government, the real tyrants of their country, asked assistance against tyranny, the English, from whom they required it, styled the French the enemies of the liberties of mankind, when France was freeing America from their yoke. And what is still more extraordinary in the history of the commotions

of Geneva in this year, is, that the principal thing with which Duroveray reproached France, was the good understanding he imagined to exist between the French ministry and the principal natives; while the rebellious faction saw no impropriety in the jailors of the government of Geneva sending their envoys to the British government; nor that lord Mountstuart, the embassador of George III., who was their friend at the court of London, should quit Turin, when he found he could not succeed in altering the intentions of the king of Sardinia, with regard to the French refugees *.

It is true, that the insurgents redoubled their vigilance at Geneva, to render their revolutionary government legal by force and victory. No sooner were the three armies of France, Switzerland, and Turin in motion, than the greatest alarms ensued; the clubs assembled over night to deliberate at the instigation of the emissaries of the commission, and the next

* D'Ivernois has the simplicity to say, in a note, that the English embassador at Turin, "on seeing the departure of the Sardinian troops, was so effected at not having been able to save the citizens of Geneva, nor to open the eyes of the court of Turin, that he quitted that court." Such, therefore, was the English fanaticism for the rebel party, that its embassadors retired. We may judge of the secret instructions of the court of London from this anecdote, which the vanity of d'Ivernois has suffered to escape him.

day the commissions put in effect what it had the evening before found means to set on foot. The fortifications which, from the confidence the Genevese had placed in their old friend, had been suffered to fall to ruins on the side of France, were hastily repaired; and hatred to France now restored them. In this moment of universal fervour, the intoxication of the revolutionists inspired or terrified the moderate party. Old and young women and children worked at the fortifications. The most fanatic among them said, "They come to set our hostages at liberty: let then these Frenchmen approach, and we will send them for balls the heads of those tyrants to whom they wish to subject us." While others said, "France only wished to be crushed." And Geneva, according to d'Ivernois, "exhibited a scene of military democracy."

All those suspected of any attachment to France, or to the imprisoned government, were disarmed, and the hostages more carefully guarded. At the first rumour of the arrival of the troops, four thousand combatants ran to arms on the ramparts, to repulse the three armies now rapidly approaching; the remaining gunpowder of the republic was lodged in the cathedral, or in the quarter of the aristocrats. We even now contemplate with horror the blind fury of the commission, who added dang-

to danger; and not contented with condemning its government to serve as an hostage, exposed the city to incur the horrors of a siege, which threatened the very existence of the republic *.

On the 29th of June, 1782, the three generals appeared before Geneva, and, by three declarations, exactly conformable to each other, summoned the insurgents to open their gates, allowing but five hours for their surrender. The city asked twenty-four, which was granted. The general of the army, marquis Jaucourt, carried his respect to private property so far, as to ask Womerat, who was in Geneva, for the keys of his country-house, for the accommodation of his staff, which was refused. Jaucourt repeated the request; and added, that if he refused, he could not undertake to be answerable for the resentment of the soldiery. Womerat replied, by sending a bundle of matches to the general. During this important day, wives were seen exhorting their husbands, and mothers their children, to expire on the ramparts,

* "They added," said d'Ivernois, "the extreme precaution of moving the remaining powder into the cathedral, and two houses situated in the centre of the aristocratic quarter; either that the latter might share the destruction which threatened the city, or that the fear of seeing themselves involved in it might compel their protector to take that personal revenge which he was supposed to be very willing to require."

for the safety of their country. Others, distributed in the churches, attended the wounded, as they were brought in. The most violent of the faction talked of defending themselves to extremity, to fighting in every street, and attacking the enemy from the windows, should the town be taken by assault. Accordingly every street was unpaved, and the windows filled with large stone vessels of boiling water and combustibles. Some were inclined to deliver Geneva from the invasion of the French, by blowing the city into the lake, and the cathedral itself upon the city, with gunpowder; others for condemning the chiefs of the aristocrats to the same fate. General Lentulus, who commanded for the Bernese, reiterated the order to the insurgents, to retire within their houses, to displace the guard who kept the government in confinement, and to restore it to the state it was in on the 7th of the preceding April: he required the exclusion of those members who had any share in exciting the late commotions; and, at the same time, that the leaders of the faction should be expelled the city, to the distance of twenty leagues, to wait there the award to be passed on them. The terror which the faction had excited among the aristocrats now had its turn on the democrats who imprisoned them. "Should a hair of

any of your prisoners' heads be wanting," said one of those who addressed the besieged, "their jailors, the democrats, shall be burned in the market-place." In the general dread, the revolutionists agreed in their clubs, that very night, to choose five out of every hundred, to decide what Geneva ought to do in this formidable crisis. This election, by dividing the revolutionary authority, invested the city with the rights the commission had hitherto usurped; and from that moment Geneva appeared to the well disposed, and the leaders of the army, to be delivered for ever from the yoke of this banditti; and the good citizens, instead of resisting the three generals, its deliverers, sacrificed the disturbers, submitted to the armies, and, ordering all the guns to be discharged, gave up the hostages.

During the tumult, a revolutionary party, in their terror, threw themselves into a boat, and being pursued, they plunged into the lake, and escaped by swimming. Other parties ran in groupes to the public squares, threatening to cut in pieces the revolutionary commission. The more violent of the democrats, divided in other groupes, talked of burning the town, and the party of Anspach wished that the gates should be opened, that, like Sampson, they and their enemies might perish together. The twenty exiles, who were a few hours before the dread of the

Genevese, were now become so obnoxious, that all, excepting a few fanatics, were heard to exclaim, *Are they gone? Are they massacred? Are they drowned*?*

Anspach, worthy by his talents to defend a better cause than that which subjected his country to a petty democratic faction, spoke to his fellow-citizens in the language of rage and despair. Thirteen years after this event, I heard him express himself with the same vehemence when talking of his country besieged by the three armies; and, far from imagining that these misfortunes originated only in the vices of a few mistaken revolutionists, who had brought on it the most dreadful calamities, he still breathed the most bitter revenge against France in particular, who had raised up the two other powers. But a few hours before the troops entered Geneva, "Who is there," said Anspach, "who is there that shall dare to talk of gentle and moderate resistance? When the strong unite against

* D'Ivernois, speaking of the exiles, says, "They joined their fellow-citizens, in order to entreat them most earnestly to give up all considerations of private interest, and to be assured that, whatever resolution they came to, they should submit to it implicitly, and without murmur." Yet Sauter, D'Ivernois, Prevôt, and Melly, rose to object to accepting the conditions offered by the three armies, which they considered as an indelible disgrace. D'Ivernois adds, "their apprehension of the murder of the hostages congealed their courage."

the weak; when they conspire to rob us of independence, liberty, and life; it is no longer time to talk of yielding in order to avoid fighting, and still less of fighting now to yield hereafter. One only mean remains to wipe off the stains of calumny: it is not either by tears or writings that we can now prove our attachment to our expiring country, but by expiring with it. The Genevese, after having taken on them the engagements of a Decius, ought to persevere in them and perish, so they perish not without glory and without revenge. Let our last moments be marked by the sufferings of their author. Let us immortalise our last sigh by devoting ourselves to certain, but to *general* and glorious destruction. Warmed with the heroism of liberty, let us defend it like republicans to the last moment, from rampart to rampart, from street to street, from one asylum to the other. Let us embrace our oppressors—but let it be with the embrace of Samson, to crush them in the last ruins and ashes of our temples."

Fortunately for Geneva, the majority of its inhabitants chose neither to be blown up in the air, nor crushed like Samson, while embracing the conquering enemy, by its falling

ruins*: in reality, the leaders of the factious being exiled, the three generals joined in drawing up a sort of military sentence, in the following letter of the mediating powers, of the 21st of November 1782.

"MAGNIFICENT LORDS,

"When our sovereigns lent their forces to the republic, with the intention of delivering it from anarchy and oppression, they thought it necessary to remove the chief authors of your commotions from your town. This indispensable preliminary for the restoration of public order was announced as the regulation of the moment; and the judgment pronounced on the twenty-one persons who were to quit the town, was submitted to the decision of the republic.

* "Scarcely had the leaders of the revolution released the hostages," says D'Ivernois, "than their labour was very near being rewarded by some of them falling victims to the people whom they had just saved (by their submission). This people gave way to such violent imprecations against them, that in this critical moment they deprived them of that presence of mind so necessary to the right conduct of affairs, while awaiting the reply of the generals, and to give them up the city without disorder. Threatened on all sides, they had soon no time left but to think of their personal safety. After having put the government once more in the hands of the four syndics, they recommended to them the care of the powder magazines, and left the town at break of day, with a precipitation which rather resembled a flight than a retreat."

" The sole intention of our sovereigns in placing the fate of those persons at the disposal of the tribunals of the state, was only the preservation of the forms and criminal laws of a republic, whose freedom they wished to strengthen and restore. When they determined on this step, they were ignorant of the state to which Geneva was reduced: they could not imagine that those who had set themselves up as masters there, meant to defend their tyranny at the peril of the state, and were desirous to involve the victims of that tyranny in its fatal catastrophe; that, with this intention, they had prepared means for the destruction of the whole city, by filling the cathedral, and the cellars of some houses, with gunpowder, and had thus left the existence of their country, to depend not merely on the madness or despair of any one person, bewildered by the violence of party spirit, but to run the risk of all the accidents inseparable from the attack they seemed to brave, and which the justice and dignity of the powers concerned would no longer allow to be delayed. When we promulgated the declaration of our sovereigns, and afterwards suspended its execution, being ignorant of the real situation of Geneva, we were far from imagining that the delay we granted would be

employed in preparing further means of defence, and thus increase the danger of the republic.

" There can be therefore no just claim advanced, either as to the form, the meaning, or conditions of a declaration, which would never have been made had the state of Geneva been better known. Besides, almost all the magistrates having been exposed to the insults and outrages of those who usurped the authority in Geneva, would find themselves obliged either to condemn them to the rigorous penalties inflicted by the law, which would be doubtless revolting to their delicacy, or to withdraw themselves: which latter would reduce the two councils to a number too small to pass sentence, and would but encourage the factious to new attempts, by the dangerous example of impunity.

" In this state of things, magnificent lords, it is fitting that this judgment should be made by an act of authority of the magnificent council, and in the manner of an engagement which it shall contract with the powers who have come to the assistance of the republic. We therefore invite you, magnificent lords, to show yourselves immediately disposed to receive within your walls those who shall present themselves for entrance; and who, by signing the new edict, and taking an oath to submit to it, shall manifest their intention of contributing to the

maintenance and support of peace: it being understood at the same time, that they can take no seat in the grand council, nor exercise any public office, unless called to it by a new election.

"So much lenity, however, would prove detrimental to the republic, and would exceed the limits of what every free state owes to itself, and the rights of all sovereigns, were it extended to all the authors of the commotion in Geneva. It is therefore indispensably necessary that Jacob Vernes, pastor, and Isaac-Solomon Anspach, minister and regent, be deposed from their offices of pastor and of regent; that Julian Dentand, elder syndic, James Vieusseux, John Flournoy, and Stephen Claviere, members of the grand council, James-Anthony Duroveray, Francis D'Ivernois, advocates, and Mark-Francis Rochette, notary, be banished for ever; and that our sovereigns should engage with the republic not to allow them to reside in their territories, or within forty miles of their frontier: that James Gremi, David Chauvet, John Janot, William Ringler, John-James Breuffe la Motte, members of the grand council; John-Anthony Thuillier, citizen, Isaiah Casc, pastor, and John-Lewis Schraidl, natives, be also exiled; but that at the end of ten years, by petitioning the grand council, promising to submit to

its laws, and to live like peaceable citizens, they may return to Geneva, if a majority of three fourths of the votes in that council shall so allow; it being nevertheless understood that they can never become members of the council of two hundred, nor fill the office of adjuncts: that John-James Bonnet, formerly a captain in the service of his most Christian majesty, be also exiled and incapable of returning within this city or its territory, without the consent of his said majesty. With respect to Girard, called Guerre, he is under the sentence already passed against him.

"We are desirous, magnificent lords, to prevent you from ever more experiencing what has just passed, by declaring to you what our sovereigns look upon as sufficient to prevent any one in future from imitating the example of those disturbers of the peace of the republic. The sanction of your fundamental laws, and the dignity of your allies, might have claimed a greater exertion of power, and perhaps a more exemplary justice would have been necessary, if our sovereigns had not reason to think, that, by the measures they have charged us to adopt with you, your government will be in future perfectly secure from every disturbance from within. Under this assurance we venture to invite you, in conjunction with the grand council, to publish an

absolute and irrevocable amnesty, which shall not in any manner derogate from the regulations made by article 25 of the edict of pacification, and which may be a pledge of reconciliation between all the orders and all the individuals of the state.

"We are most sincerely, magnificent lords, &c.

(Signed)

"Marquis de JAUCOURT.

"Count de la MORMORA.

"STEIGER, de WATIEVILLE de BELS."

Geneva thus delivered from its tyrants, the council of two hundred was restored, with a committee formed within it, of the most prudent persons, to draw up a plan of pacification. The latter was composed of Rilliet, Galliffe, Lullin, Saladin, de Sarts, Saussure the naturalist, Bierre, and Barde. The fury of the victorious aristocratic party, that fury which had been so dreaded, and which was manifested the day after its victory among the people in revolution, was exercised solely on the gunpowder which had kept that party in such strange terror. It was all thrown into the lake, the waters of which it blackened. The democratic party had put the party they vanquished in prison; but the magistrates, when victorious, restored to their situation, and delivered from incen-

diaries, attended only to restoring the republic to its original splendor. To the ferocious austerity which the democracy had required, succeeded those amusements which support and employ both the artist and the tradesman. For tumultuary clubs, actuated by the secret agents of the revolutionary commission, they substituted coffee-houses and places of public entertainment. Geneva, the rich Geneva, flourished once more. "The restoration of our old government, and the absolutely vagabond state of the chiefs of the factions," said the aristocrats, "restore life and subsistence to all the Genevese, who were threatened with famine under the dominion of the representatives. Is it not better, then, that five-and-twenty public disturbers should wander in exile, than that the country should lose that interesting part of its population, its artists, compelled to seek employment and new means of subsistence far from our walls? It well becomes a few idle incendiaries to call us aristocrats. Is it not the aristocracy which supports the many, and regulates, maintains, and governs society? It well becomes a mere banditti to insult this form of government, with which, beside, a democracy has been so constantly associated." Verbal insults, and contempt, was the only revenge which the aristocracy inflicted on their enemies, when supported by three victorious armies.

CHAP. XIII.

The Revolutionists withdraw to London.—Complaints in France against the Military Expedition of the Marquis of Jaucourt.—The Exiles favourably received by the English Government.—Dreadful Plot against France imputed to them by M. Adhémar.—England, in negotiating the Peace of 1783, rewards the Plans and Hatred of the Exiles to France.—Agreement made by the English Government with the banished Genevese—Instrument by which the Sum of Fifty Thousand Pounds Sterling is secured to them.

THAT party in France which favoured the demagogues still continued to show the interest they took in the fate of the exiles. Mirabeau, Condorcet, Mably, and all the philosophers of the day, saw with uneasiness the same M. de Vergennes who protected the Dutch and American patriots, raising the military force of a great nation against a similar party in Geneva; and even the French troops, who had beaten the English royalists in America, taking arms to subdue a Genevese democracy. M. de Vergennes' motives will appear from a memorial he presented to Lewis XVI., in which he says, "The insurgents whom I expel from Geneva are the agents of England; the insurgents of America

have been long since the friends of France. I have acted toward each of them not with any view to their political opinions, but according as I have found them disposed toward France. Such is my reason of state. The good and ancient township of Geneva is our natural friend: it is not long since it ventured to oppose the wishes of the English, who were desirous of establishing an agent there. The Genevese insurgents are, on the contrary, governed and mis-led by a few wretches in the pay of Great-Britain, who have instilled into them the strange idea of blowing up Geneva, if they could not govern it. When the marquis of Jaucourt has wholly or temporarily banished them, they will retire to London; but I shall have preserved Geneva: it will not be destroyed by gunpowder: this I have promised the king."

As he said, the exiles took the road to London. D'Ivernois, who seems to wish it should be believed, that the idea of retiring thither did not occur to them till they were without arms and without a country, passes over in silence all the former secret negotiations of the party with the English, in which he was perhaps not initiated. He even says nothing of his own private negotiation for obtaining a favourable reception there, which he had entered into in the month of June, with the earl of Abingdon, be-

fore the three armies were in motion. And such was the animosity of England against France at this juncture, that it was sufficient that the court of Versailles had persecuted any party whatever, for it to be assured of protection in England. The court of Sardinia and the Swiss, both powerful friends of George III., concurred in banishing the twenty-one rebels from Geneva. These adventurers, exiled from their country, where, during the time of their administration, they had imprisoned its government, and alarmed the citizens by the distribution of the gunpowder; these adventurers, whom three nations in a public act had disgraced and treated as incendiaries,—now fugitives and vagabonds, without country or home, detestable in the eyes of Europe for their murderous plot, by which they would have sacrificed all their fellow citizens,—found that their crimes, at which every government but that of England shuddered with horror, were so many recommendations for their favourable reception in that island. The more inveterate was the hatred they bore to France, the more agreeable were their sentiments to England. Their offers, their revolutionary systems, were qualities and dispositions highly gratifying to the English. It was France, which had just saved their country, that they now wished to destroy. M. Alphémar may recollect the memorial he sent the

king respecting the plots of these exiles. Was it together or separately that they formed their plan of vengeance on the ancient monarchy? It here follows, as preserved by Lewis XVI., to whom it was transmitted by M. de Vergennes in 1784, though it appears to have been drawn up before the peace of 1783.

On the present State of Great-Britain and France.

" 1st. France endeavoured to dethrone the august house of Hanover, and for that purpose made war on it, even in the heart of Great-Britain. Though she did not succeed then in her intention, she may possibly be more fortunate in a subsequent war.—First consideration.

" 2dly. France has endeavoured to displace the august house of Hanover, to make way for that of Stuart. She raised up the jacobites against the regular subjects of Great-Britain; and who can aver, that she may not succeed in some other plan equally formidable? It is therefore necessary to return France war for war, or risk being ruined by her perfidiousness.—Second consideration.

" 3dly. France has dismembered the British monarchy, and raised its faithful colonists against their mother country; and what security is there for Great-Britain against the continental plan of weakening her distant, colonial, and com-

mercial power? What assurance has Great-Britain, that France will stop at the dismemberment of the colonies, which, by all appearances, the king will allow and sanction on the ensuing peace? France should therefore be prevented, by an equivalent dismemberment, or the British crown will remain exposed to the continued attacks of that ambitious power.

"We have all our lives been the revolutionary defenders of virtue and freedom; we know all the means necessary for destroying this aspiring power, whose government has amputated a part of the British strength, and perfidiously torn from your majesty the allegiance of your colonies. Let France then perish, and the fate it prepared for your majesty become its own. *Delenda est Carthago!* should be our eternal cry."

It was at a period so remarkable, when Great-Britain began to negotiate with Lewis XVI., that it listened to half a dozen adventurers. Yet the subversion of their own country, a work they had attempted and failed in, might have been some reason for distrust. We will now detail the conduct of these revolutionists.

Scarcely had the twenty-one exiles quitted Geneva, when they named six commissaries: D'Ivernois, Claviere, Grenus, Ringler, Duroveray, and Gasc, who set out for London,

and joined Siordet, la Roche, and others, who already besieged the public offices. The government, which was then engaged in negotiations with France, refused them any direct assistance; but the viceroy of Ireland was ordered to provide for their subsistence, and it was imagined that those emigrants would be followed by two thousand other Genevese, as in the agreement which Great-Britain entered into with the exiles, the English government granted them fifty thousand pounds; the one half to build a Geneva in Ireland, and the other for the immediate use of the exiles. "We have," said the viceroy, "remitted the memorial of the Genevese to the king, who has been most graciously pleased to signify his royal approbation of a plan founded on motives so evidently consonant to justice and humanity." The distribution of the money was intrusted by the government,—1st, to eight members of the privy-council; Grenville, Gardiner, Forster, Clements, Cuffe, Blaquiere, Beresford, and Tyrone.

2dly, To four members of parliament; la Touche, Caldwell, Hartley, and Jaffray; and

3dly, To six refugees from Geneva; d'Ivernois, Gasc, Grenus, Duroveray, Claviere, and Ringler, who had taken upon them the title

of commissioners of the representative party at Geneva, persecuted by the French.

Hence it appears, that two-thirds of the commissioners for the distribution of the sum allotted were English, and the other third Genevese; and of these English, two-thirds were an immediate part of the government, and one third members of parliament. The aristocrats at Geneva said, "Our exiles were never before so rich, or in such good company; and, settled at London, they prove their contempt of wealth at Geneva to have been but a pretence." Every mean was also made use of in England to animate the exiles, and keep alive their fanatic detestation of the French name. Fergusson, the mayor of Londonderry, which was the principal town assigned for their reception, wrote to d'Ivernois as follows: "Virtuous citizen, the arts in which you excel may enrich the country which you shall fix on for your asylum; *but it is the hatred you bear to tyranny*, the noble zeal you have shown in the cause of freedom, which will make you valuable in this free state." England did not conceal its enmity to France. This was the *hatred of tyranny* which made the Genevese exiles such *estimable people*, whom England paid not ungenerously. Duroveray and d'Iver-

nois acknowledged these expressions by similar ones; and from the 22d of January, 1783, they did not fail to quote *the rights of man* in their epistles, which they came to teach us in 1789.

Lord Mahon offered lands and every kind of relief to the exiles; and, according to d'Ivernois, the prime-minister declared, "that the expatriated Genevese were the properest of all people to repair the ills caused by a deplorable war even in the English population." Lord Temple, since marquis of Buckingham, procured for them the before-mentioned charter, and the aid of fifty thousand pounds sterling.

The emigration, that was attempted, of the Genevese, did not succeed; since, obedient to the new government, they were too well pleased to be delivered from the tyranny of the twenty-one. Duped as they had been by the authors of the commotion in their own city, they were far from trusting to them the direction of their fate in a foreign land. Yet Mr. Pitt, when minister, continued, notwithstanding, the same aid of his government to the exiles, who were joined by some other Genevese, though but few in number, to whom the order and regularity restored in their own country were not suitable. The fifty thousand pounds had its attractions; and the act which confers it is too curious not to be preserved at length, were it only to make known the generosity of Great-

Britain. Yet, spite of all the offers of England, those Genevese who disliked the new revolution retired mostly to Constance, under the absolute power of the emperor. Janot, who was one of the most factious, went to Neufchâtel, from whence he was expelled by the magistrates: others settled in Brussels. Those most versed in the arts of conspiracy, Claviere, Duroveray, and d'Ivernois, remained in London, whither Dumont, Chauvet, and Marat, repaired to join them. We shall follow the steps of these instruments of the revolution, and the fate of the French and the English, subject alike to a government which made of their respective people the tools of their own violent passions.

ACT for granting the Sum of Fifty-thousand Pounds Sterling, for the Use of the expatriated Genevans.

To the Earl of Tyrone; the Right Hon. John Beresford; the Right Hon. Sir John Blaquiere, Knight of the Bath; the Right Hon. Henry Theophilus Clements; the Right Hon. John Forster; the Right Hon. Luke Gardiner; the Right Hon. William Wyndham Grenville; the Right Hon. James Cuffe; David la Touche, Jun. Esq.; Andrew Caldwell, Esq.; Travers Hartley, Esq.; Alexander Jaffray, Esq.; and Messrs. G. Ringler, E. Claviere, Duroveray, E. Gasc, Grenus, and d'Ivernois.

"WHEREAS the sieur d'Ivernois did, by his memorial of the 27th of September last, represent unto us, that, in consequence of certain alterations which had taken place in the political constitution and government of the state of Geneva, a considerable number of the citizens and inhabitants, attached to the blessings of a free government, where disposed, under assurances of the enjoyment of certain privileges and protection, to settle themselves in this kingdom, to bring with them their property, and to establish here those manufactures which had rendered the citizens of that state so wealthy; and that the sum of fifty thousand pounds sterling, British money, would be necessary to enable the first thousand emigrants to effect their purpose, of which a sum, not exceeding one half, to be applied to defray the expence of their journey, and the carriage of their effects; and

the remainder to be applied in the building or providing houses for their reception: and whereas we did lay the said memorial before the lords of his majesty's privy council, who, by their resolution of the 27th day of September last, expressive of the importance of the object, and the advantages to be secured to this kingdom by the accession of a body of respectable citizens, and to its commerce by the introduction of a manufacture so extensive and beneficial, and by the immediate acquisition of a very material addition to the national wealth, did unanimously request, that his majesty would be graciously pleased to take the same into his royal consideration, and to adopt such measures in this case as to his majesty's great wisdom should seem meet: and we having transmitted the said memorial and resolution to be laid before the king, his majesty hath been graciously pleased to signify his royal approbation of the design aforesaid, founded upon principles so truly interesting to justice and humanity, and of his royal disposition to induce the said merchants, artists, and manufacturers, citizens or inhabitants of Geneva, to settle in Ireland, under the conviction, that by their civil and religious principles, their industry, and their loyalty, they would materially contribute to the advantage of this kingdom:

"These are, therefore, to pray and to empower you to consult together, and to report unto us, what agreements, regulations, warrants, and authorities will, in your opinion, be necessary and proper for carrying his majesty's gracious intentions into execution, under the heads following, viz.

"1st. For the grant of a sum of fifty thousand pounds to certain state-officers, and to certain of the nobility and gentry of this realm, together with the six commissioners now in this kingdom from the Genevans; the said sum to be granted to them in trust for the use of the Genevans

settling in this country; whereof a sum, not exceeding one half, is to be applied to the charges of their journey, and the carriage of their effects; to be distributed by the said commissioners, in such proportion as they shall think equitable, upon the consideration of the circumstances, the character, and the talents of each emigrant; and the remainder to be expended in the building a town, and settling them therein.

" 2dly. To consider the rights, privileges, franchises, and immunities to be granted to the inhabitants of the said new intended town; and so soon as the said general system shall have been submitted to, and approved of by us, then to prepare a draught of a charter, which will be referred to the consideration of his majesty's law servants for their opinion, and afterwards submitted to his majesty for his royal approbation, granting to the said citizens of the New Geneva the establishment of magistrates, councils, or assemblies, with powers for regulating their internal concerns in such manner as shall be most agreeable to the laws under which they lived happily in their own country, and as shall be agreeable to the customs and dispositions of the people; observing, nevertheless, that, in no instance whatsoever, such municipal laws, or regulations, be repugnant to the laws of this kingdom; and, in case that it should be necessary to apply to parliament for further powers for carrying such charters or purposes into execution, then to prepare a draught, or scheme, of such bill or bills as may be necessary to be submitted to the legislature.

" 3dly. To consider in what manner a sufficient portion of land shall be secured to the said citizens of Geneva; to examine and recommend, with all expedition, a situation for their new town, and to consider and prepare every arrangement which may expedite the construction of it; and to report in what mode the persons arriving in

this kingdom shall, from time to time, be accommodated, until the new town, or a sufficient portion thereof, shall be erected for their reception; as also in what manner the said houses shall be distributed to individuals, or a sufficient ground to those who may wish to build at their own expence; and in what manner the freedom of the new town shall be secured to such persons (having been citizens or inhabitants of Geneva, and possessed of those qualifications of conduct and of morals upon which the success of this establishment must depend) as are not yet arrived or naturalised; so that, upon their arrival and naturalisation, they shall be entitled to the benefits of the body corporate aforesaid.

"And whereas young persons of rank and fortune, from all parts of Europe, resorted to the city of Geneva, to profit from the system of education established there, under professors of eminence in useful and liberal studies and accomplishments; and whereas a school or academy formed upon the same principles in this kingdom would forward his majesty's gracious dispositions for the encouragement of religion, virtue, and science, by improving the education and early habits of youth, and would remove the inducements to a foreign education; and, being conducted with that attention to morality and virtue which hath distinguished the establishments in that city, may attract foreigners to reside in this kingdom for the like purpose; we do further pray and empower you to consider and digest a plan for a school and academy of education to be established in the new colony, and to make a part of the constitution thereof, under such institution and regulations, and with such privileges, as may best contribute to the ends hereby proposed.

"And we do pray and empower you, that, after having given these subjects in general the fullest consideration, you do report unto us a particular detail of what

shall be thought most fitting to be granted and ordered for the advantage and encouragement of the Genevans settling in this kingdom aforesaid, and for the welfare and prosperity of the new colony, that the necessary representations thereupon may be laid before his majesty, without loss of time; so that every facility may be given to the adoption of every measure calculated to give the said citizens of Geneva the fullest proofs of his majesty's royal protection and regard.

"Given under our hand and seal of arms, at his majesty's castle of Dublin, the 4th day of April, 1783.

"By his excellency's command,

"S. HAMILTON."

CHAP. XIV.

Reciprocal Effects of the Hatred which subsisted between the old Government of France and England.—Necessity of the two Nations terminating their old Disputes.—The Punic War intended by England against France, proved in the End only destructive to the House of Bourbon.

WHEN we behold France and England so eagerly employed in the means of destroying each other, as to squander the public money in the attempt; when, on the one hand, we see England carrying the idea of raising a new Geneva in Great-Britain so far, as to grant fifty thousand pounds to a few factious individuals, enemies of the French name; when, on the other hand, we see every exertion, pecuniary and military, made by the old government of France, to raise a party in Holland against the stadtholder, and the American republicans against their mother country; what Englishman or what Frenchman can so little care for the prosperity of his country, as not to deplore the fate of each, suffering for so many years, both in France and England, under governments, which condemned their subjects to serve as the blind and

passive instruments of their mutual hatred, carried even to the meanest and most unworthy extremes.

In considering the deadly consequences of this mutual animosity in all its bearings, are we not compelled to mourn over that violent and mad policy, which, four or five times in the course of every century, has exhausted the population of Great-Britain and France, whose governments have seemed only to allow a few temporary intervals for population to increase and be flourishing, in order to involve it once more in the ravages of war, to which no period is put, till each power is again exhausted.

What availed the disastrous wars of the eighteenth century between France and England? How blind and useless was the enmity of the two governments! What weakness and ignorance both on the part of the continent and of Great-Britain! The latter, in 1701, takes arms to prevent the establishment of a prince of the house of Bourbon in Spain, as if England would thereby be less prosperous. The former, in 1745, performed the same scene, to place a son of the house of Stuart on the English throne, whom the nation had expelled; as if England would have been less a rival of France under the reign of the Stuarts. What endeavours, what efforts, were not made in the seven-

years-war, to rob France of Canada; and, in the American one, to raise her colonies against England, as if either England or France could be eventually degraded from their continental or maritime preponderance by means so trivial! And why has Mr. Pitt, ever since the year 1789, drained his country, to overthrow, revolutionise, and dismember France? Did he suppose any comparison could be made between the French and the Poles? Surely, the two governments do but evince, by these periodical paroxysms of passion, that they have been directed by ignorant and mistaken men, by enmity and personal pique, which have prevented them from seeing, that the real prosperity of each nation consists in remaining in a state of peace and mutual amity, instead of cherishing an eternal hatred. Is not the peace of thirty years, under cardinal Fleury, a sufficient proof of the truth of this neglected maxim? Ever since that memorable period, both governments have been trying to persuade their subjects, that the flourishing state of commerce of the one depended on the ruin of that of the other; while they ought to have known, that France and England had greater commercial advantages and prosperity during those thirty years, than either of the nations in the thirty succeeding ones; of which one half has

been spent in open war, and the other in only a pretended peace.

In France, under the former government, there existed a system of enmity highly blameable, against England, its constitution, its king, nobility, and parliament. There was a person of rank in the court of Lewis XV., to whom the English were never mentioned, without his expressing the contempt which that cast in France was so apt to feel towards the descendants of the assassins of Charles I. Any French nobleman who should presume to travel in England was sure of losing the prince's favour. The higher nobility, and particularly the clergy, shared the same sentiment. This unjust system was extremely detestable; and being possessed by the first orders of the state, whose constitution was in open opposition to that of Great-Britain, it became the national one. It was in vain that the English annually, by fasting and prayer, lamented the death of Charles I. They were continually reproached with it by France, even in her manifestoes and declarations of war, in which kings and nations reciprocally upbraid each other with whatever can lessen them in the eyes of the rest of Europe. But England was no less blameable in the unjust and hereditary hatred it nourished against France—a hatred which was permanent in several titled

and ministerial families. These families, whose implacable resentment renders them the perpetual scourge of the British nation, are the original cause of those destructive wars which have been denominated, by observing men, the first or second Punic war: such they have amply proved, as to the house of Bourbon, whom England has succeeded in dethroning, by the factions and parties it has raised and subsidised in France for the ruin of its dynasty.

But France, such as her national genius has now constituted her, that France which has sacrificed so many intestine enmities, and who no longer opposes either the Stuarts or the nobility of England to the reigning house of Hanover, is equally inclined to lay aside all her former rancour against the British nation. France cannot be ignorant, that one party, and that the wisest of the English, did not wish to go to war with her. Is it not then time to put an end to this Punic war, so fatal to the house of Bourbon, and so glorious to France, since England remains victorious at sea, and France by land? Is not the time come for giving up, to the ignominy of nations, the agents of the hatred of the English ministry to France?

CHAP. XV.

The opposite Factions in Geneva continually accuse each other of being the Tools of England.—Diplomatic Papers on this Head. —Picture of the Revolutions directed by the English in France, by Means of the Exiles from Geneva, in 1782, by Lewis XVI.; and by the other revolutionary Genevese, Dumont, Duroveray, and Claviere, against the Monarchical and Constitutional France; by Marat against the Principles of a Republic;—and by d'Ivernois, against every sort of Government.

I HAD no sooner arrived at Geneva, than each party was eager to inform me of their systems, rights, and respective enmities, and particularly of the attachment of the opposition party to the inveterate enemy of France—England.

"You will soon learn," said they, "that all our Genevese revolutions are but attempts within our walls, at trying the grand revolution, which England meditates in the interior of your country, and which torments you. An enormous English subsidy maintains the democratic party here, and enriches their leaders. If you desire official proof of this, you will find it in an act of the privy council, which may be styled a stipulation between Great-Britain and a few of the heads

of our revolutionists. This public measure is a scandal to Great-Britain, who is not ashamed to act in Geneva the part which France had descended to act in Philadelphia, by paying the leaders of a party against the government."

The democrats said, "We are not ignorant that it is represented in France, that d'Ivernois, Claviere, and Duroveray, have received large sums to effect a revolution both in France and Geneva, and that they are pensioners to George III. Time will prove this to be a mere calumny. The revolutions we have begun, are still making, and shall continue to make, are revolutions of opinion, and not tumultuary movements, commanded and paid by England. During your legation, citizen resident, you will learn this of yourself."

The aristocratic party, producing official papers, replied, that the English character, notwithstanding its hatred to France, was still too honourable to descend to the mean views which debased the Genevese exiles, who are the dregs and scum of our revolutions. "Not only," said they, "is the French revolution, which is going on, their work, but they have been employed in the service of England, as leaders in its execution. We have a political problem ready for your solution, concerning these very revolutionary Genevese, who were

brought up in this country in the heart of our conspiracies, and employed by England against the well-being of Lewis XVI. and France itself. We had determined to raise your curiosity, and then leave to yourself the means of satisfying it; but, since you are disposed to listen to us, we will leave you the paper, the explanation of which you will find at your leisure, by affixing the names to the numbers which represent them."

NOTES on the Revolutionists brought up in the Centre of the Genevese Conspiracies; exiled as Incendiaries by France, Switzerland, and Piedmont, in 1782; and since employed by England, to revolutionise monarchical, constitutional, and republican France.

1. He overturned the ancient government of France, and acted in concert with the English, to effect its destruction.
2. He seized on the moment of alarm occasioned by the departure of Lewis XVI. for *Mont-Médy*, to propose to the secret English council, resident at Paris, the proclaiming *republican France.*
3. The old government being abolished, he was employed to destroy the constitutional monarchy, by paying the faubourg St. Antoine for the 20th of June, and the Marseillese and others for the 10th of August.
4. The constitutional monarchy existing no longer, he was occupied in the destruction of the foundations of all government, and especially republican ones. Having two years since quitted revolutionary France,

he went to London, to receive there the baneful instructions, which he afterwards brought back with him.

5. Every well-established government in France being the enemy of England, his employment consists in presiding in London in the private office of the minister for foreign affairs, charged with revolutionising France.

6. Of the ancient establishments of industry under the French monarchy, a few declining manufactories at Lyons are all you have remaining. They are scattering millions there at this moment, on the English account, to destroy this centre of your trade.

7. After he had ruined us, he ruined you, in 1789, 1790, and 1791. He was the counsellor and friend of Mirabeau, and those like him. He did still more in 1792 and 1793. He spared Austria and England the odium of declaring war against you, by inducing the legislative body, and the Brissotine faction, to declare it.

8. He is not to be defined.

They have deluged Europe with blood. At Paris and London tears can never cease to flow. It was not without cause that we got rid of and banished them. You have no doubt received your instructions: yet the eight foregoing articles are of more consequence to a French resident than any instructions whatever; but you must expound them yourself.

This political problem remained some days without a comment; but one of the partisans of the exiles of 1782, casting his eyes on the paper, boasted of being able to unriddle it, and used these remarkable expressions, "This paper relates to us. Well, what can they do to us? What is past is no more." At the same time

he wrote the following names, with a pencil, under the several figures corresponding to the above notes.

1	2	3	4	5
(**)	*Dumont.*	*Clavières.*	*Marat.*	*D'Ivernois.*

6	7	8
Gasc and Janot.	*Duroveray.*	*Grenu.*

The conversation and writings of the two parties, then so agitated, deserve to be recorded. That part of the English people that wishes to see peace and harmony restored between England and France will then be able to judge how much its administration forgot the dignity of a great nation, when it kept men like these in its pay, and directed their fatal talents against our social organisation. I shall here continue an epitome of their expressions and writings.

Conduct of the Revolutionists towards the ancient French Monarchy.

" Mr. Necker," said the Genevese aristocrats, " had no sooner, by his ministerial conduct, begun the subversion of the old constitution, by those measures which were the necessary prelude, than the ablest of our revolutionists appeared in France and at Geneva, in the person of d'Ivernois, the principal author of the plans hostile to your internal quiet. The Eng-

lish embassador, lord Gower, unblushingly received him, and introduced him to others. Their first desire was to be on a more intimate footing with Mr. Necker, and propagate the principles of your revolution. Clavières, who had also been exiled by Lewis XVI., soon hastened to Paris with his revolutionary plans. The doubling the number of the *tiers-état*, debating in one chamber, and uniting the aristocratic minority to the armed and over-heated democracy, were the first acts which the Genevese revolutionists guided in France. What they had attempted here they now proposed to execute there. By repeated memorials they secured the friendship of Mirabeau, who found among their plans a revolution ready formed, and called Duroveray his revolution-master, and Clavières his finance-master. The most mistaken parties in France became the friends of these common disturbers; and Mirabeau had scarcely received the first price of his attachment to a party, by whom he was secretly paid, than he gave up his *Courier de Provence* to our Genevese revolutionists, Duroveray, Clavières, Dumont, and Reybas. The eloquent pen of Mirabeau had raised the list of subscribers to the number of six thousand; but the wretched style of our disturbers reduced it so low, that England had to pay the whole expense of

the journal. The *Courier de Provence* pointed out the revolutions still necessary in France; the individuals who ought to be detested and persecuted; and the quantity of assignats to be created, in order to effect the exportation of your money, as had before been wished by England. To be thoroughly informed of the intentions of this junto power, read the memorials, speeches, and motions of Mirabeau, the sketches of which were furnished by our Genevese, Mirabeau adjusting them agreeably to his own style and manner. Then read the journal itself, and you will find the miseries prepared for you by the restless vindictiveness of England, assisted by the men we proscribed in 1782. Read also the journal of Brissot, and his motions; exiled from France by M. de Vergennes, as the others had been from Geneva. Companions in misfortunes and adventures, you will see them accomplices in revenge."

Of the Conduct of the Genevese Disturbers against constitutional France.

"If there were any period more unfitting than another for declaring a republic, it was certainly that of the king's flight. The national assembly, though influenced by the democracy, was almost wholly, both in spirit and principle, for royalty.

Yet this was the moment chosen by our exiles for forwarding the intentions of Great-Britain, who saw during the existence of the constituent assembly, in your internal commotions, nothing but the expulsion of the house of Bourbon, the means of establishing a new dynasty on the continent, and the dismemberment of France. You may remember a certain disturber of the cordeliers, named Duchâtelet: it was he who lent his name to the writings of our Genevese *.

" Meanwhile the fabric raised by our exiles in France was supported nearly in the same way as their plans of government at Geneva. They had succeeded with the heads of the constituent assembly, in procuring the adoption of a royal-popular democracy: a democracy which a breath might destroy. To overthrow this, our emissaries joined the Brissotines, who, previous to the 10th of August, were the montagnards of the second legislature. England wished to make France, already torn by factions, and believed to be dismembered by the treaty of Pilnitz, declare war against Austria. It was besides in contemplation to destroy your Austrian alliance of 1756.

* Madame Roland, in the first part of her Memoirs, page 40, says, " Dumont the Genevese, a man of abilities, was editor of the journal called *the Republican*, to which Duchâtelet, an officer in the army, lent his name; and Condorcet, Brissot, and others, were preparing to give their assistance.

The Brissotines took upon them the whole odium of the declaration of the war, which our exiles succeeded in raising up, for the benefit of England, against your best friends, as well as the neutral powers, without making any distinction between those who were friendly and those who were inimical to France.

" It was at this juncture, so dreadful to the court, that England, after having, at a great expense, raised the insurgents of the suburbs of Paris, on the 14th of July and 6th of October, on the king's flight, determined, in concert with the duke of Orleans, to have a man of its own in the French ministry. This the queen's party opposed. She was thoroughly informed of the revolutionary views of England. The English party, therefore, met with difficulties in getting Clavières elected. But these the faction got over, by terrifying the queen. The last forgery of assignats having incensed the patriots, a secret council, formed of two of our exiles, in which Brissot presided, resolved to accuse her of having commanded and directed the fabrication of these assignats, unless she admitted Clavières into the ministry. The court of France might be truly said to throw itself wilfully into the gulf, for it was previously warned and instructed upon the subject. The king was, how-

ever, so weak as to call the Genevese into the ministry.

" Clavières was a kind of adventurer, replete with that daring spirit, those views and vices, which are dangerous in every state. Such was the opinion entertained of him by all men of sense in Geneva; and he was, beside, considered as one whose honesty was at least doubtful. Four potentates had banished him from Geneva, by whom he had been also excepted on every amnesty, on account of his seditions and plots for the absolute destruction of his country, if he could not govern there as he pleased. The king could not be ignorant, that he had been appointed distributor of the strange subsidy of 50,000*l.* together with lord Grenville and other Englishmen *. Accordingly the court no sooner recovered from the fright into which Brissot's menaces had thrown it, than Clavières was dismissed. Offended at having thus remained in administration for a few days only, on the 20th of June he raised the suburbs against the king with the English money, and di-

* D'Ivernois has given a portrait of Clavières in two lines. " Clavieres," says he, " loved democracy, though perhaps he had more of it in his head *than in his morals.*" D'Ivernois, the sharer of his adventures and revolutions, must surely be well acquainted with his character.

rected them to the palace, which they forcibly entered.

"You know the events of the 10th of August: it was necessary that our English emissaries should gain this second victory, for Clavières to be once more raised to the ministry—a ministry which proved in this instance still more disastrous than in the former. Danton received from Clavières the sums which were employed in the revolutions of August and the subsequent massacres of the 2d of September; and Mr. Pitt threw on Brissot, and his party, the odium of a declaration of war, which was contrary to the wishes of England. The girondists, persecuted by the montagnards, endeavoured to save themselves by a coalition with the moderates, and laboured to preserve the king, when they dethroned him; while the montagnards, by dethroning him, were desirous of ending his reign and his life together.

"When this unfortunate monarch was condemned to suffer death, then it was that the banished Genevese returned triumphant, opened the clubs which had been shut up in 1782, and a second time overthrew the constitution and government of their country. Read the official speech of the revolutionist Anspach, which, though exiled from Geneva in 1782, he delivered in 1792, in the presence of your predecessor,

M. Châteauneuf; and you will see the unfortunate monarch of the French, when a prisoner in the Temple, still the object of the rage of our revolutionists, and in what manner they express it in presence of his envoy. Yet Lewis XVI. did not send his troops against the Genevese democrats till they had thrown their government, his ally, into irons *. This hatred to the king was, however, conducted with much precaution, and step by step, by England, from whom our Genevese revolutionists hold their immediate commission. Advisers and bankers to Mirabeau, from the time of the opening of the states-general, they consulted with him on the sending back the troops from the *Champ de Mars*, and the detention of the monarch in the Tuileries †. When Lewis XVI. set off

* Anspach's speech was made in December 1792, when Lewis XVI. was a prisoner. He praised Châteauneuf, the French resident, as the *apostle of the rights of man*. He said, that the Genevese patriots, often vanquished but *never subdued*, were the tutors of the French in revolution. "Does it not become," said he, "a just and generous nation, to efface by benefits the injuries of a king which have cost us so many tears?" Anspach then thanked Châteauneuf for the interest he had taken in his revolutionary success. It is certain that the brigands supported the revolution with blows worthy the muscles of an ox. And it is this spirit of propagating revolutions, this Genevese spirit, which, when introduced in France, armed all Europe against us.

† See the eulogium of Mirabeau by Grenus, the colleague of Clavières, and exiled from Geneva with him in 1782. In

for Varennes, the Genevese Dumont, behind the curtain, under the name of Duchâtelet, is ready to offer his plan of a republic. When at length you have a first constitution, Clavières insults it by raising the mob of Paris on the 20th of June. If the legislative body receives the conquered monarch on the 10th of August, the Genevese Marat, domineering in the municipality of Paris, agitates the question, whether this prince should be sent to the Temple, and prepares the way for his execution. The blows of our Genevese adventurers, who interfered in your revolution, were chiefly aimed against the royal person. It is the centre of authority which is the object of their direct attacks.

"In this situation of things, how do the English and Spanish act? The latter, undertaking in a high tone to defend the king, inspired new courage in the party which opposed Marat, and gained the accused monarch a few votes from the deputies of the provinces on the Spanish borders. There is no doubt, that had England shown the same solicitude, it would have produced many more from those of the western

his 18th page he says, that Mirabeau was studying a course of politics under "Clavières, formerly honoured with exile, a man of an enlarged mind, penetrating, profound, and an able calculator."

coast. Mr. Pitt afterwards thought it no disgrace to Great-Britain to arm the royalists to destroy. Why then did he think it degrading to take a few political steps for the preservation of the monarch? The decree for the king's death passed only by a majority of five: three more negative votes would accordingly have been sufficient to save him; and Mr. Pitt was well acquainted with the art of gaining in a great assembly those whom money can purchase. But naturally of a gloomy disposition, and a profound calculator, he rejected the generous opinion of Mr. Fox, and eluded all measures favourable to the king, even those official steps of friendship and protection to which the opposition, and the English in general, were inclined in this fatal juncture. Mr. Pitt might in a moment have destroyed all the revolutionary and preparatory measures of the d'Ivernois, Duroverays, and Dumonts; he might have annihilated the insurrections of the mob of the suburbs, planned, executed, and paid by Clavières; he could have rendered null all the attempts and violence of Marat. The intentions of England, in receiving these revolutionists, were far from being unsullied; nor did she send them to France when in a state of revolution, without meaning. According to the system of Mr. Pitt, it was the interest of England to reduce your country to

a state that it should no longer dare to accuse the English of regicide. Mr. Pitt was desirous that his country should have no occasion hereafter to hang down their heads when out of their own island, in consequence of the manifestoes of your ministers, and the writings of your authors; and it is because the English still blush at the execution of Charles I., that a few adventurers, nurtured in the conspiracies of Geneva, and who had departed with an ill regulated mind from the centre of our revolutions, that Dumont, d'Ivernois, Clavières, Marat, and others, were employed in the execution of the various scenes and proscriptions of the 14th of July, the 20th of June, the 10th of August, and the 21st of January. Englishmen, I will venture to say, were scarcely capable of conducting these revolutions themselves, because they were not exasperated against your government to the same degree as our exiles were.

"Thus Mr. Pitt, in the house of commons, treated with contempt the generous motion of Mr. Fox, who certainly expressed the wish of all Europe, of France, and, I may say, of the majority of the national convention, who were held during these circumstances in a state of terror, both by the commune of Paris and its own minority.

"In the upper house, lord Grenville stood

ready to reject a similar motion, should such a one be made by any noble lord. The marquis of Lansdown brought it forward: the minister's reply was, 'But with whom in France can we treat? Would not the negotiating with such men be to acknowledge the republic? Would not the character and dignity of Great-Britain be dishonoured by treating *with so desperate a rabble?* We have nothing to fear from the new government, nothing to negotiate with its agents, and nothing to communicate to them without derogating from the national dignity.' Hence it appears that Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville —who did not think Great-Britain degraded by granting fifty thousand pounds by stipulation to a few Genevese, banished in 1782 by four united nations; to men excepted from every amnesty, and so excepted in consequence of a horrible plot they had formed to blow up their native city—could in the English parliament declare it to be derogatory to Great-Britain to negotiate in favour of an imprisoned monarch, though all Europe have since applauded the gentle and conciliatory negotiation of the Spaniards. Lord Grenville had not thought himself disgraced by accepting the office of distributor of the subsidy, and becoming the colleague of a d'Ivernois and a Clavières: yet he could assert the dignity of the kingdom to be endangered by treating with Lebrun for the king's

safety; or with Clavières, one of his own colleagues.

"As there were but three votes wanting in the convention for the minority to have become the majority, and prolonged the days of the monarch, whose death has cost France so much blood, and raised against it such a storm of revenge; it follows, that Lewis XVI. was beheaded by the predominating faction of Marat the Genevese, who had just succeeded to the faction of the Genevese Clavières. From these two factions united, originated the 14th of July, the 21st of June, and the 10th of August. The Marat faction, by the 21st of January, completed the plan for the destruction of the French government.

"There is something in the proceedings of the French republic, as well as in our own, of which I will give you the secret clew. I give it not to the French resident, but to a Frenchman attentive to the history of his country, from whom we expect a stop to be put to those *ox-like* blows, those tortures, which, before his coming, were dealt among us, to set in motion the revolution; and of whom we only ask, that, not from partiality, but justice, he will refuse his influence and support to the violent revolutionary party by which we are governed.

The clew I mean, the clew at once to your revolution and ours, is this, that all the materials of which these revolutions are formed were first prepared by England, in the same manner as the trading watchmakers of this city direct the making of a watch: the parts were distributed to each, as in Geneva every part of a watch is given to its appropriate artist; one makes the case, another the dial-plate, another the springs, and another the wheels:—the result of the whole is a watch.

"In all our revolutions, there is the same preconcerted mechanism, the same combined and perfect effect. Our government meanwhile becomes inert, and slumbers, and our disturbers hold their secret committees. Our clubs are then their executive power: when they are opened, there is no longer any government; when they are closed, it resumes its functions. With you, as at Geneva, there exists revolutionary classes, whose savage hierarchy perfectly imitates the constitutional one. Our expatriated Genevese, who direct your revolution, have preserved this hierarchy, and the revolution accordingly exhibits a continual succession of destructive passions, so well arranged, that the ruin of Mr. Necker made way for the rise of Clavières; the ruin of Clavières for the faction of Marat, &c. There

was a general union and friendship between them in 1789. In 1792, they were scattered different ways, London being the common trunk from which the revolutionary ramifications diverge.—Would you learn by some characteristic sign the nature of the other subaltern factions, either of France or Geneva, who have managed the sums scattered by England in your revolution? I will describe them to you, by one general observation: 'They are men who have never been, are not now, and never will be, content with any form of government in France, but will be traitors to them all.'"

On the Conduct of the Genevese Commissioners, Distributors of the English Subsidy, after the Establishment of the French Government.

"There is in Geneva one of the illuminati, but an honest man, by name Chenaud, a notary, replete with good intentions toward France. He is said to be initiated in the secrets of a branch of the German illuminati, who have separated from the original stem, because their plans for the destruction or reformation of all human institutions are much more moderate. It is said, that this notary, on every particular period of the revolution, has regularly every year informed your predecessors, and Lewis XVI., in writing, what misfortunes the destroying party were con-

certing against France for the year to come *. I have even heard it affirmed, that he offered effectual means for stopping the course of these revolutions, which in the end will ravage all France. If this be true, and I have no reason to doubt it, it appears that the French are the mere tools, and that their virtues, as well as their passions and crimes, have been alike employed to transform your government into a revolution.

" I have been assured, that Chenaud's penetration went so far, that he knew beforehand all the various adventures, partly romantic and partly sanguinary, of one of our most noted revolutionists, Clavières. This penetration is by no means impossible to be acquired in states subject, like this, to periodical revolutions. The leaders of the revolutionary party are themselves exact calculators of future revolutions. They are so certain of the success of their crimes, that one of them has in his own character delineated them all. I will give you, from memory, the words written by Clavières under his own portrait.

* I received myself a series of letters from Mr. Chenaud, during my fifteen months legation, and I found among the records of former legations the letters in question written by Mr. Chenaud to my predecessors, who despised his information.

1	2	3	4
Falling,	rising,	stricken down,	destroying,
5	6	7	8
retreating,	advancing,	stopping,	and pursued *.

" You will see the giddiness of these revolutionary heads, and may judge whether they were calculated by nature for any thing but destruction, or were not destined by the evil geniuses of France and Geneva to be the scourge of those two nations. (Remember also they will become indirectly that of the English.)

" In reality, when the old government of France was overthrown, its hierarchy destroyed, its greateſt men murdered by the Sep-

* 1. *Falling.*—Their exception from the amnesty of 1782, and their exile by the four nations of France, Geneva, Berne, and Sardinia.

2. *Rising.*—The act by which Clavières, Duroveray, and d'Ivernois, were named distributors of the English subsidy.

3, 4. *Stricken down,—destroying.*—The 14th of July, and other revolutions of the constituent assembly.—See the *Courier de Provence*, by Clavières, d'Ivernois, Duroveray, and Reybas.

5. *Retreating.*—The fusillade of the Field of Mars put a momentary stop to the English revolution, and produced constitutional France.

6. *Advancing.*—The first administration of Clavières.

7. *Stopping.*—His being turned out of the ministry.

8. *Pursued.*—His second ministry, and the 20th of June and 10th of August.

But he guessed whither his destiny would lead him in this pursuit, which he prevented by suicide.

tembrisers, or conducted to the scaffold; when constitutional France was also destroyed; your nation still retained an intelligent, active, and industrious population. You had valuable manufactures. Lyons was still the centre of your commerce; the foreign imports amounted constantly to ninety or a hundred millions (of livres), which you owed to the existence of this interesting spot. Alas! the envy of England destroyed at this period the city of Lyons, by the hands of the Genevese. Enormous sums were bestowed on the Précy party by the court of London, through the channel of Geneva, in order, under the protection and favour of our revolutionary government, to destroy the jacobins. Equal sums were sent to the heads of the jacobine faction, to destroy the shopkeepers. Five per cent are to be gained by this means, say the members of the Genevese government. See, on the other hand, the troops of the convention which already surround Lyons, the capital of your trade, which the murderous disputes of the revolutionists and royalists will no doubt rase to its foundations. I took care that the French resident here should be informed, though indirectly, of the time when this should take place. With any other government, the agents of England, who

were charged with the general direction of the commotions at Lyons, would have been taken in the fact, and been punished for an act of perfidy, that would have involved the two nations in open war.

"But the revolutionary Genevese government is influenced by the majority of individuals, who received the pay of England in 1783. Can it then punish that power for continuing its benefactions to your enemies*?"

* In consequence of this and other information, I laid a complaint at the time before the revolutionary Genevese government, or rather before its committee of general safety, on the impunity with which various extraordinary sums were sent to Lyons by way of Geneva. The president of that committee, who was one of the exiles of 1782, answered me officially, that I was not ignorant that the government had made judicial inquiries into the proceeding.

These inquiries were mere pretences, and Janot had the confidence to require me to punish the authors of the bill posted on the walls of Geneva, which denounced the remittance of money from England to Lyons through the medium of the Genevese government.

Bertrand, the mayor of Lyons, on my interrogating him concerning the aids received by his party at Lyons, of which he was chief, replied, "It is true the leaders of the patriots have had assistance, and wanted nothing; but far from receiving a present from the court of London, which we should have rejected with horror, I declare that all those sums were furnished from the office of secret expenses of the committee of public safety; at least so we are constantly assured by those who supply us.

Here end the first private conversations, and the first minutes of the partisans of the former Genevese government.

The Genevese democracy, triumphant in 1792, owed its success to the decline of Lewis XVI., who had been the protector of the old establishment. It was also indebted for it to the influence of Clavières and Brissot's party, who rose in proportion as they degraded the royal authority.

The Genevese aristocrats called the Swiss in vain to their aid, who entered Geneva in 1792. The allied cantons uselessly took this expiring aristocracy under their protection. Clavières, and the executive council, ordered Montesquiou and his army to advance to Geneva, keep the government at bay, and insist on the expulsion of the Swiss troops. The three potentates had, in the time of Lewis XVI., by their military operations, freed the aristocratic party, then imprisoned by the democrats, and restored the two orders of the state of that republic to their constitutional situations. Our troops were destined, by Clavières and Brissot, in 1792, to destroy this harmony, and abolish their relative positions and powers, by the too great weight thrown into the scale of the democracy. When general Montesquiou employed those proper forms, which a great power should necessarily

adopt to a less, Clavières and Brissot, in the eagerness of revenge, passed a decree of accusation against this general, who had attached himself to the popular party in France in the year 1789, by renouncing all his titles and honours. Democracy then reigned a second time in Geneva. The distributors of the English money, banished and excepted from the amnesties of 1782, enter the city in triumph, open the clubs, overthrow the government, its councils, and constitutions, create an administrative committee of government, and a committee of general safety. Already, in the month of December 1792, was a trial made in Geneva of that revolutionary government, which was to take place in France in the ensuing October. And as a painter preserves his ideas by a sketch before he enters on a larger piece, so Britain, by means of Brissot, Clavières, and the other restored exiles, tried the effect of the revolution, on a smaller scale, in the city of Geneva. Should not the effect of such a machine on the interior of a country have been ascertained? It was close to one of these revolutionary machines that I was appointed resident minister by the executive council, before the committee of public safety was in being. A short time after my arrival, I promised the Genevese magistrate, from whom principally I received the above

anecdotes, that I would never join the existing government, or the democratic party, against its opponents. I promised to use all my endeavours to induce Barthelemy to get the constitution accepted at Berne, and to terminate the revolutionary government. The natural animosity of the party who were exiled in 1782, and victorious in 1792, put the aristocratic party in imminent dread of new insurrections and dreadful retaliation. I farther engaged to grant no official assistance to the revolutionary excesses of that government. The dangerous resentment of the predominating clubs against this pacific system was foreseen. I was answered: "I have, and I always shall have, a democratic magistrate depending on me, and am possessed of other means, which authorise me to promise you, that, whatever may happen in France or at Geneva, you and your family will be safe, if you, on your part, faithfully execute the treaty, and if no free and spontaneous act be performed here by the French legation against our party; except in case of any of its members happening to do any thing notoriously obnoxious to punishment."

A year from my arrival at Geneva passed on, during which that republic enjoyed the most perfect tranquillity. It was freed from the revolutionary government; it adopted the consti-

tution of Barthelemy, founded on principles of public probity and equity, at a time when those qualities were banished from the constituted authorities, and procured it to be adopted by the cantons allied to Geneva. Not a drop of blood was shed in the course of this year; not a single revolutionary detention, or one confiscation, took place.

But the year being ended, the public treasury was found empty. An impost was demanded by the government, and refused by the general assembly of the people. The government party accused the party of rich aristocrats of a desire of destroying it, and draining the public treasury. In 1782 a few individuals of the existing government accused the government, then taxed with aristocracy, of insulting the will and majesty of the sovereign people. In 1792, the same individuals, when become the government themselves, continued the insult; they take arms against the decision of the sovereign, and raise the popular societies to accuse and punish it. *The great club of the revolutionists of the mountain* at Geneva, the first agent of the government, declared itself in a state of revolution, and divided into nineteen clubs, to accuse those suspected of aristocracy, the aristocrats, and the party called *englues*; so denominated because they were moderate in

their principles, and were attached to or stuck by the aristocracy. These nineteen clubs took up arms, to obtain, by revolutionary right, from the rich Genevese, what freedom had allowed them to refuse or grant to the avarice of the government, who had joined the insurgent clubs.

The armed clubbists entered the houses of the wealthy citizens, "usurping," said a neutral magistrate of integrity, "the name of *revolutionists*, which is appropriate only to a people in arms against its tyrants. Those clubbists, armed and in insurrection against the sovereign will of the people legally known, imprisoned, in one night, the eighth part of the nation. We have neither princes, nobles, nor catholic priests; but, under pretence of the aristocracy of riches, the clubbists named a commission, who arbitrarily exiled, imprisoned, and shot, five hundred Genevese, and plundered them of a million and a half of florins."

The Swiss, who had withdrawn their troops the preceding year, hoping the democracy would not go to extremes against the opposite party, seeing that the democrats now sported with their own government, that that very government sported with itself, that it joined the clubs, and shot the aristocrats, stuck up the following proclamation in all parts, dis-

daining all communication alike with the revolutionists and syndics. " Geneva," said they in their proclamation, " that republic in which we have always taken so much interest, resulting from the long and intimate relations and alliances subsisting between us, and the habitual connexions of immediate neighbourhood, is given up to unheard-of calamities, of which it is impossible to guess the duration or consequences. At the very moment when they gave us reason to expect the return of tranquillity by the new order of things, which *the government had just solemnly announced to us*, as well as to the canton of Zurich, *as the term of all our dissensions*, an armed and undisciplined mob attacked and destroyed at once our public freedom and personal security. They were seen violating the dwellings of individuals with open force, tearing a number of persons from their homes, putting them arbitrarily under arrest, and immuring them in various prisons. Blood has been shed, and citizens have been sacrificed, *even against the consent of a majority of votes, and new victims are pointed out, new attempts are forming on persons and property*, which are carrying on amidst the oaths for preserving the established forms and laws of the state. Geneva awaits in terror and amaze the fate prepared for it by *those sanguinary rioters, who have usurped*

the right of disposing of the lives and fortunes of their fellow-citizens. The knowledge we have acquired of the criminal participation of some individuals of our nation in the dreadful excesses we have just mentioned, increasing our affliction, and adding to our indignation, our paternal solicitude for the safety and honour of our country will not allow us to tolerate those men of blood, sullied with crimes, on our territory. We therefore order, that entrance upon it be interdicted them, and require, that such as are known to have taken any share in these atrocious scenes be immediately denounced and seized, reserving to ourselves to pronounce against them the just punishment, of which their guilty conduct in a city so long our ally shall have rendered them deserving."

The clubbists, in their proclamations, answered, that these were aristocratic complaints.

Already an eighth of the population of Geneva, under accusation of aristocracy, was shut up in prison in the heats of July, where they awaited their fate in terror. The club of the Grate, the favourite of the government, was the first to take up arms, and put the citizens under confinement. A committee of seven, named by the clubbists, and invested with absolute power, superseded the government. On the ensuing day, twenty-one clubs had nominated

the twenty-one judges of the revolutionary tribunal, whose sentences of death were to be ratified by the revolutionary citizens.

The members of this tribunal, which was formed by the clubs like the tribunals of the 2d of September, sat without coats, in nothing but pantaloons, their necks and breasts open, and their arms bare above the elbow; each had a pistol in his girdle, and a sabre slung in a scarf, which hung over the shoulder; they were surrounded by wine, brandy, strong liquors, pipes, and beer. The very garrison refused to obey their orders.

In their horrid declarations, they said, "The members of the tribunal, having entered on a career as painful as important, had to guide them no rule whatever, no particular law or organisation; yet, on their entrance into office, they found more than four hundred prisoners. It was therefore necessary to begin by a discrimination of crimes, which they have divided into seven classes:"

1. The calling in the French, Swiss, and Piedmontese in 1782, and the Swiss in 1792.

2. Aristocratical taking up arms against the patriots.

3. Machinations against the independence of the country.

4. Against the restoration of equality.

their mis-led and intoxicated fellow citizens. The next day a placard was stuck up in Geneva, attributing their sentence to the minority, the *true* patriots, and the intended mercy to the *false* patriots.

Meantime the hatred toward the rich, as well as their pillage, increased daily: the people had been flattered with the hopes of plenty, if they would support the revolution. Historic impartiality, which ought to extend even to robbers, requires that we should here refer to the writings published by themselves.

Watched by other plunderers, less fortunate in the share of the spoil, they gave an account of their receipts. They divided their booty into three classes, according to the different kinds of property: on one side they put the amount of the plate, species, wine, and hay, they had pillaged and appropriated; on the other was placed plate and species extorted or presented as patriotic gifts; and, lastly, the booty resulting from effects in a state of requisition. The revolutionary committee of finances made the amount of the whole to be one million eight hundred and fifty thousand livres. I should add, that the aristocratic party, who were plundered during the imprisonment of the rich, reckoned an equal sum lost in paper: but as those who were at liberty, and acting in the cause,

owned no more than one thousand livres in assignats, we will not run the risk of inserting a calumny in the historic page.

The booty being divided on the 1st of August, Fatio, formerly syndic, was condemned to death. Naville daring to defend, before his sanguinary judges, the old government of Geneva, and the necessity of a counterpoise of its various powers, had the like sentence passed on him. One of his judges, named Nal, gave his opinion in the following words: "My conscience tells me, that Naville does not deserve to die; but, as it is necessary to have two consciences, I pass sentence on him." Dessonat, a deserter from the French army, member and secretary registrar of this tribunal, might have still saved him; the clubs having decreed their sanction no longer necessary to the sentences of the tribunal. This clubbist magistrate spoke as follows: "Naville is an aristocrat, but he has never been guilty toward the people: yet, though I do not think him deserving capital punishment, as I wish to save my country, I condemn him to suffer death." Delhorme and Audeoud received the same sentence: the former as attached to the aristocracy; the latter, as a jobber and the inventor of the famous *billets solidaires*.

5. Against stock-jobbing.

6. The intrigues in Switzerland to destroy our alliance.

7. For corrupting the public morals and mind.

Hence, after ten years of revolution, after three amnesties, after the establishment of a peaceful constitution submitted to by all orders of the state, the clubbists were preparing to sacrifice such individuals and friends of the government as had instigated the exile of the popular party in 1782.

This mournful state of Geneva, abandoned to the cruelty and avarice of a popular democracy, is a striking lesson, which should teach nations to counterpoise the opposing interests in a state, and the necessary ranks of society. The leaders of this rebellious populace were so well aware of this, that, having plundered the imprisoned party, they distributed, according to their own account, 617,039 florins, under the title of military rewards, among the mechanics and persons hired to assist in the execution of the sentences they might pass. This mad mob, while receiving forty sous a day, imagined themselves in possession of an inexhaustible mine; for they kept all the rich in prison.

On the 23d of July, the revolutionary tribunal condemned and banished Prévost, Cailla, and

Rochemont, subject to the revision of the revolutionary clubbists. On hearing of this sentence, the revolutionists thronged round the tribunal, which it accused of sparing the rich and condemning the poor; and required, with the most horrid expressions, the execution of the seven on whom sentence had passed; and the tribunal of clubbists gave orders accordingly.

The next day the revolutionary clubbists got together to execute or annul the sentence; and the mob called for the ratification of that passed on the seven. On proceeding, however, to its formal sanction, the young and interesting Rochemont is declared innocent by a great majority; when immediately the minority of the clubbists, voting for his death, join the very dregs of the people. Cries of rage resound from all parts. The tribunal, the committees, the presidents of each club, all are threatened to be shot; and, so violent was the tumult, that the revolutionary tribunal and the military committee ordered the execution of the three persons, whom the majority in the tribunal and of the clubbists had pronounced innocent; and, lest their victims should escape in the night, they were immediately put to death by torch-light. They all suffered with the utmost courage, declaring themselves the martyrs of freedom, the defenders of the constitution of their country, and forgiving

Then it was that the class of jobbers, so very numerous in Geneva, began to be in the utmost apprehension; and patriotic gifts were poured in for the benefit of the judges and presidents.

All the victims suffered with fortitude and resignation, and with still more striking patriotism and love of their country. The assassins having failed in their first shot at Naville, mangled as he was, he replied to their awkwardness and ferocity: "I told you you would miss me." At the tribunal, who gloried in its victims, he had pronounced a speech worthy the best days of the Roman republic. He spoke prophetically. "One fate," he said to them, "awaits you and your accomplices. Enriched by plunder, and absolute masters of the state as you are, think not to enjoy in peace the fruit of your crimes. You have destroyed all those beneficial institutions, which preserved your country from despotism; you will yourselves feel the effect of that destruction. You wish to reign free men over a free people, and are incapable so to do. Within your own faction new factions will arise. You will destroy each other, to secure the authority to yourselves. Like tigers, you have united to gain your prey; like tigers, you will tear each other to pieces, to devour it." These words were

interrupted by savage howlings; but were retained by a spectator, who repeated them to the author of the *History of the Miseries of Geneva.*

Prévot expired publicly thanking his wife *for the happiness she had bestowed on him*; and entreating his mother's forgiveness for having embittered her last years by his death. He exhorted his son not to meddle with public affairs.

The sanguinary authority of the tribunal happily expired on the 10th day of the month. During its session, comparable only to that of savages assembled to plunder and devour the vanquished, it had condemned thirty-seven citizens to death and to confiscation of their property, twenty-six of whom were cast for non-appearance; ninety-four were sentenced to perpetual banishment and confiscation; and others, to the number of five hundred and eight, to different penalties, such as solitary confinement, various periods of exile, imprisonment, and loss of their offices. After these proceedings the tribunal declared the people sufficiently revenged. It is true that the rich were decimated, and accused of having refused the impost by influencing the sovereign assembly: their plate and pocket-books had paid the tax; but the period of the miseries of Geneva was not yet arrived.

The sufferings of those in prison were worse than death. The celebrated De Saussure was a few hours under arrest *. Necker Germany, the brother of the famous Necker, purchased his liberty by the gift of twenty thousand livres. I saw him soon after he recovered his liberty calm and collected: he neither complained of the loss of his money nor of his liberty; but hastened to implore for his country the clemency of the senate of Berne, enraged against the banditti, who had deceived them *by promises of public security and internal tranquillity*, if the senate would acknowledge the revolutionary government, and support the new constitution. Can this benevolent and generous action be forgotten?

The clubs had begun to pillage on the 18th

* *Letter of Citizen Soulavie to the President of the Revolutionary Tribunal.*

"I am glad to be able to inform you, citizen president of the revolutionary tribunal, that citizen De Saussure is a member of fourteen of the academies of Europe, as I am assured by a Danish traveller, who has just left a public situation, and is now on his way to see the glaciers of Chamouni. He has desired me to observe to you, that, should citizen De Saussure receive the smallest injury, you will be considered by the fourteen academies as the enemies of human learning; and that, on his return, he will make inquiry into the affair. I exhort you, citizen president, to preserve for your country the just reputation it has acquired, of being a city famous in sciences and arts."

of July; and on the 10th of September, when accused of peculation, they exhibited the following account. This account proves, that the revolutionists had, by their own acknowledgment, in the course of fifty days, plundered and consumed at least one million eight hundred thousand florins.

It was then truly remarked, that the clubbists had exhausted, in the course of a few months, both the constitutional and revolutionary resources.

THE AC-

Given by the REVOLUTIONARY

Dated the 10th of September 1793;

RECEIPT.

PROPERTY SEIZED.	Species.....*Florins*	162403	5	6
	Plate.....	206809	4	6
	Wine and Hay.....	3228	11	0
N. B. *There is much property not yet sold, but still in sequestration.*				
PATRIOTIC GIFTS.	Species.....	349374	6	0
	Plate.....	50109	4	6
	54 shares of the patriotic fund; valued at 200 florins.....	10800	0	0
	1 ditto of the charcoal society.....	102	0	0
	5 ditto of the authorised society...	3500	0	0
	1500 livres, in assignats at 30 livres.....	1051	10	6
	5000 weight of hay	500	0	0
	Various merchandise	340	0	0
N. B. *The gifts of corn and flour have been converted into species, and are comprehended under that head.*				
N. B. *Two houses in the town, and one in the country, have been given, but not valued.*				
Plate in requisition		890912	6	0
Produce of the former chest of aids—Credit on the patriotic establishment		22635	7	0
	3 shares of the same stock.....	600	0	0
	In species.....	20748	7	0
Property in the corn-hall, belonging to the company of *fusteurs*, put in requisition		98450	0	0
Received of different persons for taxes, or on account of taxes		81970	7	6
Credits		2028	7	6
TOTAL of RECEIPTS.....*Florins*		1,855,565	5	0

N. B. *There is a difference, which the book-keeper is endeavouring to discover, of 252½ florins, to balance the account of this difference. 232½ florins are already detected. 19½ still remain.*

COUNT,
COMMITTEE of FINANCES.

Third Year of Equality.

EXPENDITURE.

Military indemnities..... *Florins*	617039	6	6
Relief distributed by the commissioners elected by the clubs, in conjunction with the police-officers:			
In orders for bread.....	36936	5	6
Meat and cheese.....	15765	7	0
In species.....	60636	7	3
Do.....	1275	0	0
Extra Expenses—Dinners for public functionaries; refreshments; extras for guards and drummers; prisoners' expenses; candles, paper, books, pens, ink, &c.....	46559	2	6
Indemnities of public revolutionary functionaries—majors, secretaries, and clerks of offices—agents of the tribunal, of the revolutionary commission, and of the military committee—inspectors at the gates—visitors, and divers officers within and without the city to this time.....	56011	10	0
Money advanced to the patriotic establishment	31758	2	6
to the repository of industry.....	4335	0	0
Due from the administration on the produce of plate already advanced	938884	4	0
In the hands of the commissioners of the public aids.....	6024	9	9
Various debts	11538	6	0
57 shares of the patriotic establishment	11400	0	0
5 ditto of the authorised society	3500	0	0
1 ditto of the charcoal ditto	100	0	0
50 hundred weight of hay in hand	500	0	0
Sundries, a small lot	480	4	0
Merchandize	340	0	0
4127 livres, 15 sous, in assignats	2727	1	6
Cash in hand	898	4	6
TOTAL of EXPENDITURE..... *Florins*	1,8[illegible]5,312	11	0

Of the most remarkable Part of the Conduct of the Genevese Democrats toward each other. They shoot one another in Effigy and in Reality.

Geneva imagines it has in its democracy discovered the most sublime of governments; and continues to hold it up as a mirror of perfection, even after the plundering and murdering of its citizens by the military and revolutionary commissioners of the insurgent clubs.

The certain proof of the deficiency of this government is, that Geneva itself has been for two centuries discontented with it, and has given the greatest uneasiness to its neighbours for at least a hundred years past. One single city gave uneasiness to ancient France!

Its hereditary nobility, clergy, and monarch, having been for two centuries abolished, it calls its constitution the master-piece of human wisdom; yet it has been constantly seeking freedom and tranquillity in a great variety of administrative forms, without having ever been able to attain them.

The history of the republic demonstrates, that, however this state may boast of perfection, it has been for the last two centuries nothing but a ruin itself, injured by time;—the unformed and irregular remains of that

government, which had been so formed by preceding ages, as to establish an exact equilibrium in its three authorities, and the three interests; which bind men together, as they do the free cities of Germany.

Ever since its original constitution was dissolved, Geneva has floated through and experienced all the political situations, which, since the institution of the French democracy in 1789, has exhausted France; yet without ever meeting any one calculated for happiness and durability. Every Genevese government, which has endeavoured to find a stay, or to improve itself, has been reckoned an usurpation —some invisible power was still opposing the restoration of social order.

There is no need to wonder, that the French democracy, after having abolished its clergy, nobility, and monarchy, has been ever since preying on itself. Imperfectly sketched out by its founders in 1789—not on the three powers and interests united in the British constitution, which they despised, but on the democracy inspired by Mirabeau, together with Dumont, Reybas, Clavières, and Duroveray, his advisers and intimates—the history of the ten revolutionary years of France exhibits all the symptoms of the Genevese democracy in its wildest paroxysms; more particularly in the

enmities and proscriptions of its leaders, and the rise of the subsequent parties.

In France we have seen the revolutionary family, in which were Mounier, Necker, Bergasse, and Lally Tolendal;

Overthrown in 1789 by the revolutionary series, amongst whom were the constituents, la Fayette, Bailly, and Barnave;

Overthrown in 1791 by the series in which were Vergniaux, Condorcet, and Brissot;

Overthrown in 1792 by the faction of the mountain, Chaumette, Duchêne, Chabot, Danton, and Momoro;

Overthrown by that of Robespierre, Couton, and St. Just;

Overthrown on the 10th of Thermidor by the faction which took its name from that month, and the other disturbers of the day, who never ceased tearing each other to pieces till the great day of St. Cloud.

That torrent of revolutionists, which has desolated France, had before existed in the Genevese democracy; but it is worthy of remark, that the revolutionary movement, which was the harbinger of our revolution, commenced amid that tribe of Genevese, which gave birth to the first attempt of the clubs against the government in 1782. Then it was that the authority of the government was undermined by the influence of

the popular societies. D'Ivernois, Duroveray, Dumont, Gasc, Janot, Clavières, Anspach, and Marat, all brethren and friends in 1782, emulated each other in the defence of their principles, willing, as they said, to expire together for the freedom and independence of Geneva.

In 1792 a schism took place amongst them; the party of d'Ivernois and Duroveray became, in the eyes of their former collègues, aristocratical, criminal, and worthy of punishment.

A few months after this a second schism took place; and this time the different degrees of anarchical ferocity became the fundamental distinctions of the sanguinary factions which ensued—The party that may be compared to Marat's plunders and murders that which was a parallel to the party of Clavières, as well as the antecedent parties. This revolutionary refinement at length leaves nothing remaining in the Genevese revolution, but a government and revolutionists, who banish, or shoot in effigy, those who are out of their reach. The Neckers, Duroverays, Grenus, d'Ivernois, and their companions in proscription in 1782; nay even the patriots of the preceding revolutions, such as Mallet-du-Pan, an anarchical democrat in the revolutions of his day, and now an aristocratical anarchist. The Genevese revolution in this extremity could boast no patriots but Janot and

Gasc, with their minister Reybas and their insurgent clubbists*; the natural result of establishing that *equality of right*, which, for ever irritated by the inequality in *fact*, will in all populous states occasion the most dreadful and fatal struggle. This is the last part of the picture of the Genevese revolution, which remains for me to delineate. The monarchies of Fez and Morocco, degenerated into absolute despotism, exhibit the effects of the cruelty and injustice of an individual. The moment was now come for Geneva to show the unbridled cruelty of numbers mis-led by their chiefs.—The following is an extract from the acts of the Genevese revolution, published by itself in the moment of its madness.

The first popular victory gained over the Genevese government, in 1789, having destroyed the mixed constitution, which had been restored in 1782 by the three mediating powers, the democracy thence gained possession of the force necessary for a successful attempt at increasing its power. The revolution of 1789 had been directed by d'Ivernois, who had entered into eight several agreements with

* The constitutional government of Geneva acts in accord with the revolutionary authorities. (Reybas in his Letter of the 28th Thermidor).

the aristocracy, and given up a part of the democracy. But Clavières, and those like him, continuing to wind up the springs of the revolutionary machine, obtained the withdrawing of the Swiss in 1792; and the clubs, proceeding from success to success, and from revolution to revolution, arrived to such a height of democracy, and such a degree of perfection, that there were no patriots in the world so pure as this residue, the definitive and revolutionary remainder which I have just mentioned.

Now at Geneva, as in France under Robespierre, the virtue that was the order of the day, the love of our country, equality, and independence, allowed this purified extract of former revolutions to sacrifice every citizen who was not at its pitch. Genevese ferocity made its way into the heart of the French republic and armies. And its revolutionists, agents of Gasc and Janot, and even of Dessonat, secretary-registrar and historian of the Genevese revolutionary tribunal, negotiated with the jacobins and Fouquet-Thinville for the execution of our generals and residents *.

* This excess of depravity would be incredible, had not the Genevese government published a proof of what is here advanced.

(Extract from the letters of Dessonat to citizen G. at Paris, p. 3. vol. II.) "I send you what I have written about Kel-

The Genevese government committed other excesses, the ferocity of which could not have been believed, had it not published itself, in those moments of insanity, some of those political acts which now remain in proof. This government had resolved on the destruction of several Genevese in the opposition; and, to insure it at Geneva, accused them of endeavouring to procure a re-union with France, and in France of being in Geneva the enemies of the revolutionary tribunal of the jacobins, Robespierre, and Marat. By the destruction of this troublesome opposition, the Genevese government meant to show Robespierre it was the exclusive friend of France, beginning with the syndic Gasc, the distributor of the English money, and now one of the magistrates of Geneva *.

lermann; and should not be sorry, that my letters to that traitorous general should be published in the journals, *after his sentence*. They are already all in the hands of the revolutionary tribunal, as the jacobins have written me word."

Yet *this* very general Kellermann, at the head of our troops, under the Brissotines, had protected the Genevese revolution of 1792, against the old government. The Genevese revolutionist was sacrificing his protector.

* Extract from the official report of the Genevese government, signed Janot, syndic; Gasc, syndic; Butin, Delapanche, and Bousquet, afterward president of the revolutionary tribunal, pp. 12 and 14:

"Among those whose names we may be allowed to mention, it is sufficient to point out Witel, that self-called mountaineer, who in our popular societies declaimed against the

This strange administration, victorious over the Genevese aristocrats, and the avenger of Marat, Robespierre, and the revolutionary tribunal of Paris, had determined on the death of Witel, who really merited the utmost resentment of the Genevese government. Witel and Conte had intercepted the correspondence of an English member of parliament, who had thought proper to negotiate with Robespierre, and had in consequence gone to Paris, some time before the 10th Thermidor, and presented himself to the tyrant, who had procured him a passport for Geneva, that they might thence keep up a correspondence on the object of his embassy. This Englishman was the agent of a party, who had consented to treat with Robespierre. He declared, that there existed a faction at London disposed to acknowledge the French republic, if Robespierre would settle a revokable executive power on one or two, as had been the case in the Roman republic; if he would stop the persecution of merchants and religious worship, and substitute some prop of

mountain, represented Capet as a good prince, and his execution as a murder, spoke in defence of Brissot, and loaded Robespierre and Marat with invective.

"Guer..... accused the French mountain party of desiring a counter-revolution; and repeatedly broke out against the convention, the revolutionary tribunal, and the jacobins, on whom he bestowed the most opprobrious epithets."

authority, equivalent to that of the suppressed nobles. On these conditions an endeavour was to be made at London to form a party of a few citizens, who should bring others into the scheme, and make way for a termination of the war.

Witel, Conte, and others of that party, gave me information, that Robespierre was negotiating with foreigners, as if he were the head of the republic, and ruler of its fate. They went still further, brought the intercepted letters of the Englishman to me, and exhorted the French resident to use all his endeavours to prevent a mere individual in France from treating with a party of English, and particularly such an individual as Robespierre. But what was then to be done with the letters broken open, which were the evidence of the truth of Witel's assertion? To whom could they be addressed? Meaulle, now member of the tribunal of cassation, and at that time one of the deputies of the convention, happened to arrive at Aix as a representative on mission; and Witel was informed, that Meaulle, alarmed at seeing France bathed in blood, was hastening to Switzerland to avoid the guillotine, which he had been told was preparing for him by Robespierre. Meaulle was therefore solicited to send the English dispatches to the committee

of general safety, which he had heard was in opposition to Robespierre. The committee received them, and Vadier, a member of the committee, who began the revolution of the 10th of Thermidor, delivered them to Robespierre, with the other intercepted letters of Chenaud, and paved the way for the cry of deliverance, *Down with the tyrant!* Witel had been informed of the existence of this correspondence by some persons of the old Genevese government, with whom he was in habits of friendship. Thus we see the Genevese government on one hand, and the opposition on the other, were come to such a point, that, while the government publicly proscribed the persons that defamed the revolutionary tribunal of the jacobins and Robespierre, those very persons were secretly labouring to put an end to the tyranny, under which the French suffered.

Those two parties of the government and the opposition were distinguished by their respective appellations. The former found its strength in the party of *the great club of the revolutionists of the mountain* of Geneva. The opposition, in that of *the club of the montagnards*. Japot, Gasc, and Anspach, were the leaders of the first. Grenus, their ancient collegue in proscription and distribution of the English subsidy, and Witel, formerly secretary

to Mirabeau, were the chief among the party of the club of *montagnards*. The latter, the montagnards, accused the mountain, or rather the government, of draining the public treasure, detesting France, and serving Mr. Pitt.

The government reproached the montagnards with having, in Witel, a leader who served the aristocrats; and, in Grenus, another who laboured, according to them, to gallicise Geneva; and consequently of being the agents of the French resident, whom the government represented as one placed in that office solely to prepare the way to a union with France. And, as all the Genevese at that time wished for a union with France about as much as the French did for a union with England, the violence of the enmities and resentments of the different parties, and the dangers to which they were exposed, may be better imagined than described.

From the commencement of the revolution, no age, sex, rank, or condition, escaped the terror with which all became impressed by the unaccountable coalition of the government with the authorities created by the clubs *. The

* "The constitutional government proceeds constantly in accord with the revolutionary authorities. The utmost zeal is exerted to relieve the poor at the expense of the rich."—See Reybas's Letter of the 28th Thermidor, Year 2.

aristocrats imprisoned and plundered were decimated in the public squares, and the ministers of religion laden with irons. The execrable ferocity of the revolutionary tribunal was exerted even against the *englués* *, a timid and neutral class, who were only suspected of being attached to the aristocrats; and, at last, the revolutionary ferocity was turned against that part of the revolutionists themselves, who showed a more particular attachment to France, the oppressed aristocracy of which had stirred up its leaders, in order to make a secret diversion to the murder and plunder carried on by the clubs. These clubs had declared, from the very commencement of the revolution, that their vengeance would be directed against the pride and

* Reybas. Memoir on the revolution at Geneva on the 18th of July, 1794. A fourth class of citizens had been formed under the name of *englués*. It was composed chiefly of those, who, having been patriots before this period, had allowed their principles to be relaxed by the gratification of their vanity, and the attentions of men in office.

The Genevese revolutionists were tired out with these various changes. They were weary of the incorrigible arrogance of the aristocracy, of its obstinate neglect, and of the principles of the constitution of 1794, which it seemed to have acceded to solely for its own safety. In the night between the 18th and 19th of July, after the tumultuary sitting of the great Genevese club, most of them ran to arms, and got possession of the military posts. The houses of the citizens, supposed to be aristocrats or *englués*, were entered, and their persons secured.

disobedience of the aristocrats, and *against the enemies of France*. The revolutionists of the clubs aimed all their blows exclusively at the aristocrats; and the latter, plundered and decimated, addressed themselves to one Witel, president of the club of the montagnards, and some others of its leaders, requiring an account, from the constitutional government, who had emptied the public treasury, as well as from the heads of the revolutionary government who had joined the two syndics, from the time of the refusal of the impost, and the diplomatic report for revolutionising and pillaging the plate and port-folios.

The revolutionary tribunal, and the government, declared this request to be the result of a criminal coalition between the aristocracy and the club of the montagnards against the patriots of the grand club of the mountain, where the revolution had begun, where it had been organised, and whence its members had rushed with madness and rage to take arms. Such was then the situation of Geneva, that the constitutional government and revolutionary club of the mountain, after having killed and plundered the aristocrats, plundered and killed the montagnards, and even the poor mechanics, whom they declared to be infected with aristocracy *.

* The proceedings of the tribunal are still slow. It has sentenced a considerable number of mechanics whom the

The revolution, therefore, preyed on itself at Geneva: the absent patriots, accused of contumacy, were sacrificed without even sparing Grenus, the old associate in the distribution of the English money, &c. The brigands killed all alike; and patriots, *englués*, and aristocrats, who had refused the impost, all fell victims to the same insurrection. They killed the montagnards, because they called for accounts and persecuted the murderous government, who had published the before-mentioned declaration, which had alarmed them all; and they killed the moderate party, because they remained neuter.

The montagnards being thus punished in the persons of Witel, Genton, Grobety, and Conte, the clubbists and the government had time to breathe. They were then able to execute, without opposition, the most incredible of all administrative measures for the extortion of money. They established a progressive tax, according to the degrees of property: they went still farther, and established one of the same nature on opinions; so that there was a scale of taxation for the aristocrats, another for the *englués*, and a more fa-

magistracy has rendered unsound. Their punishment has been in general a shorter or longer term of imprisonment. (*Decree, 13 Messidor, Year 2.*)

vourable one for the patriots; that is to say, the patriots, while taxing the others, did not tax themselves at all. "We tax," said they, "the rich and the *englués* for the benefit of the poor." —"Those of the first opinion," said Reybas, "are taxed at one and two-thirds *per cent* for each thousand livres up to twelve thousand; and after that sum, to any amount, four *per cent* on the capital."

"The *englués*, or egotists, one *per cent* on four thousand livres of capital, increasing one-quarter *per cent* for each thousand livres to the extent of twenty-five *per cent* on the capital."

The rich patriots paid but little; the poor ones would have been supported by preceding contributions, even if the revolutionary leaders had not bestowed the booty on them, so long as this murderous system continued.

I have collected, from the public acts of the Genevese revolution, the account of its sanguinary excesses and pillage; a work which would be complete in all its parts, were I to add that of the injustice and cruelty exercised against my office, which lasted fifteen months, by the Genevese government and the insurgent clubs: and this would have found a place here, if such a chapter would not now be a revenge even worse than the offence. It consists of extracts from the correspondence, both active

and passive, of the Genevese government, of its minister at Paris, of the committee of public safety, of its clerks, and of my own secretaries, and the publications of the insurgent clubs. This work, of which I have taken care, will see the light, whenever I shall judge it useful to my country.

But as the abbé Barruel, in his history of the jacobins, and d'Ivernois at London, have accused me, in my station of a minister of the French republic, of directing the crimes of the revolution at Geneva; as my embassy concluded with an imprisonment, ordered by Treillard, Thuriot, Prieur, Robert Lindet, and by the celebrated author of the law against those who were suspected, who now, for their own justification, point me out as a terrorist in France, where I have never exercised any office since 1788, where I never wrote any thing but the *Memoirs of Richelieu and Barthélemy*, the latter an upright man, whom I saw with grief and alarm banished to Cayenne by the enmity of the directory; I shall here give a brief account of my official acts at Geneva, and the revolutionary acts of the Genevese government and clubs with respect to me.

It is a notorious fact, that, during one year of my legation (which Marat attacked before it was begun), and till the time of the insurrec-

tion of the clubs, there was neither a drop of blood spilt in Geneva, nor one imprisonment on account of politics. Geneva passed under my eyes from the revolutionary state, in which I found it, to the constitutional state. In concert with citizen Barthelemy, I contributed to get its unworthy government acknowledged by their excellencies of Berne, who very justly contemned the reunion of the adventurers, whom they themselves had banished in 1782. They only acknowledged it a regular government; and I took the steps to make them do so, simply because it promised to rule peaceably. I conducted myself to this government in the manner it fitted a Frenchman to behave to the six distributors of the subsidy of the court of London. They expected me to be, at Geneva, not the French resident, but their head clerk; and, in consequence, Robespierre was no sooner entered into the committee of public safety, which happened during my being in office at Geneva, than its government incensed the tyrant against me. An order, which I wish to preserve here as an honourable proof of the hatred of Robespierre, condemned me to the scaffold. At this juncture, the Genevese directed a girondist, put from under the protection of the law, to the French resident, with whom he took refuge. I had him safely conducted to an inn at

midnight by my faithful Benedict: I arranged his emigration; and the government of Geneva, in concert with several Frenchmen, little worthy of the name, made inquiries and reports to carry into execution the original order against him. I will declare to the whole world, that Barrère, who has saved Delille-Desalles in like circumstances, having signed Robespierre's order, prevented the execution of it by these remarkable words:—"I have long been acquainted with the Genevese resident; should Chaumette get us declared outlaws, and we take refuge there, Soulavie will receive us as he received Gamond, and will amuse the syndics with his notes. This is acting like a worthy embassador." The decree, taken by Robespierre, was not executed till afterwards, by Treillard, Thuriot, and Merlin, and on the same report. The Genevese government had held the revolutionary axe for a year suspended over my head and that of my family. When it raised its clubs to begin their ravages, conscious of its guilty intentions toward me, it imagined, that I directed the club of montagnards against the party of the revolutionary club of the mountain, who had taken up arms, and were its chief strength and support. It also imagined me devoted to the aristocrats; and thought proper to impute to me a memorial

against Geneva, the original of which Meaulle had received during his mission at Ain, with the signatures, which he has given me, and a copy of which was found at the club. This government was not ignorant of my proceedings with that of France, to secure the independency of Geneva; yet it persuaded all the Genevese I was labouring for the union, and gained an interest with their fellow-citizens from that very representation. I felt myself highly honoured by all the persecutions, insults, complaints, and enmity of that government against my ministry, and by those of its Septembrising tribunal; and I wish to preserve their expressions, as well as those of their colleague, d'Ivernois, whose treacheries against France still remain for me to exhibit.

Decree of the Committee of Public Safety, on the Complaints made by Rybas of the Government of Geneva, and on the Report of Deforgues, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"The committee of public safety, on the report made by the minister for foreign affairs, decrees, That citizen Soulavie, the resident of the French republic at Geneva, shall be recalled without delay*; and that the mission with which he is charged in the Genevese republic shall be entrusted to citizen Rivalz. The minister for foreign affairs remains charged with the execution of the

* In a dispatch made after the denunciations of the retreat of Gamond and Grandmont, put from under the protection of the law, in the legislation, was added, *and conducted to the revolutionary tribunal.*

present decree, of which he shall give an account to the committee of public safety.—Signed at the registry: Billaud de Varennes, Barrère, Robespierre, Prieur, and Robert Lindet."

Extract of the Genevese Denunciations to Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety, against the French Resident, relative to Gamond and others.

"The resident had twelve hours to search after him, and exert himself in Geneva, before Gamond could escape. He might have made all the necessary requisitions to the government in the evening; he might have insisted that the magistrates of the police should make such inquiries as would have rendered the escape of Gamond impossible. I made this objection to citizen Soulavie.... He knew the abode of Gamond; he had his description, and was sure to have found him at his inn, where he remained till nine the next morning...When the escape of Gamond is in question, a fugitive deputy, a member of the federalist party, of a man put from under the law, Soulavie contents himself with denouncing him as a young emigrant, and requiring his expulsion from the Genevese territory!" *Dalborme to the French Government, the 22d Messidor, Year 2.*—And the same person, on the 12th of Messidor, the same year, says: "It is really time to have done with this man, whom every body accuses, and who has entered every path which leads to the revolutionary tribunal."

Darliville, to the French ministry, the 22d of Nivose, year 2, says: "Dessonat (registrar of the revolutionary tribunal of the Clubs) has told me, that Soulavie intended to emigrate, and that he had sent his library to Switzerland, where it is at the house of Staël. Dessonat has shown me letters of the society of jacobins, by which it certainly appears, that he has informed them of some of these

circumstances. They have written to him to continue his watchfulness over Soulavie, to give information to the society, and to furnish materials against him to the revolutionary tribunal. Meetings were held with suspected persons at the resident's. I promise you to watch all the motions of Soulavie."

"It would be necessary not to lose the present revolutionary instant, as happened on the overthrow of the magistracy in 1792. These motives seem to operate strongly in favour of the means I have pointed out; the means are simple, and the more secure, as it would be difficult to form an idea of the influence which well-informed and firm patriots might obtain here, who spoke in the name of the committee of public safety." *Delhorme, 13 Thermidor.*

The Government of Geneva, coalesced with the principal Insurgents during the Pillage, to the Committee of Public Safety, the 6th of August, 1794. (16 Thermidor, Year 2.)

"More than two months since, it was expected that citizen Reybas would have laid before you the causes of complaint against the resident Soulavie, and have obtained from you his recall. An insurrection has just taken place; the body of the people have risen to crush for ever the numerous partisans of aristocracy, who were spared in the revolution of 1792; more than four hundred have been arrested; a revolutionary tribunal has been formed to do justice on the guilty, and cleanse our republic of them. But how did citizen Soulavie conduct himself? This man, who is not so much the enemy of the aristocrats as of the government of Geneva, which he does not forgive for having discovered his meddling and intriguing disposition,—this man has so managed, as to direct that insurrection against the government, which was intended only against the aristocrats."

..... "Ask citizen Reybas for such explanations as he is well able to give you; and you will then judge whether our request for the recall of a resident, who has infringed the law of nations, is well founded. He concealed in his house a citizen pursued by the tribunals of this republic*; imputed to the constituted authorities the escape of an enemy of the French republic, whom he had received in a friendly manner, and for whose arrest he gave no order, till he believed him to be in safety†. Try an honest man among us."

Extract from the Book of Dessonat, Secretary-registrar of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the insurgent Clubs. Vol. III. page 211.

"Soulavie was closely guarded till eleven at night, when he was removed to the frontier by the public force, (Dessonat ought to have said, by Janot, the leader of the armed force of the insurgent clubs,) and was placed in the care of a general of brigade commanding in the Pays de Gex. One trait of hypocrisy of this ex-priest ought not to be omitted; as he got into the carriage, he repeatedly exclaimed, *Vive la république de Genève!* A rascal like him to have the impudence to pronounce these words!"

D'Ivernois, in p. 169 of the London edition of 1795, says: "It is not known whether the rascal (Soulavie) has yet received the punishment he deserves."

Meanwhile, the clubbists, who had pillaged the aristocrats, now totally plundered the legation. The seals of Thuriot, Merlin, and Treillard, placed a week afterwards on what was left, still remain there from the year 3.

* Cler..., whom they had proscribed for having spoken ill of Robespierre and Marat.—*See the appendix, report of Genets.*

† Genonod, on whom they set a watch in Switzerland, and in consequence of whose flight they drew up the inquiries, which were sent to Robespierre and the committee.

And now Messrs. Barruel, d'Ivernois, Thuriot, Merlin, and Treillard, may see how far I was indebted to Robespierre for my post at Geneva, and how much I had to do in the direction of the revolutionary Genevese.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Conduct of D'Ivernois and Duroveray, Colleagues of Lord Grenville in 1782, *in the Committee for distributing the Fifty Thousand Pounds given by England; and of the* primum mobile *of all the Crimes of the French Revolution established in the Offices of the Ministry at London. — Concluding Reflexions on the Twenty Revolutionary Years of the Genevese Refugees, as well at Geneva as in London and France.*

THE history of the revolutionary adventures of the Genevese, who were banished from their country in 1782, will be here completed, by giving the last touches to the portraits of those two, who showed most ability in the art of raising insurrections and popular seditions,— D'Ivernois and Duroveray.

The latter, while this country was enslaved by the companions of his adventures, was running over Switzerland; whence he got himself expelled by the government of Berne. He caballed with Fitzgerald, George the Third's minister there, and a few emigrants, to raise a commotion in the mountains of Jura *. From

† "Fitzgerald, and his agents Duroveray and Pictet, are employed in fomenting an insurrection in the Jura." *Letter of the French Agent Buchot at Basil, on the 9th Messidor, Year 3.*

this, one might imagine this Genevese to be devoted to the partisans of the old French government, if there were not an historical proof extant, which will show posterity the treachery of the English government, and the means it employed for the disorganisation of France. This same Duroveray, who appears at the head of a few of the scattered nobility in 1794, in 1789 had been labouring for their destruction, prior to the union of the three orders, and even prior to the 14th of July. He took a seat in the interior of the hall of the third estate, to direct it against the king and the other two chambers. Duroveray thus posted, Duroveray a pensioner of the king of England, and colleague of lord Grenville, distributed to the deputies of Bretany, and others of the English party, the notes that prepared the first erroneous and disastrous proceedings of this chamber, whence originated all the subsequent misfortunes of France. This expert workman, "born," as he told the English government, "in the very centre of conspiracies," appeared in the midst of an assembly of the deputies of the people, who had repaired to Paris with the best intentions possible, but without any of that revolutionary experience, which Clavières and Duroveray so amply possessed, having learned the fatal art in the schools, society, clubs, and

morals of their country. It was in vain that some of the former magistrates of Geneva, astonished at the audacity of these exiles, sent well-judged and predictory memorials to Lewis XVI. This unfortunate monarch found himself placed between two opposite French parties, and two opposite Genevese ones; one of which, with Mr. Necker at its head, persuaded him to give himself up to the public and the revolutionary torrent; while the other party, by their writings, recommended him to hold back. Let us attend to the following representation, which the king had carefully preserved.

Memorial to the King.

"SIRE,

"Some of the magistrates of the republic of Geneva, with whose loyalty and unshaken attachment to your sacred person your majesty is acquainted, with the utmost grief present to you their complaints on the conduct of Clavières and Duroveray, formerly citizens of our republic. Their crimes have banished them, and others like them, not only from the territory of Geneva; but France, Sardinia, and Switzerland, as well as our republic, united to exile them from all their frontiers. We know not whence arise their present influence and riches:

but they have returned from London, by whose government they have been favoured with so much of both, that scarcely can our eyes believe the publications which announce them. Night and day these men surround the deputies of the third estate; not the most virtuous among them, but those adjudged by the public opinion to be most inclined to irregularities. They scatter their money; they profess the most alarming opinions concerning religion, the state, and your sacred person; they hover about the *Palais Royal*, and even enter it; they pass from Paris to Versailles, spreading notions subversive of all society, and distribute them, in print or in manuscript, to those members of the third estate, who are most celebrated. Alas! sire, they will shake France to its foundations. Deign then to recollect the misery in which they kept their own government; deign to recall to your mind the imprisonment of that body by these men in the Scales inn; and that it was they who, in 1788, placed all the gunpowder of Geneva under our largest buildings, intending to crush the city and your majesty's army by their explosion. We intreat your majesty to prevent the evils prepared for you by that party. It is under the direction of M.... Sensibly affected by seeing the best of monarchs labouring at the head of his peo-

ple for the reformation of his kingdom, we are alarmed at the evils prepared for him by the banished Genevese, should they be favourably received by the less respectable of the deputies of the third estate. We see much inexperience and exasperation in these deputies; in our exiles we behold men experienced in the arts of sedition, and checked by no restraint. Ah, sire, should the union between the latter and these deputies of the third estate take place, to what miseries will not your august house and kingdom be exposed? Save then, sire, your august family, your worthy spouse, and those children, who, brought up under a virtuous prince, are yet the hope of their country."

But nothing could convince the king of the crisis, to which the revolutionary party was leading; every advice of this kind was destroyed by the observations of its opposers. The king could never give an impulse; he could only receive it: and we may see what kind of persons these adventurers were, who blew up the flames of discord in France. Some Genevese, who observed the cabals of the exiles, and no doubt the same who presented the above memorial to the king, finding their zeal useless, introduced themselves into the chamber of the third estate, prior to its union with the others, to take the revolutionaries of 1782 in the very

act; and, from the mouth of deputy Madier, the following strange motion was heard there: "I require the chamber to order the expulsion of those, who, not being deputies, have taken their seats among us. I see one, a foreigner, who has been proscribed in his own country, a refugee in England, and a pensioner to its monarch, whom day after day we have seen writing and circulating his notes in this hall." The chamber, struck with astonishment at seeing a pensioner and agent of George III. so placed, showed a momentary emotion: when Mirabeau, whose genius already overawed them, seeing one of his council, one of the authors of the revolutionary memoirs which regulated his conduct, thus openly attacked, replied in these terms: "This proscribed foreigner, this refugee, this pensioner of the king of England, is one of the most respectable of the *citizens of the world.* He has, from his very youth, enjoyed the confidence of his fellow-citizens, who sought his concurrence in the forming of a code of laws, which was to secure for ever the constitution of his country. In the midst of factions and enmities, calumny itself has respected the virtues of Mr. Duroveray. Involved in the proscription, which the aristocracy instigated the Genevese and the generals of the three armies of

France, Switzerland, and Piedmont, to pronounce, Mr. Duroveray withdrew to England, and will, doubtless, never deny the honour of his exile.....A great number of respectable British citizens were eager to receive the proscribed republican. They took measures for his honourable reception, and induced the government to bestow a pension on him....Will you suffer,' that a martyr to liberty shall receive an insult here*?"

* See *Mirabeau's Letters to his Constituents,* letter x. page 12. See also *Mirabeau's Portrait of himself,* vol. i. page 33. *published by Buisson.* Also the preliminary volume of *the Dawn of Day, sitting of the 12th of June* 1789, page 351, where that sitting is reported.

In consequence of Mirabeau's explanation, Duroveray, whom that celebrated deputy called *his revolution master,* was not expelled. It is necessary to read the history of this sitting in Mirabeau, drawn up by Duroveray himself, who has the confidence to put the following expression in the mouth of Mirabeau: "The French name remains tarnished on the borders of the Leman lake." No doubt for having banished the tyrants of Geneva in 1782. In this collection, Mirabeau acknowledges Clavières to be his fellow labourer in his treatises on finance. After the death of Mirabeau, the exiles claimed even the last memorial, which the expiring deputy sent to the national assembly. There is a singular expression in this collection. The Genevese exiles make Mirabeau say,: "They shall not r - nter Geneva, but exculpated and avenged, and to prove whether they or the aristocrats most merited exile." The offence was given in 1782; the desire of revenge was expressed in 1789.

In all these pieces you see the pensioner of the British monarch, in 1794, at the head of a handful of emigrants in Switzerland, labouring to raise the Jura against the republic; in 1789, taking his post in the heart of the commons of France, to raise them in rebellion against the other orders of the state. The English, from the centre of their isle, smiled at the credulity, and what they called the awkwardness, of our commons. "The French," said they, "imagine they have acquired freedom. They have just touched it, as they passed by; but have far to go yet, before they can secure it; before they can even seek for it; for it must be acknowledged they have mistaken the way." The Genevese secret council of Mirabeau, who was the grand mover of the third estate, actually at that time planned the false basis of that short-lived monarchy, which was seen to expire at the end of ten months. Is it not well to know, that France was indebted for it to a pensioner of the English government?

What post Duroveray held in 1789 has been already shown. D'Ivernois filled one still more remarkable. Fixed in the private cabinet of lord Grenville at London, he, by his writings, informed all Europe, and the English par-

ties established in France, Russia, Vienna, Philadelphia, and London, and more especially the members of the English parliament, what they ought to think of the French revolution, and how they ought to conduct themselves toward it. D'Ivernois, the enemy of the French republic, was to those tainted with the Anglomania in Europe, as Duroveray, the enemy of the French monarchy, was to the third estate: an engine of destruction, who acts the same part against republican France, which, in 1788, and the following years, he acted against the French monarchy. D'Ivernois at London was the soul of all the measures which revolutionised France. Unconnected with the parties of Great-Britain, he possessed the art of pleasing both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, and, in his libels against the French, deals out his praise to them both. A disturber at Geneva, and head of the democracy in 1788 and the ensuing years, his dependence and slavery at the court of London induced him to engage in the crimes, which he is not ashamed to exhibit in that collection of imprudences, falsehoods, and evil prophecies against France, contained in his writings and productions, which show the depravity of his own mind, and the insidiousness of England. He is the first public functionary of the British government who has dared to

acknowledge the original intentions of Mr. Pitt. "Long since," said d'Ivernois (p. 205, 1794), "all thoughts of parcelling out the republic has been given up: the intention now is the saving of Germany from absolute dismemberment. The grand point is to drive the French back within their own territory, by compelling them to exhaust their finances."—In p. 207, he says, "The coalition has led the monarch to the scaffold, when it meant to restore him to his throne; and has placed on the throne the crime it wished to conduct to the scaffold. Who can be ignorant, that the French republic will be a second Lewis XIV.? Who can think without trembling on the torrent of blood, which will flow at the commencement of the nineteenth century, should the other powers, by yielding to this new military republic some of its immense conquests, give it the intoxicating expectation of attaining new ones hereafter? or, should an immoral policy give them up for the present, with the secret intention of lulling it asleep, in order to take up arms a few years hence with greater success? The restoration of its acquisitions, and of all of them without exception, is the sole security for a lasting peace: and since the tempest of the French revolution has lost much of its original violence, the sole remaining aim of the war, and the only one to which

Germany and England should now persevere in directing its views, is the preserving inviolate the confederation of Westphalia. Nor do I hesitate to pronounce, that, should the majority of the plundered members of Germany have the weakness to betray their own interest, and purchase the remaining provinces, by agreeing to abandon those of which they have been despoiled; the engagements into which Great-Britain has entered, as well as its dignity and its interest, will absolutely require it should exert all its weight, to compel its allies to defend their own cause, or to defend it for them, should they be inclined to desert it *.

" Johanot (p. 245), whom I look upon as the most honest, or perhaps the only honest man of all those who have handled the public money, affirms, that one year's revenue of the unsold national property amounts to about three hundred millions, making the absolute value of twelve milliards. The compulsory force of various circumstances will lead, sooner or later, to the restitution of the property of the emi-

* The course of events since 1794, and the war of intrigue carried on against France, clearly prove, that d'Ivernois was initiated at London into the English secret, which he divulged. This observation is useful, as it relates to the miseries prepared for us at the commencement of the nineteenth century, should the confederation of Westphalia not remain inviolate. *(Advice to the French Government.)*

grants. Will not the French (p. 349) have recourse to despotism in their distress? Or will they adopt the temperate and hereditary monarchy of England as their model?

"All my reasoning powers are in arms, when I hear talk of an elective Washington among the French; among that nation who will produce many Voltaires, before one man shall arise or be remarkable among them, who will bear a comparison with Washington, for that spirit of regularity, those modest talents, that foresight of the future, that prudence in his measures, and moderation in power *. But it is now necessary to have the courage to say to the French openly, from this time, that they can never free themselves from the spies of England and the house of Austria, that they can never secure their independence, except by returning to the august family of their monarchs. They, the French, become Spartans! I wait for the morrow of the day,

* But France has found its Washington; and the Genevese disturber, who was indignant at the possibility of his arising, breaks forth with new fury against France, in the libel which at this moment appears, entitled, "*On the Causes which led to the Usurpation of General Bonaparte, and prepare its Fall.*" What d'Ivernois wished to have seen established in France, was, as he has told us, a protector placed there by the courts of London and Vienna —(Frenchmen, forget not the plans of this promoter of commotion.)

on which they shall again fall under the rod of a lieutenant of police.

"Why, ye French soldiers, why do ye yet delay disconcerting the sanguinary hopes of your leaders? Are you not aware, that these men only persist in turning your attention to foreign countries, to prevent your casting your eyes on the ruins with which they have covered your own? Do you think it possible they should ever restore that France, of which they have made one vast tomb? I have proved, that peace can never be re-established, till the neighbouring powers have united together to drive France back to its ancient boundary, to confine it there, and deprive it of all hopes of ever beginning a new career of conquest, and a new harvest of plunder. (P. 264, *of the Usurpation of Bonaparte.*)

"And if, falling from defection to defection, notwithstanding the well-proved faithfulness of its subjects, notwithstanding the flourishing state of its population, and the subsidies of England, Austria should not believe itself in a state to oppose any effective power against the French, there then remains for it nothing to do, but to acknowledge itself vanquished, to put an end to the useless destruction of mankind, and bow its neck to the yoke. But every treaty of peace,

which shall aggrandise the territory of France, will be the germe of a continual war."

Recapitulation and Conclusion of the Twenty Revolutionary Years of the Genevese Democrats, expelled their Country in 1782, by the Armies of Lewis XVI., Switzerland, and Piedmont.

Imagination cannot support the idea of the series of crimes and iniquitous plans, which this set of men have set on foot in France, Geneva, and London, directed by their own depraved and destructive turn of mind, and under the impulse of a malevolent government, that has rewarded the crimes I shall here enumerate.

In 1782, the revolutionists, already so often mentioned, strong in the promises and protection of England, under pretence of obtaining a code of laws for Geneva, took arms against their government, and against France, the guarantee of the old constitution of Geneva, who opposed the new code. They were banished by four potentates, by whom they were degraded and dishonoured in the eyes of the whole world.

In 1783, they were again united; and, if I may believe one, who knew them intimately at Paris, took a horrible oath, to be avenged on their country, France, Switzerland, and Piedmont, to the devastation and destruction of all which they have at different times contributed.

In 1789, one of the seven took his post in the very heart of the meeting of the third estate, to mislead it by his circular notes: and four of them became the council of our first revolutionists at Versailles, particularly of Mirabeau.

In 1791, the king fled to Varennes; and Dumont, who proposed the establishment of a republic, raised the cordeliers.

In 1792, this party was employed by England, who was the cause of its destruction by procuring through its means a declaration of war against Austria, and afterwards against England itself, the last acts of Clavières and Brissot.

Out of the ruins of the ancient monarchy we had still remaining, in 1792, constitutional France. Against this Clavières raised the suburbs, paid the 20th of June, and furnished Danton, at the head of the cordeliers, with the money which afterwards purchased the 2d of September. In September, 1792, the king was in chains, and the degraded legislature, destitute of courage, was a lifeless mass. Marat, the Genevese ex-refugee at London, commanded the massacre of all the most illustrious persons of ancient France, both clergy and nobility, and disorganised the very republic.

In 1793, there existed neither the ancient nor the constitutional monarchy of France, neither

republic, government, trade, nor social intercourse. The convention was become nothing but an amphitheatre of gladiators, who disputed with which of the two parties, that of Marat, or that of Clavières and Brissot, the power and the guillotine should remain. But we still had our manufactures, that eternal source of the envy of England. Then it was that the court of London confided the sums, which destroyed the emporium of our trade, to the agents of the revolutionary government, Gasc and Janot, the exiles of 1782; and then it was, that Janot, instead of punishing the crime, dared to require from me the punishment of those who denounced it. At the same time Dessonat, the agent of the government of Geneva, the secretary of the revolutionary Genevese government, caballed with the jacobins and the revolutionary tribunal of Paris, for the sacrificing of our generals.

In 1794, Gasc, president of the revolutionary syndicship; Janot, president of the revolutionary diplomatic committee, and of the armed force of the insurgent clubs; and Bousquet, president of the revolutionary tribunal, directed the proscriptions, plunder, and murder, which covered with blood the interesting city of Geneva, plundered the legation, and proscribed the French resident.

At length in the eighth year of the republic,

France having passed under the most dreadful variety of governments, there arose *a man*, to whom all our ills were known. France and Europe put their fate into his hands; and the disturber-general, d'Ivernois, from the closets of the court of London, calculated the possibility of depriving France of its prosperous government; pointed out the means of so doing, and threatened France with an eternal war, should it retain what it had subdued.

I could here demonstrate, that the hatred of the seven disturbers of the public peace, Marat, Dumont, d'Ivernois, Duroveray, Janot, Gasc, and Clavières, was only pretended; that the hatred of the parties of Geneva never existed, but among the unfortunate commonalty whom they deceived and mis-led. But the subject is too foreign to *the Memoirs of the Reign of Louis XVI.* Incontestable proofs of it exist in other writings, yet unpublished, but which are in the bookseller's hands.

I have exhibited the uninterrupted chain of crimes of those dreadful revolutionists, which bear the stamp of reflexion and forethought, to whom the English government has not been ashamed to intrust its vengeance and its fate, at a point of time, when, I will venture to say, the great body of the English nation, affected by the endeavours of France for attaining fr-

dom, contained perhaps not a single person willing or able to take on him the execution of so many crimes aimed at our unfortunate country. It has been said, that there are no direct or convincing proofs of the influence of the English and Genevese in our revolution; yet it is notorious, that the philosophical theories of the Genevese Rousseau paved the way for it. It is certain, that it was carried on against the old government of France by the Genevese Necker; and the revolution is well known to have been turned against constitutional France by Clavières and the Brissotines; to have been carried into effect by the Genevese Marat, the corruptor of the most popular party; and pointed out by d'Ivernois, who, with the stability of a cube, has remained fixed in the offices of the court of London ever since 1789, directing the rise and fall of that variety of governments, which have been formed and destroyed in France within so short a space of time.

It is but just I should observe to my readers, that, having been at Geneva the victim of Marat, Janot, Gasc, and Bosquet, the president of the tribunal of the revolutionists; the victim also of their secretary registrar Dessonat, who, by his writings, stirred up the Genevese against the French legation; my account is natu-

rally to be distrusted. Therefore, to enable them to judge impartially of these revolutionists, I have preserved, at the end of this volume, the records of the most sanguinary and revolting excesses of the general democracy, in the days of its revolution, during the latter part of my being in office. The democracy cannot form an equitable judgment of itself; it is in a state of perpetual intoxication, and the aristocracy is its enemy. But the time for appreciating the pure democracy of France and Geneva, the absolute aristocracy of Venice, the tyranny of Fez and Morocco, and the merits of a mixed government, both in great and little states, is now come, not only in France, but in Europe.

APPENDIX.

OFFICIAL PAPERS

RESPECTING

An Inquiry into the Political Situation of France, in October 1786, by the Count de Grimoard.

N° I.

Memoirs on the Cod-Fishery, by M. Perree.
(November, 1782.)

ONE of the branches of trade most useful to the state is that of the cod-fishery. During peace it forms a vast number of sailors, fitted to supply the losses sustained in other more destructive parts of our navigation. In war, it supplies the marine with hands inured to labour, and accustomed from infancy to brave the dangers and fatigues of an element, which experience alone can enable men to conquer. The fisher secures a sale for our home produce and our salt: and population and competence are its certain attendants.

These are truths with which France seems never to have become acquainted, till she had lost the possessions which the boldness of her navigators had made a part of her empire; possessions in which she united the double advantages of fishing and agriculture. England, either jealous of her power, or better informed, was eager to keep her rival at a distance from these countries; but, by the

fatality which ever pursues the desire of grasping all, the losses sustained by France within a century past have dragged Great-Britain into an abyss of misfortunes, of which its pride cannot contemplate the consequences without trembling.

The independence of the English colonies will naturally put an end to those long and dreadful wars between the European nations, the flames of which, first kindled in America, have set the world on fire. This new world, so long undiscovered, even in its infancy emulates the empires of the ancient hemisphere. It is the interest of this new power to maintain peace henceforth between the two worlds. May the charms of a long and, if it be possible, eternal tranquillity bury in oblivion the ills their inhabitants have mutually inflicted and endured.

It would be very difficult to foresee all the effects the independence of America will have on commerce; but it is very evident, that in a few years it will have the most baneful influence on that part of it resulting from the French fishery, if the ministry be not attentive to its support. It is important to prevent this misfortune on the conclusion of a peace, by securing a fixed property in our fisheries, and an extent proportionate to the necessities of the nation. It is only from the union of these two advantages, of which France lost sight in the peace of 1763, that it can expect to rival the English fisheries in foreign markets, provide for the interior consumption of the kingdom, and the supply of its sugar colonies.

The time is now come for France to claim the right of its ancient possessions, to which nothing can be more

just than her title. Directed by that prudent moderation, which seeks only the happiness of her people, France aspires to a share of that wealth which her rival is desirous of appropriating entirely to herself.

From the coasts of Normandy and Bretany proceeded those, who, in 1504, were the first fishers at Newfoundland. They raised the first establishment on the south of that island. James Cartier, the celebrated navigator of St. Malo, a city famed for great men, acquired a more perfect knowledge of this island in two voyages he made thither about the year 1540. He discovered the entrance of the gulf of St. Lawrence, since called the straits of Belle-isle, and the coasts of Labrador within the gulf: and, encouraged by his example, his hardy countrymen frequented that part of the island where James Cartier had landed: it is now called the *Petit-Nord*; under which denomination is comprehended the east coast of Newfoundland, from Cape Dégia to Cape St. John de la Scie.

The cod-fishery made no very rapid progress; for it was in its origin subjected to exclusive privileges. These fell with the deceitful hopes to which they owed their rise; but the establishments remained, and became in time considerable towns, under the protection of government. Such were Lewisburg and Port Dauphin, at Cape Breton; Port a-la-Joie, at the island of St. John; Fortune and Placentia, in the island of Newfoundland. The French fishermen entered the gulf of St. Lawrence, and spread themselves along the coasts of Canada and Labrador, and all round Newfoundland. The possessions of France in these countries were immense.

By the misfortunes of the war of the Spanish suc-

cession, France lost Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. England, too well aware of the importance of possessing the latter, availed itself of the carelessness of France with regard to this island, which is partly desert. By the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, signed the 31st of March 1713, the French retained nothing but the liberty of fishing from the spot called Cape Bonavista to the northern extremity of the said island, and thence westward to the spot called Point Rich; but this track was far from being as valuable as that which the English had reserved for themselves.

During a long peace, a calm highly necessary after the violent storms which had shaken all Europe, the French continued their fisheries established at Cape Breton, and on all the coasts of the gulf of St. Lawrence; but they had merely precarious establishments, during the fishing season only, on such coasts of Newfoundland as were specified in the treaty of Utrecht. It is essential to remark, that, from 1713 to the war of 1741, the French fishermen, far from going to Bonavista, as they had a right by the treaty of Utrecht of doing, never went farther south than Cape St. John de la Scie. The English had taken possession of that part of the island, and formed fixed settlements upon it. The French, whose fisheries were still very extensive, avoided all subject of dispute with the English inhabitants, and confined themselves, during the fishing season, to the terms of the treaty of Utrecht; to the coasts extending from Cape St. John to Cape Dégra, the northern extremity of the island, and thence along the west side to the spot called Point Rich. This Point Rich, or Cape Ray, forms the north coast of the entrance into the gulf of St. Lawrence, at the

strait so called. The English never disputed this interpretation of the treaty of Utrecht. It was generally followed from 1713 to 1744, and from 1749 to 1755.

The fifth article of the treaty of Paris, of the 10th of February 1763, secured "to the subjects of France the liberty of fishing and drying on that part of the coasts of Newfoundland specified by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, which article is by the present treaty renewed and confirmed."

The treaty of Paris was scarcely concluded, when, either through jealousy or repentance, the British government interpreted it in a manner differing from that which had for fifty years regulated the two nations. There was no possibility of having recourse to subterfuge, as to the name of Bonavista, which had been known and unaltered; but as there existed no Point Rich in the interior of the gulf of St. Lawrence, beside Cape Ray or Rich, the court of London produced a map, boasted of as ancient, on which Point Rich was named. The English thought proper to give this appellation to a point situate two leagues south-west of Port-à-Choix, latitude fifty degrees forty minutes. It is a low point, unknown to all navigators, possessing nothing whatever to make it remarked. France yielded to this claim, as false as its title was frivolous; by which its fishermen lost the liberty of extending along eighty leagues of the coast. The fishery of Port-à-Choix being thus confined, was, by degrees, abandoned by the Biscayans, who had frequented it. New difficulties from similar causes were started at St. Pierre and Miquelon.

By the sixth article of the treaty of Paris, "the king of Great-Britain cedes the isles of St. Pierre and Miquelon,

in full property, to his most Christian majesty, as a shelter for the French fishermen." These islands are separated from Newfoundland by a narrow channel of five or six leagues, within which the French were not allowed to fish. The English *guarda-costas* seized and confiscated such French boats as they found fishing there.

In its plan for the sovereignty of the seas, it was certainly a serious omission in Great-Britain, for which it now pays dearly, to leave France any fisheries; but could it possibly foresee, that the French fishermen would be able to make any advantage of the coasts of the Petit-Nord, with which it was unacquainted; and that this petty remainder of the French possessions would, in a short time, enable it to restore its marine?

The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, surrounded with an indifferent fishing-ground, barren and without wood, one of the first necessaries of life, as well as of a fishery, yet became, in the hands of the French, an important colony. Labour and industry mastered nature. Schooners and other vessels were fitted out to fish on the Banks. This fishery was far preferable to that of the bare rock of St. Pierre, both for quantity and quality. This colony, during the preceding peace, employed annually a hundred vessels, either for barter or fishing, amounting in the whole to nine thousand tons burden, and carrying 3,500 men. The population of St. Pierre and Miquelon consisted of 1,600 persons. They were the former inhabitants of Lewisburg, and of Nova Scotia, who had almost all been supported in France by the government solely. They had all removed to this new colony, attracted by that something which makes every man prefer the air of his

native country, be the climate ever so severe, to that of any other. I do not think I exaggerate, when I estimate the produce of the fisheries of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon at three thousand tons of fish. It produced also six hundred barrels of oil.

A small trade was carried on, by way of barter, with the Americans; who, notwithstanding all the vigilance of the English, sometimes ran into Port St. Pierre; this was however extremely confined. But that jealousy, which, thinking it has every thing to fear, exaggerates every thing, persuaded the British government, that these islands nourished the embers which lit up the flame of discord between the mother-country and her colonies; and hence the whole weight of its vengeance fell on their wretched inhabitants. On the 14th of September, 1778, commodore Ewens seized this colony, obliged the inhabitants to evacuate it, and rased their buildings. England has constantly made the same use of its conquests in these regions; intending, no doubt, by this sort of devastation, to render the English property there more secure, and leave nothing which might remind France of what it had once possessed.

If the fishers of the Petit-Nord gave less umbrage to Great-Britain as far as regarded its colonies, they were not less the object of its anxiety. An English frigate was annually stationed at Havre de Crocq, to watch the fishermen, require a declaration of their place of equipment, the name of their captains, number of the crew, product of their fishery, both in cod-fish and oil, the port whence they came, and whither they meant to return. Such was its commission; and it never took its departure thence, till after that of the last French vessel.

The officers of the British navy had been pardonable for fulfilling their orders, if they had not likewise treated the defenceless French fishermen with the most revolting arrogance, and if power had not made them unjust. The fishermen were forbidden to raise their flag on land, even as a signal for their boats;—on the approach of a boat from the English frigate, they were obliged to hoist their flag on board. To see the ridiculousness of this last demand, it is necessary to be informed, that the vessels are left empty in the ports, all hands being employed at work on the shore, so that they were obliged to leave every thing, and send off the crew to perform this ceremonial. The English officers frequently searched them, and many examples might be produced of the confiscation of our vessels, during the years 1765, 1766, and 1767; sometimes forcibly carried off from the ports where they were fishing, or stopped under frivolous pretences in the open sea, and taken into St. John's. The English commanders, at once parties and judges, decided arbitrarily on the fate of the accused. Ambition and envy saw nothing but guilt in the French captains, who had, perhaps, been only unfortunate, generous, or compassionate. The time was not yet come, when the English should be compelled to be just: it was, however, approaching. In 1771, some fishermen prepared to fish in the ports they had not before frequented, in the neighbourhood of Bonavista. The English, who were in possession of them, threw a thousand difficulties in the way; and some acts of violence were committed. The court of London, wishing to avoid any disagreement with France, atoned for them by satisfying the French, on complaint being made of the injustice they had received.

The French fishing vessels from Port-à-Choix were stopped by the boats of the English frigates, when fishing to the south-west of Point Rich; but, on complaint, the French captains were restored a few days after their capture, when they had lost a very material and irreparable point of time. But those stopped at Belle-isle rarely obtained so much favour. Yet this isle, situate without the gulf of St. Lawrence, and at an almost equal distance from Newfoundland and Labrador, ought, by right, to belong to France, which had never ceded it. It had never been mentioned in any treaty, and could not be reckoned adjacent either to Newfoundland or to Labrador.

Notwithstanding the state of humiliation to which the French fishermen were reduced; notwithstanding the obstacles of every kind, which the jealous inspection of the English navy was constantly raising against them; the Petit-Nord became a productive nursery of seamen.

From 1766, the fishing trade had repaired the disasters of a war which had been the grave of the French marine. One hundred and twenty vessels were employed at the Petit-Nord, amounting to eighteen thousand tons; nine thousand six hundred men supplied their crews. Their fishing produced two hundred and sixty thousand quintals of cod, and two thousand five hundred barrels of oil. The natural result ensued: the multiplicity of vessels increased the expense of fitting them out, and the coast being overstocked with fishers became less productive to each individual. Yet the total product greatly exceeded the necessary consumption of the kingdom; and the surplus was disposed of at a low price, to procure a vent for it in foreign markets, but in vain. The English, who could sell still lower, from reasons we shall presently ex-

plain, shut us out from the Spanish ports; Italy ceased to get fish from Marseilles; and, notwithstanding the prohibition, the French islands were supplied by the English. The French fisheries flourished during the disturbances which took place in 1774 between the colonies and the mother-country. The effects of an overbearing rivalry was less sensibly felt from that time to 1777; foreigners returned to our ports, a few vessels sold their fish in Spain, others traded to the West Indies, and the ports of France sent out a prodigious quantity of fish to its islands. The French fishery, by a better sale, arising from a channel of which it had been deprived, repaired the losses of its preceding years. This experience may serve as a guide to us for the future.

The same did not happen to the fishery off the Great Bank. Independent of other circumstances, its prosperity depends on the assistance and protection of the government. The English do not prepare the fish caught there as we do; and their fishery there, has not, in that respect, any effect on ours. Our wet cod are consumed in the interior of the kingdom, and in the northern provinces. This kind of salt-fish cannot bear the heats of the Mediterranean, and still less that of the West Indies. With respect to this branch of our fishery, there will certainly need no alteration at the peace; the sea will remain open and free for the exertions of labour and industry.

At the time of the last peace, France employed at the fishery on the Great Bank one hundred and twenty vessels, carrying nine thousand six hundred tons, and one thousand nine hundred and twenty men; producing one million five hundred thousand cod-fish, and two hundred and forty barrels of oil.

STATE OF THE FISHERY.

	Vessels	Tons.	Men.	Wet Cod.	Dried Cod.	Barrels of Oil.	Total.
On the Great Bank,	120	9,600	1,920	1,500,000, at 1 livre each	. . . . .	. . . . .	1,500,000
	Idem	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . . .	240, at 180 livres each	43,200
The Petit-Nord, Ferolle, and Port-à-Croix,	120	18,000	9,600	. . . .	250,000 quintals at 16 livres each	. . . . .	4,160,000
	Idem	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . . .	2,500, at 170 livres each	425,000
St. Pierre and Miquelon,	100	9,000	3,500	. . . .	60,000 at 25 livres per quintal	. . . . .	1,500,000
	Idem	. . . .	. . . .	. . . .	. . . . .	600, at 170 livres each	102,000
Total - -	340	36,600	15,020	1,500,000	320,000	3,340	7,730,200

Such was the product of our fishery: it was the price of our commodities, and the result of the labour of our men. Was then this commerce beneficial? The question is difficult to solve, yet it is certain, that the profits of the fishery at St. Pierre and Miquelon were almost wholly consumed in the habitations raised there. The whole has been destroyed; the fishers of the Great Bank now see a part of their capital consuming in their vessels expensively decaying in the ports. The fishers of the Petit-Nord alone have derived profit in general from their successful voyages in 1763, 1764, 1776, and 1777.

But let the result of the fishery have been fortunate or unfortunate to those employed in it, the state has nevertheless reaped the greatest advantages from it. It is the fishery that has supplied the royal navy with the best and ablest sailors among the crews of the king's ships: in it the port of Brest has found an infinite resource for seamen of all descriptions, and mechanics necessary to the navy. Another important consideration offers itself to government respecting the fishery; it is favourable to population, and makes agriculture flourish, from the ease it affords to the class of indigent labourers—a truth with which all who have seen the countries in the vicinity of the fishing-ports have been struck, no less than with their population. But this trade, even more than any other, requires the encouragement of freedom. On the last peace, it was laden with incumbrances, which must have soon destroyed it, but for the breaking out of the war between England and her colonies.

The French fishermen enjoyed the exclusive right of fishing and drying their fish at the Petit-Nord. We have

shown how much they were exposed to the caprice of the British navy, and the insults and injuries they suffered from the English. The French fishermen, obliged to leave their boats on the coast, never found the same number on their return; it was necessary to cross the ocean every year with the immense incumbrance of fishing tackle; and it was every year necessary, at a great expense, to rebuild or repair their habitations, injured by the weather or the ravages of the English. Hence they were obliged to leave Europe six weeks before the necessary time, which, produced consumption of victuals, a burdensome expense to trade, and great fatigue and danger to the crews, who were impelled by a spirit of competition to encounter the ice, with which the coast of the Petit-Nord is covered in spring. The accumulated expenses of the out-fits, the consequences of not having permanent settlements, greatly raised the price of cod even before the vessels left France, by the speculation on the whole fishery; a very extraordinary and remarkable circumstance, and in general little known. It became, therefore, impossible for the French fishermen to enter into any competition in foreign markets with the English, either of the mother-country or the colonies.

The fishermen of New England could pursue this trade with every possible advantage: their coast abounds in large and rare fish, which are the more valuable, from the little expense in preparing, and its higher price in the markets. They fished at home in spring, summer, and autumn; their habitations were in constant repair; their tillage, united to their fishery, produces them abundance of provision; their winter fishery, and peltry, the product of the chace, were additional advantages. Their

forests, abounding in light and convenient wood, provided them with materials necessary for the construction of boats and vessels: they had the iron necessary for their labours at home. Not contented with fishing on their coasts, they sent innumerable schooners to the Great Bank. The cod were salted on board, and carried on shore to be dried, very few being barrelled wet.

The English, who arrived every year from Europe to their habitations, scattered along the coast from Bonavista to Cape Ray, were also in the habit of sending their vessels to fish on the Great Bank, with fresh and salt bait, while they fished along the coast in their boats. They enjoyed not all the conveniences of the Americans; who supplied at a moderate price their consumption of bacon, butter, flour, and bread; but they had every other advantage resulting from the possession of settlements in that part of the island just mentioned. They reckon there three towns: St. John, which is the principal town of Newfoundland, Placentia, and Fortune. Notwithstanding the abundant resources with which these possessions supply the English, fishermen had settled in such ports as they thought promised them additional success, round the whole island of Newfoundland, and on the coasts of Labrador. They particularly resorted to Castle Bay, where the fishing was late and abundant. In the latter years of the peace, they had almost ceased to frequent the Petit-Nord, where they only carried on fishing in the winter for seals, which repaid them for the poorness of the summer product, or added to its advantages. The salmon fishery, hunting, and cutting down wood, likewise became objects of their attention; to which they might apply with all the per

severance resulting from the enjoyment of liberty and property.

The English population in Newfoundland, almost wholly confined between Bonavista and Fortune Bay, is very considerable: it has been said to amount to 50,000 souls. If to these we add the fishermen of Labrador, those of the interior of the gulf of St. Lawrence, Canada, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, and the whole coast of New England, we shall easily be convinced, that the English fishery exceeds that of France by at least two thirds. This branch of its trade was the best support of the English navy, and supplied Great-Britain with the means of exchange with Portugal, Spain, Italy, and the sugar islands.

On the return of peace, this stream of abundance and prosperity will be divided in its course. The Americans, freed from the restrictions which curbed their industry, will receive all nations. Those who most abound in the productions of which the United Colonies are in want; those whose necessaries or luxuries are most agreeable or useful to them; those, in short, who can sell at the lowest price, and whose ports are open to their vessels, will, no doubt, acquire a preponderance in North-America, and consequently in Europe. And who, more than France, has a right to aspire to this?

But if it would be a general advantage to France, to find a sale for its produce of all kinds in the United States of America; and if this future source of speculation should give new vigour to its trade; from this accidental advantage, which most probably would be of short duration, would ensue the particular ruin of the French fishery, should it be confined to the vagrant establishments of Newfoundland.

The present war is a source of prosperity to the United Colonies; with the troops of England and France their gold has found its way there, as well as by the emigration of private persons; the population of America will probably be greater at the end, than it was at the beginning of the war; and its progress will be more rapid, when, the arms of the soldier becoming useless by peace, the return of its blessings will attach him to a country he will be no longer paid to destroy. How many thousands are there, who, having nothing to lose by change, and hoping for a better lot in America, will pass over to settle there! The wealth of the northern provinces consists in their fishery. Hands are only wanting to its increase; and their wealth is both more valuable and durable, as it depends on the immutable laws of nature only. These provinces can pay for the goods imported from France only with their dried or salt fish, or with fish oil; and whether this take place in our own ports through the medium of the Americans, or by vessels which go to them for a lading, the effect will still be the same: for, should they even sell their fish in our ports at a lower price than ours, they would still remain gainers. The French merchants, who should carry out a variety of goods to North-America, will find little for their homeward lading, beside oil and salt-fish; and if they can but make a profit from their trade with the colonies, they will reduce the price of cod and oil to a rate injurious to the nation. France has still another subject of fear, from the independence of the colonies. Will not the old connexion, which subsisted between the English fisheries at Newfoundland and Canada, and those of the United States, afford the former a certain opportunity to incorporate

a great part of the product of their fishery with that of the Americans; and, by their connivance, secure the same advantages for themselves, either in the ports of France or elsewhere? The future affords a prospect equally disagreeable as to a market for French fishery in the West Indies. It is only in consequence of what passed at the last peace, that these alarming conjectures may be looked on as realities.

In 1763, and the following years, some vessels sailed with salt-fish from the eastern coast of Newfoundland to the French West-India islands. English cod was forbidden there; but, in consequence of various abuses, these expeditions became so ruinous, that the French were compelled to give up that branch of commerce. The government, sensible of the evil resulting thence to the state, wished to remedy it. The introduction of foreign cod was again forbidden. The French ministry encouraged its fishermen to frequent the Antilles, by a premium of twenty-five sous per quintal on their fish. The fishing trade could not do better than follow the example, by granting a similar premium to such of its vessels, as, before their leaving France, should enter into an engagement to carry their fish to the Antilles. Encouragements like these may raise a new branch of trade, but it will not long support an old one, the root of which is grown rotten. Particular circumstances operated in favour of the English salt-fish: it was larger, and cost the planter less, who found his advantage in giving in exchange his rum and melasses, of which France consumes very little since the loss of her possessions in North-America.

We have mentioned what was the state of our fish-

eries at the beginning of the sixteenth century; weak and precarious, like every branch of commerce at that time still in its infancy. We have shown what were the possessions which France gave up at the peace of Utrecht. We have run over the coasts remaining for the use of the French fishery from that time to 1748. We have seen the employment she made of it till 1775. We have pointed out the effects of the jealousy of the English in their false interpretation of the treaties relative to Cape Rich, removed by the English, in 1763, eighty leagues farther north than Cape Ray, which was always known as Cape Rich. We have not concealed the humiliations suffered by the French during the last peace, within the narrow limits where only they were allowed the liberty of fishing and drying. We have calculated the amount of the product of this fishery, and proved its necessity to the state, from the number of mariners it produces. It was not difficult to show the superiority of the English fisheries, and how easily our rivals found means to shut the foreign ports against us, and open those of our West-India islands for themselves.

To these representations, equally true and disagreeable, succeeds a prospect of the future, still less pleasing. We can only trace with a doubting hand events yet concealed in the womb of futurity: but nothing can be more alarming to the French fishery, than the natural consequences of the freedom of America, and our union with that nation. It remains for the prudence of the French ministry, for the deep and penetrating glance, which sees at once the minute parts and the great outline of the national interest, to determine the means of giving extent to these new branches of commerce, to which our friendship

with America, now independent, will give rise; without allowing the charms of this novelty to affect us to the prejudice of the French fisheries, from which such great advantages have resulted to the state; and from which it may expect still greater, should the approaching peace assure the French a property in those territories, where they may form settlements, and attend in all seasons to every different fishery, which the coasts of Newfoundland afford, in the manner which best suits their habits and resources.'

Though the French could never expect to reap all the advantages enjoyed by the Americans, they would be enabled to offer their fish as low at least as the English; our permanent settlements would become a valuable bond of union between France and its colonies in the West Indies; and an exchange of commodities be established between them, which would prove a powerful bar to the English. We may frequent foreign parts like them; and it will even be in the power of Spain to ruin the English fishery: for, having but a poor market at home and in their colonies, the English are obliged to export the greater part of their fish to foreign countries. The consumption of Spain is great; by shutting its ports to the English fishermen, it would give a mortal blow to the British navy.' This new pledge of union between Spain and France will be worth many victories to them, and will be unsullied with the blood of their people.

The fisheries will be divided among three nations. Those of the Americans are both very extensive and very profitable. The English are still in possession of Nova Scotia; Cape Breton; the coasts within the gulf of St. Lawrence; Labrador, which extends to Hudson's Bay;

and the island of Newfoundland. France retains nothing but the remembrance of having been the first discoverer and founder of these colonies: this remembrance is the basis of its rights; the titles of potentates are never forfeited by prescription: if made void by force at one time, at another force will restore them. Could France be accused of ambition for again claiming the absolute property and possession of the whole of Newfoundland? Each power would then have distinct and separate fisheries, the only method possible for preventing all causes of dispute in future.

The independence of America will probably be too heavy a blow on the pride of Great-Britain, to allow it to consent easily to restoring to France the whole island of Newfoundland. The French minister will be convinced of the importance England attaches to its possession, from the difficulties he will meet with on this demand from the British ministry, and still more from the parliament. The ceding some of our conquests in the West Indies might perhaps amuse the English nation, easily offended concerning every thing relative to the property of its citizens. The conquest of Newfoundland, the chief strength of which lies at St. John's, and the speedy removal of its inhabitants, according to the example set us by the English at all times in these climates, would remove every difficulty.

Whatever may be the French fisheries on a peace, it concerns the honour of France to free that part of its subjects who live by fishing from the degradation to which they were reduced by the British navy from 1703 to 1777; that the defenceless French fisherman may, for the future, find the vessels of his nation protected on the coasts of Newfoundland; and that the flag which first appeared in those seas should fly there freely and independent

N° II.

Considerations on the Affairs of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and on their ultimate Effect on France, by M. Grimoard.

THE present state of affairs in the Dutch United Provinces may prove of the most serious consequence to France. It is therefore fitting to inquire, what are the proper expedients for bringing them to a speedy issue, in a manner glorious and useful to the king.

The object of the constitutional reforms, undertaken by the Gallo-patriotic party, is:

1st, To provide for its general preservation, and the security of its members in particular.

2dly, To exclude for ever all foreign influence capable of restoring or increasing that of the stadtholder.

3dly, To deprive that prince of all means of favouring England, to the detriment of the republic and her allies; which he has hitherto never failed to do, from his natural inclination and private interest, (most decidedly in the war which ended in 1783,) and which he will do as long as he shall have it in his power.

4thly, To give a preponderance in the United Provinces to France, who neither can nor will do them injury in any way.

England, sensible that France would gain a decisive ascendancy by its union with the republic, and despairing of a reconciliation with the latter, is desirous,

by the commotions it excites there, to make it useless to France as long as possible. The British ministry has wisely profited by the concern which the king of Prussia takes in the affairs of the princess of Orange his sister, and the well-known Anglomania of Mr. Hertzberg, that monarch's prime minister, to lead him on to concur in the accomplishment of the views of the court of London.

In this complicated state of affairs, there are but three modes of conduct for France to adopt:

1st, To leave the patriots to their own strength, and give up Holland.

2dly, To effect an accommodation between them and the stadtholder, in concert with Prussia.

3dly, To support the patriots with its whole power.

The first way is too disgraceful and injurious to France, ever to be proposed by any of its ministers.

The second, nearer allied to the *mediatory principles* in estimation for some years past, deserves a serious discussion.

Should France bring about an accommodation between the patriots and the stadtholder, England, it is plain, will take effective though secret means to preserve for the prince of Orange the greatest possible influence in the affairs of the republic, ultimately to frustrate the schemes of France. Beside, admitting such an accommodation to be possible, who will warrant the stadtholder's acquiescence in the limits it may be thought proper to prescribe to him? England, prompted by its own interest, will succeed sooner or later in breaking his bonds. The stadtholdership, though abolished in 1702, on the death of William III., in Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Overyssel, was restored in 1747 by England, who

will find it much easier to raise it again, if its powers be only limited; since all that will be necessary will be to extend them to their former bounds: a revolution, the obstacles to which will be very few, compared to those which they surmounted in 1747.

The stadtholder's principal prerogatives have hitherto consisted:

1ſt, In the regulations of 1764, by which he had a right, in several provinces, of choosing the magistrates, or at least of procuring his own creatures to be elected.

2dly, In the almost absolute disposal of the forces, both by land and sea; and,

3dly, In an excessive influence on the trading companies, who govern the colonies of the republic.

The inconvenience of leaving the magistracy at the disposal of the stadtholder is too generally acknowledged, for any hopes to be entertained that the patriots should ever consent to the continuance, or even to any modification whatever, of the provincial regulations. It is not on this head, therefore, which is one of the first consequence to the Dutch, that France could ever induce them to give satisfaction to Prussia, by leaving the stadtholder in possession of the smallest prerogatives.

Should he continue, under whatever restrictions, to dispose of the sea and land forces, the past may teach France to apprehend, that this prince will employ the influence it should imprudently endeavour to secure him in this respect, for the purpose of frustrating those measures which it would be compelled to concert with the republic in case of war, either by laying open their plans to England, or by delaying the preparations for their execution: a delay for which it is easy to find a pretence, that,

however trifling, will be sure of having its partisans. The affair of Brest, and several other circumstances, ought to convince France of what it is to expect from the stadtholder, more than ever offended with it, (on account of the attempts of the patriots, which he justly considers as its work,) and whose weak, obstinate, and sullen disposition can never be induced to do any thing contrary to the attachment and zeal he will ever retain for England. That power, therefore, under the shelter of Prussia, and at the expense of France, would preserve an influence in the states of Holland, which would soon gain ground sufficient to produce the second revolution before mentioned; a revolution that would irreparably destroy the links which unite the king of France and the republic. Besides, the patriots, who like all other men have a natural love of life, will never allow the stadtholder to have even a limited direction of the forces by land and sea. They are aware, it would be leaving him too many dependants, and putting the power into his hands; so as to afford him the means and instruments of exercising his revenge on them. Certainly, therefore, France cannot reasonably propose to the patriots the military existence of the prince of Orange.

What has been before alleged, respecting the power he would enjoy of counteracting the plans of France and Holland, proves the necessity of leaving him no influence in the colonies, and consequently on the East and West-India companies. And since, without the greatest risk, the stadtholder cannot be allowed the least influence in the magistracy, army, fleets, or colonies of the republic, it must be allowed, that no expedient remains, but that of his ab-

solute removal, or being put at the head of the church: and even could the latter be seriously proposed to the patriots, which we are far from conceiving, it is greatly to be doubted, whether they would take the prince of Orange even for their high-priest.

All conciliatory projects between the patriots and the stadtholder therefore being chimerical and dangerous, were any advances of this kind to be made, they would produce nothing but the disgrace of having failed in an inconsiderate undertaking. Now, national dignity not being a mere idle expression, France ought not lightly to sacrifice its own: besides, it cannot attempt an accommodation in favour of the stadtholder, without appearing servilely to court Prussia, who has held back from its alliance in consequence of an agreement with England equally hasty and unexpected. In these circumstances, is it consistent with the king's honour to make advances to the court of Berlin, who visibly holds back? Is it his majesty's interest to give the least satisfaction to Prussia, now nothing but a tool in the hands of the English, the natural enemy of France? Is it, in short, possible to destroy the good understanding subsisting between the courts of London and Berlin? This is much to be doubted. We may add, that every kind of mediation, proposal, or measure, adopted by France, tending to preserve the least vestige of power to the stadtholder, would only serve to evince a versatility and weakness unworthy so powerful a monarchy; and whilst it diminished the attachment of the patriots to France, it would induce them to take a resolution the most humiliating to our court, that of throwing themselves under the protection of the emperor, in the well-founded hope, that the inter-

ference of this monarch would be a check on the king of Prussia.

The writer of the present memoir will relate a very remarkable conversation he had with the burgomaster Hœft at Amsterdam, in December 1785, respecting an attempt then lately made by the court of Berlin in favour of the stadtholder, to which France had not paid any attention. "Your court," said the burgomaster, "though it is so greatly interested in preventing the king of Prussia from intermeddling with our internal affairs, is extremely indolent. Why does not the king declare, he will not allow us to be thwarted by any other power? This is all we wait for, to terminate a revolution as useful to the republic as glorious to his majesty. If your court defer too long giving us proper protection, now that we have made our peace with the emperor, we shall be compelled, however unwillingly, to have recourse to him, to prevent the king of Prussia from harassing us; and, as it would be his interest to grant our request, it is probable it would be favourably received." The burgomaster added, "Your court cannot be sure of our republic, but through the patriots. Should it not effectually assist us, and should we not have recourse to the emperor, every thing would turn out as under William III. Read the letters of count d'Avaux, French embassador here at that time; they are applicable enough to the present state of things."

The following expressions occur in one of the letters of this celebrated negotiator, dated the 5th of December 1680: "Since they intended to treat the prince of Orange thus, it ought not to have been done by halves; he should have been totally ruined. It is very injudicious, to show so much enmity to him, without

letting him feel its effects. But he has been provoked, and not destroyed; the good republicans have been raised against him, but not supported; so that he is become the king's decided enemy; and the others have been left to his resentment, without being able to defend themselves, or do any good to France."

The conclusions to be drawn from this quotation are so evident, as to render it useless to dwell on them; and every one must allow, that it is indispensable for France to support the patriots with its whole power.

The declaration, which they so ardently desired the king to make in the month of December 1785, was delayed for some unknown reasons till the 21st of April. A copy of it will be found at the end of this Memoir. It was no sooner made public, than the patriots began to act against the stadtholder; with this observation, however, that this declaration was only the necessary result of the treaty of alliance signed the 10th of November 1785; and that, had it been produced immediately after the ratification of that treaty, they would not have uselessly wasted near five months, which was the period elapsed from the 12th of December to the 21st of April. This delay seems in reality a fault the more serious, as the reform in the prerogatives of the stadtholder might have been quickly effected before the death of the king of Prussia, which happened on the 17th of August: for though that monarch was wholly incapacitated in December 1785, Mr. Hertzberg, not being secure at that period of the favour and approbation of his successor, who always spoke of him with contempt, would not have dared to make any alliance with England. Hence originates the embarrassing situation of the French ministry at this

day; a situation easy to have been foreseen, and still more easy to have been prevented. The principal patriots knew this, and were continually repeating: "Let us act, while the king of Prussia cannot." But they were not attended to; and many of their adherents, intimidated by the letters which Mr. Hertzberg made the expiring monarch sign, and which France no way opposed, dared not act; and the patriotic party was compelled to remain wholly inactive till the ensuing April, before it could enter on the preparatory measures for depriving the stadtholder of the command of the Hague.

The king's resolving generously to share in the payment of the sum claimed by the emperor from Holland produced a very good effect there; yet it could not console the patriots for the important time they had been obliged to lose. It afterwards appeared, that France had it in her power to appease them, whilst it spared an expense to itself, which, considering the disordered state of the finances, was burdensome enough:—but to return to our subject.

The declaration of the 21st of April expressly stating "that the king would, if necessary, spare no exertions to prevent their high mightinesses from being troubled from within or without;" should we now insist, in the king's name, on conciliatory measures with the stadtholder, the patriots might justly complain, that France does not fulfil her engagements, but sacrifices them to the court of Berlin: they will then have no resource, but to seek the protection of the emperor; a forced step, which it has been shown they already had some thoughts of taking; and which can reflect nothing but disgrace on France, who would in so doing act with a weakness wholly in-

conceivable to those who reflect on what its real power and true interest require it to perform. We will here remark, that the only way by which France can now destroy the influence of Mr. Hertzberg, and restore a proper weight to prince Henry, is boldly to resist the pretensions of the court of Berlin, who probably declared in favour of the stadtholder from a persuasion of our giving him up: so mean is the opinion of our firmness entertained by foreign powers. Should we, on the other hand, absolutely refuse to give up the patriots, the king of Prussia will be obliged to recede; he will then feel, that his minister has very imprudently brought him forward, and will confide in him no more.

Should the emperor, which seems not to admit a doubt, comply with the request of the Dutch, is it not to be feared, that he would succeed in depriving France of her remaining influence in the republic, and obtain it for himself? and that, offended with that court, which, without a sufficient certainty of an alliance with Prussia after the death of Frederic the Great, has long and openly shown a repugnance to entering into any private treaty with the Austrian monarch, the emperor may himself seize the opportunity to renounce the treaty of 1756, and, as well as Russia, join with England and Prussia, in order to effect in concert both the partition of the Ottoman empire and great changes in Germany? What then would become of France? What could she do, possessed of a respectable naval power, but without land forces, money, or allies? Would she not find herself exposed to be plundered of her frontier provinces? The picture of the miseries with which she would then be threatened is too dreadful to be sketched by the hand of a good citizen.

From the foregoing considerations it seems reasonable to conclude, that the only means which can be pursued for getting out of the present embarrassing situation are:

1st, To give up all thoughts of acting as mediators; which would only tend to give time to England and Prussia, and consequently facilitate the accomplishment of their views: for policy teaches, that, instead of yielding to the wishes of an enemy, we should always oppose him.

2dly, To support the patriots with the requisite vigour against Prussia and Holland, and excite them to expel the stadtholder between this and the ensuing spring; before which time the king of Prussia cannot employ force for the protection of his brother-in-law. The patriotic party is certainly resolved on the absolute removal of the stadtholder, though it has not yet manifested its intentions openly.

3dly, To conciliate by prudence and proper management the court of Vienna; which would bring on a good understanding with Russia, in order, by such a counterpoise, to compel Prussia and England to remain quiet.

Any other mode of proceeding will be deficient in stability, and will be no better than the application of quack medicines; which, though they relieve pain for a time, occasion its future return with redoubled violence.

Declaration made to their High Mightinesses, by the French Embassador, the Marquis de Vérac, on the 21st of April 1786.

"HIGH AND MIGHTY LORDS,

"The embassador undersigned has the honour of transmitting to your high mightinesses the warmest expressions of affection and friendship on the part of the king his master, and to repeat the assurances of his majesty's unshaken attachment to the alliance subsisting between his majesty and their high mightinesses.

"It is in consequence of these sentiments, the king earnestly wishes, that a reform of those abuses, which have occasioned internal dissensions in the republic, should take place, and its tranquillity be restored, on principles founded on its real constitution.

"The king, in expressing this wish to your high mightinesses, does not pretend to intermeddle with the regulation of the internal affairs of the republic: far from having any such intention, *he would, if necessary, employ his utmost efforts to prevent your high mightinesses from suffering either internal or external troubles.* His majesty has no end in the step he now takes, but that of fulfilling the duties of a friend and ally to your high mightinesses, and giving a new proof of the sincere interest he feels for the happiness and prosperity of the United Provinces."

N° III.

Is wanting.

N° IV.

Reflexions on the present State of Political Affairs in Europe.

(October 10, 1786.)

THE death of the king of Prussia, happening at so critical a juncture of the affairs of Holland, may produce the most serious consequences, and prove the salvation of the stadtholder's party. The eyes of Frederic the Great were scarcely closed, when his successor sent count Goerz, one of his chief ministers of state, to make known the particular interest he took in maintaining all the rights of his brother-in-law, the stadtholder. May it not from this hasty step be inferred, that the court of Berlin expects to find the other courts of Europe favourably disposed to the views of Prussia? in which, there is no doubt, he will be warmly seconded by England. France appears to have little reason to depend on Prussia; since the return of prince Henry to Rheinsberg seems to announce his influence to be but small, and that baron Hertzberg, ever passionately attached to England, has the ascendency over the mind of the king, whose confidential minister he is.

No circumstance can be more detrimental to England, than the abolition of the stadtholder's power in Holland. Should the patriotic party, which is entirely French, continue to predominate, the interest of the republic will be that of France—a union, from which the utmost danger will ensue to the British power in India, the sole remaining resource of England.

But will the king of Prussia, it may be said, even though in union with Great Britain, undertake a war for a cause wholly foreign to his own interests? His apprehensions, lest the emperor should join with Russia to attack his own state, is too important a consideration for him not to be swayed by it? Certainly, so long as the king of Prussia shall be under any fear of that kind, there is no reason to imagine he will expose himself to such imminent danger. It remains then for us to inquire, whether these apprehensions may not be removed, and Prussia at the same time acquire additional means of executing still vaster plans?

The emperor, when united to Russia, would turn the balance of Europe to whatever side he should declare for. He is ambitious, and wishes his own aggrandisement. Russia, who shares his inclinations, will second his attempts; and these two powers will decide only in favour of some third, who can procure them such advantages as their views require. Should a union with England and Prussia appear useful to them, they will hasten to strengthen their good understanding by new treaties, in which all the contracting powers should find their advantage.

England and Prussia may form a quadruple alliance with Russia and the emperor, in which it may be stipulated, that the court of Berlin shall be sufficiently supported to enable it to terminate the Dutch affairs favourably for the stadtholder, in order to break up at once the connexion of France with the republic, which last must then join the allies by force, if not by choice. The contracting parties, in execution of their treaty, would concert the means of sharing different states among them, by which the Germanic league would be destroyed, and France, Spain, and

Sardinia, overawed. For it is doubtful, whether the former of these, considering the state of its finances, could reasonably undertake a war at once by sea and land.

The emperor's share would probably consist in the exchange of Bavaria, in gaining the title of the king of the Romans for his nephew, and a considerable part of Turkey in Europe, as far as Greece.

To Prussia would probably be given all that part of Great Poland extending to the Vistula; adding, perhaps, a part of some of the emperor's possessions in that kingdom, from the partition of it in 1772.

Russia would have Constantinople and Romania, with liberty of spreading at will into Asia Minor, and along the coasts of Bithynia, the Hellespont, and Phrygia.—And England would have Egypt, the isles of Candia and Cyprus, which would secure for ever her empire in India, with which she would be connected through Egypt, and, directing her commerce through this incomparably shorter road, would reap thence such vast advantages, as would prevent the competition of any other power hereafter.

Russia might then seize the whole trade of the Levant, or share it with England; but, in either case, France would be shut out both from that and the trade of India. What, indeed, could that power effect, even in conjunction with Spain and Sardinia, against such a combination? And even should the French minister succeed in bringing the forces of Sweden into action, so feeble a power, endeavouring to cope with Russia and Prussia, would be like a sparrow attempting to fight with an eagle.

We do not say, that the emperor, Russia, Prussia, and England, really entertain the project we have stated; but it cannot be denied, that the union of these powers is at

least within the class of possibilities, at the same time that it is highly for their interest. The English will be the great promoters of the alliance; and it appears, as if France could only oppose so fatal a league by immediately endeavouring to treat with the emperor and Russia. As the aggrandisement of Prussia will then be out of the question, and the emperor will keep his Polish possessions, there is no doubt but those two potentates would prefer an alliance with France to that with England and Prussia, their natural enemies, whose aggrandisement they have every reason to oppose. By such an arrangement, France would be enabled to preserve her valuable alliance with Holland, for whom she might procure some part of the Netherlands; taking a still greater for herself, together with the county of Namur and duchy of Luxembourg; and would, moreover, secure for herself the advantages England intends to share by the supposed quadruple alliance: while the possession of Egypt, Candia, and Cyprus, would enable France to carry the war into India on the first favourable opportunity, and destroy the British power there.

The cession of the Netherlands and their dependencies leaving the emperor nothing to exchange for Bavaria, France and Germany would be for ever easy on that head; and should the court of Vienna hereafter make any attempts on the freedom of the empire, France (seconded by Holland, the Germanic league, and Prussia, who would be carefully maintained in its present state,) would be stronger than even is necessary to compel the emperor to remain quiet. That monarch besides, become the neighbour and rival of Russia, would soon find her an enemy. By this arrangement, Prussia and the empire,

having no support left but France, would be forced to court the latter, who would then act the most important of all parts, that of *the arbitrator of Europe.*

Whatever be the existing situation of France with respect to the emperor, it is certain, there is not a moment to be lost in endeavouring to conciliate that monarch; and that it will be extremely dangerous for France to allow herself to be longer deceived by the hopes of an alliance with Prussia, who, by its conduct with regard to Holland, seems to verge towards a friendship with England; from which, should that power really intend to second its views, it can only be disengaged by the offer of greater advantages; such as some aggrandisement in Poland, or a dismemberment of the Austrian power;—ideas too chimerical in the present state of things to affect the court of Berlin, which seems convinced, that, considering the remoteness of our possessions, we can afford it no material assistance, especially as our army is in too bad a state to act with any effect. Prussia, besides, sees Holland ready to become wholly devoted to France: it sees, that from such a change, the support it has hitherto experienced from its alliance with England will be useless, whenever the republic shall unite with France against that power; and that from that moment the court of Berlin would remain destitute, and without any support but its own internal force. It cannot therefore fail to use every art of policy, to prevent the ruin of the stadtholder, and secure an union with England; hoping successively to draw in the empire and Russia, by holding out to them their aggrandisement. Should France, therefore, defer her offers, she would risk the loss of Holland, even should she employ her whole power in support of the patriotic party there, and would remain

a quiet and shameful spectator of those great changes, which will sooner or later take place in Europe. Besides which, she would lose her consequence also, and perhaps, in the end, many of her finest provinces.

We are not ignorant of the inconveniences which might arise from a perpetual and too close alliance between France and the emperor: but there is a just medium in this case, easy to be observed and followed. Besides, the king's council can have no other aim, than to avail themselves of every favourable circumstance which occurs, to weaken England, and drive the English out of India. The issue of the war, which was terminated by the peace of 1783, proves, that we shall be always successful against Great-Britain, as long as the emperor shall not force us into a continental war, in concert with that power. Add to this, that even should the alliance of France with the courts of Vienna and Petersburg, with the above views, produce a war in Germany between Prussia and England against the emperor and Russia, France may still, as in 1757, be dispensed with taking any part in it; furnishing only the twenty-four thousand men, or the subsidies in money, stipulated by the treaties of 1756 and 1758; reserving its other means, in conjunction with those of Holland and Spain, to carry on a maritime war against England; which, considering the state of the king's navy, could not be other than successful. The emperor will have troops enough to be able to detach forty or fifty thousand men against the Turks (whom the Russians will attack in another part), and to form an army on the frontiers of Bohemia and Silesia, capable of keeping the Prussians within bounds. The short war of 1778

continued long enough to prove, that the Austrians are acquainted with the impregnable posts in that country; since neither Frederic the Great, nor prince Henry, were able to make any impression on them. We may also observe, with respect to the war of 1756, that circumstances are now greatly altered.

1st, Frederic the Great is no more; and it does not seem probable that his successor has inherited his genius with his throne. Credible persons, who have had opportunities of judging of him, represent him as weak and expensive. Now, no king of Prussia can ever act a principal part on the theatre of Europe, unless his treasury be full.

2dly, England has lost with America the means she employed successfully against France in the war preceding the last.

3dly, Russia is now more powerful than in 1756.

4thly, The Austrian armies are on a better footing, and much more numerous than they were then.

5thly, France will be assisted by the money and forces of Holland, (admitting the destruction of the stadtholder) which is an incalculable advantage that she did not enjoy in the war of 1756.

Every palliative which could be employed to prevent the union of the emperor, Prussia, Russia, and England, would, at best, serve but to retard a little the execution of the individual projects of the various monarchs, and leave things in the alarming state in which they now are; which is repugnant to the true interest of France, who ought so to conduct herself, as to increase her power and respectability, or at least preserve them uninjured,

and prevent all fears for the future; otherwise, one embarrassment will succeed another, and France will have constantly some new battle to fight.

It seems reasonable to conclude, that if the king acts in concert with the emperor, and takes the necessary steps to restore order in his finances, and regain the influence he enjoyed at the commencement of the American war, he would become the arbitrator of Europe; by which his reign would be happier, more glorious, and more tranquil, than that of Lewis XIV. So that, should the present crisis be terminated in the manner we propose, there will no longer exist any cause to light up the flames of war in Europe, or to involve France in one against her inclination.

We are far from believing, that the views here mentioned are conformable to the dictates of sound policy, more particularly those relating to the partition of Poland and Turkey in Europe, which should be prevented or delayed as much as possible. But we are obliged to set off from that point, to which a false system, as well as our own errors, have driven us, and draw at least some advantage from those ills which our reduced situation will not allow us effectually to oppose. In a word, it is necessary, by a momentary deviation from right, to prevent the other powers from estimating us as nothing, as they did in the first partition of Poland in 1772. France has suffered herself to be led into a violent situation, from which she can only be extricated by forced means: but, from experience of her past errors, she will no doubt form at last a good system of policy, established at once on her local relations and real force, which she will afterwards

support with the firmness and dignity becoming so great a power. It is by a spirit of foresight and regularity, that propitious events are brought about or made use of; and it is by devising proper obstacles to oppose to them, that unfortunate events are guarded against.

OFFICIAL PAPERS

RELATIVE TO

The Plunder of Geneva, and the Proscriptions of the Revolutionary Tribunal, under the Syndicship of Gasc and Janot, and the Revolutionary Government of the Clubs in Insurrection:

OR,

Extracts of the Official Publications of the Clubbists during the Revolution of Geneva, in 1794.

WHILE this fifth volume was in the press, a repentant ex-revolutionary Genevese having expressed a wish to read the account of his own exploits, I satisfied him.

Shuddering at the relation of the errors of his youth, as the big tear trembled in his eye, he said: "Your history wants nothing but the papers which you tell us you have collected. To complete your work, publish every part of the correspondence which passed between France and Geneva, the secretaries, the Reybas's, the spies, secret agents and purveyors of the guillotine. Exhibit to the whole world the dreadful spectacle of democratic ferocity; demonstrate its incapability of governing even the smallest states. It is high time that the effects of untempered democracy should be known. You are writing Historical Memoirs of the Reign of Lewis XVI. The first insurrection of the Genevese democracy was in 1782;

the last in the year immediately following that monarch's death. You cannot close your tragedy at the fourth act; but if you give us the testimonials I require, the picture will be complete in all its parts, and your work be accompanied with proofs, that cannot be controverted, and which are besides but little known."

I yield to his request, not by publishing the secret acts of the Genevese revolution, but its public ones; particularly the bills it posted up and distributed, and which I caused to be collected at the time, as monuments of the revolutionary delirium at its greatest height.

These, I must acknowledge, are agreeable parts of the Genevese revolution, when compared with the correspondences mentioned above, which are too repugnant and odious to bear reading: the time too for publishing them is not yet come.

These hand-bills and others, decorated as they are with the ornaments and arms of the Genevese republic, are original pieces of equal authenticity with our famous conventional bulletins. If any doubt be entertained of their authenticity, I am willing to deposit them in the national library.

If aristocracy at Venice produced the inquisition; if tyranny mark the despotisms of Tunis and Algiers; elementary and unmixed democracy has exhibited effects equally cruel. One of the greatest nations, France herself, has exhibited a proof of it. I shall here show the same pure democracy producing similar calamities in a small state.

In the text of this volume, I have called the tribunal of the clubs, *a septembrising tribunal*. I have made use in this respect of an expression employed at Geneva, and

which was well-founded. In reality, the aristocratic party were in chains, decimated, plundered, and imprisoned. An essential and integral part of the Genevese did not concur with the political proceedings. The *englués* were afterwards detained in like manner, and the portion of the people so called had nothing to do with the proceedings of the clubs.

There was none but the revolutionary party acting in Geneva: and this was even divided into a minority and majority; the former, factious and sullen from its natural ferocity, almost always directing the revolutionary government.

Thus the minority of the revolutionary party, itself a minority, governed Geneva during the reign of terror, and the revolution of the clubs.

This observation was necessary, to prevent the blame falling on the whole body of so interesting a city, of which it is but just I should say, I have admired its attachment to France, and the respect for property, humanity, virtue, morals, and love of order, which distinguish it; while the minority of the minority behaved in the manner, of which it shall itself exhibit the proof in its own publications.

Bill of the Genevese Government, (Gre and Janot being Syndics) approving the Murder and Pilla in July and August 1794.

"The syndics and council, on a report made to them, that certain persons allow themselves to search out the property of others, considering, that, at a moment of regeneration, when all the *great principles* and virtues are the order of the day, it is of the highest importance that no individual should take upon him, for his own pleasure, to invade the effects and property of another, decree, &c."

Extract from a Report of the Tribunal of the Insurgent Clubs, July the 19th, in the great Club of the Revolutionists of the Mountain of Geneva, against the Club of Montagnards, of the 6th of September 1794.

" The Genevese people have been seen in insurrection on the 19th of July, to annihilate their enemies. A revolutionary tribunal was therefore instituted.... The judges, misled, were merciful, and the country remained without being wholly saved.

" About a year ago, a popular society was formed under the name of *montagnards*. This name, respectable in the eyes of the French, who, by means of an association so called, destroyed a faction inimical to liberty, had no relation to the Genevese, nor their situation.

" The one in France, very properly wished to destroy the factions, establish a central government, and put an end to all the struggles of contending authorities.

" The other, on the contrary, at Geneva, wanted to destroy the popular authorities, and disorganise what the revolution had created. The conduct of those leaders who called themselves *montagnards* was extremely suspicious.

" John Lewis Soulavie, who was respected as the representative of the French republic, could no longer be so, when he quitted that sacred character to act as a caballer, calumniator, and sharper. The French republic cannot leave an embassador among us, who acts contrary to the intentions of the national convention, which will doubtless not long delay executing justice on him."

Extract from a Bill of the Septembrising Tribunal of the Genevese Clubs of July 26th, posted up at the Time when the Tribunal condemned to Death those it had declared to be innocent.

" Revolutionary citizens! The tribunal which you have invested with the powers necessary for co-operating for the safety of the people, is not, because so invested, the less accountable for its proceedings. It comes forward to explain to you its conduct of yesterday. The result of the scrutiny was no sooner made public, than various reports announced the general indignation of the revolutionists. The ferment was great; the prisons seemed in danger; when a deputation from the military committee presented itself at the tribunal, and required, in the name of the people assembled to save the country, that the judgment of the tribunal should be carried into execution. A deputation from the batallions (the armed clubs) pointed out the same expedient, as the only one which could calm the indignation arising from observing, that certain caballers, disturbers, and malcontents, who had crept in amongst the revolutionists, had so far succeeded in misleading a number of persons, as to effect a choice of condemnations, as unjust as treacherous, and which prove the continued existence of parties, that wish either to save the grand aristocracy, *or destroy the independence of the republic.* What did it become the members of the tribunal to oppose to those proceedings? *Calmness and fortitude.* Innocent blood must not be shed; and immediately the tribunal declared, that, in consequence of the desire of the revolutionists, and in order to save their country, the seven on whom sentence was passed should suf-

fer death . . . . . It is glorious to be responsible for events which put a stop to proceedings, the issue of which was incalculable, and will suffice, perhaps, to revolutionise all minds, and to strengthen more and more equality, liberty, and independence."

Extract of a Bill posted up on the 29th of July 1794, from the Revolutionary Commission.

"The revolutionary commission, considering how important it is, that the enemies of the country should not have the power of withholding *their property, and thereby rob the defenders of liberty of the just indemnities due to them*, decrees as follows: It is forbidden on pain of confiscation, and of being treated as suspicious and counter-revolutionary, to carry any thing whatever out of the city and territory, without the express permission of the revolutionary commission.

(Signed) BOUSQUET, president."

Bill of the 30th of July.

"All citizens who have received patriotic gifts, or to whom money has been delivered, either under the name of indemnities or relief, will to-day render an account of their receipt and expenditure to the revolutionary commission.

(Signed) BOUSQUET, president."

Bills of the Genevese Government (Gasc and Janot, Syndics) of the 29th of July, forbidding the Relations of the Genevese, shot by Order of the Revolutionary Tribunal, to wear Mourning. Another of the 2d of August, allowing black Coats to be worn, but forbidding the Use of Crape, Buttons covered with black, Veils, Ribbands, black Buckles, Trimmings and Furbelows, to prevent Abuses.

Bill of the 3d of August, 1794.

"REVOLUTIONARY COMMISSION.

"The aristocracy, in its detestable triumph, had put the last stroke to the miseries of the people, by oppressing them to supply the expenses of establishments, by which they meant to enslave and corrupt the people.

"The revolution, which has just crushed to the earth the aristocracy, aims at consolidating equality and liberty, and securing general happiness, by institutions calculated to give a spur to industry, to bestow competence on the people, and regenerate the public morals and mind. A fund will be necessary for the forming of useful establishments, as well as to free the state from its debts, and defray many considerable expenses occasioned by the revolution.

"It is but just, that the aristocracy should refund the fruit of its extortions, and pay the expenses of the restoration of liberty.

"It is also indispensably necessary, that the rich patriots should sacrifice a part of their superfluity, to supply so interesting a demand. The revolutionary commission therefore decrees, that every citizen, whose fortune amounts to twelve thousand livres, and upwards, shall be obliged to make a declaration of what he possesses within eight days,

at the expiration of which term, all citizens who have not given in a statement of their fortune shall be considered as counter revolutionists, and punished accordingly. From the declarations so exhibited, the revolutionary commission will regulate the contribution to be provided by the rich patriots: but it will extend the quota of indemnities and restitutions, due from the aristocrats to the republic, to all those acknowledged as such, whatever be their fortune.

"The commission, moreover, in consideration of the necessity of immediately providing for the current expenses of the revolution, and the urgency of furnishing as speedily as possible a fund for the patriotic establishments, which are to provide work for the laborious part of our fellow-citizens, whose want of employ must be considered both as a public and private evil, invites all the citizens not to discontinue their patriotic gifts, and engages, that sums thus furnished shall be received in payment of the contributions to be hereafter regulated.

"Revolutionary citizens! we are at the moment of a crisis, which, though violent, is necessary for regeneration. Let all our means, our knowledge, our virtues, and our wills, be united. Let us march under the standard of justice, and the republic is saved.

BOUSQUET, president.
CHAPONNIERE, secretary."

Bill of the Revolutionary Commission of the 4th of August, signed Bousquet, President.

"The property of the undernamed, under sentence of death or banishment, being confiscated for the national benefit, such citizens as are indebted thereto shall come

and declare the same to the revolutionary commission within three days, on pain of being considered as counter-revolutionists, and punished accordingly.

CHEENAUD, DEROCHEMONT, jun., MEUNIER, CAYLA, VIVIEN, DECOMBES, PREVOST, FATIO, NAVILLE, } shot.

SPADE, SALLES, PETIT, MUSSARD, GOURGAS, JOLIVET, } banished."

Bill from the Government of Geneva (Gasc and Janot being Syndics) of the 8th of August, 1794.

"The syndics and council resolve and order, that all the female Genevese citizens wear either in their caps, hats, or on the breast, a round cockade, eighteen lines in diameter, of the three Genevese colours, on pain of being reckoned suspicious, and treated accordingly; charging the magistrates, police officers, and post-master, to keep a strict hand, &c."

Bill posted by Order of the Revolutionary Tribunal, dated the 8th of August,

Ordering "all persons, who shall hear either men or women hold any conversation of an incivic or seditious tendency, to make known the same immediately to the revolutionary authorities, that they may be proceeded against forthwith."

Bill posted by the Revolutionary Commission of the 12th of August, 1794, annulling all Leases.

"One of the heaviest abuses with which luxury has long oppressed us is the mad desire of the wealthy to parade their idleness through extensive mansions; an usurpation of

room which has raised the price of small houses, in which the poorer part of the people are compelled to be crowded together... But the aristocracy, put to flight by equality, has diminished our population.... It is therefore just that the price of leases should be reduced to a reasonable rate... and the commission decrees that all the present leases are made void."

Bill of the Revolutionary Commission, forbidding the carrying of Bullion to the Goldsmiths. Dated the 13th of August, 1794.

"The commission, being informed that certain citizens, having little or no desire to conduce to the general good, elude the requisitions on plate, by removing what they are possessed of, and thus keep back what the necessities of the country require, forbids all goldsmiths, silversmiths, and others, to take any plate on loan, purchase, or any other pretence whatever.... It invites all the Genevese to conform to the requisition, and fulfil a duty, which will always be remembered as honourable to them, while those who refuse will be marked with ignominy."

Bill of the Revolutionary Commission of the Clubs, arrogating to themselves the exclusive Privilege of plundering, of the 13th of August, 1794, signed, Bousquet, President.

"The revolutionary commission is informed, that, without any order given by the commission, domiciliary visits have taken place, and collections been made both in town and country, under pretence of relieving the poor. The houses of the suspected ought undoubtedly to be searched, and the poor relieved. Your commission, eager to deserve the trust you have reposed in it, to unite regularity and justice with energetic and severe measures,

repeats the prohibitions already made to all individuals, not to make any arrest, domiciliary visit, impost or requisition of money, effects, or merchandise, without an order from the commission.... As the aristocracy unite every vice to keep the people in slavery and wretchedness, let us, revolutionary citizens, to save our country, rally around us every republican virtue; let our actions prove, that we have accomplished the revolution with a view to establish equality and liberty on a reform of the public manners and mind."

Bill of the Revolutionary Commission, summoning such Genevese as had individually joined in the Plunder, to appear at the Club to give Account of it; the 14th of August, 1794.

"The revolutionary committee of finances calls on all individuals who have collected donations, as well as the receivers of the clubs, in whose hands indemnities have been placed, to repair and give a full account of the same."

Bill of the Revolutionary Commission, enjoining the Justices of Peace to receive the Declarations of such Citizens as shall apply to them to register the Birth of their Children, to the Prejudice of the Pastors of the Holy Gospel. Signed, Bousquet, President; the 18th of August, 1794.

Another, ordering the Genevese to bring to the Revolutionary Commission of Finances, within twenty-four Hours, a Note of all Persons who have withdrawn their Property from Trade, either by way of Exchange or Anticipation. Dated the 21st of August, 1794.

Another, in which the Revolutionary Commission, informed of the presumed Intentions of various Genevese to remove their Capital to other Countries, ordains the suspending of all public Sales for a Year, and forbids the Notaries to take part in them. August 21, 1794.

Another, in which the Revolutionary Committee, having in charge the Security of the City, orders the Revolutionists, in case of Alarm or Insurrection, to repair to their respective Clubs—and the Commander of each Club to draw up his Troop in Order of Battle. Dated August 22, 1794.

Bill of the Revolutionary Commission of the 23d of August, 1794.

"Revolutionary Citizens, you have destroyed the aristocracy, but the national justice has not reached all those whom the public opinion has long since pointed out as the enemies of equality; some of them still insolently raise their heads. Several clubs have this night expressed a wish, that measures suppressive of these persons should be adopted. The commission decrees its permanent sitting, and invites all revolutionary citizens to lay before it the existing denunciations against the incorrigible enemies of the revolution, when it will issue immediate orders for their being secured.

"The revolutionary commission declares, that, at the risk of the lives of each of its members, it will exert the utmost vigour against the enemies of liberty, equality, and independence, and against all those who shall sully the *purity* of the revolution by any disgraceful excesses.

(Signed) BOUSQUET, president."

Bill of the National Commission of the 18th of September, 1794.

"The commission, being informed that a great number of persons are seeking an opportunity of leaving Geneva, to avoid no doubt the payment of the just taxes and indemnities due to the republic by the enemies of liberty and equality, and that they endeavour by fraudulent means to remove their property out of the country, decrees the examination of all passports and passage-cards;

and orders all persons provided with such, to return them within four-and-twenty hours, on pain of being reckoned suspected, and treated accordingly by the commission."

Another, of the National Commission, of the 27th of September 1794, requiring each Contributor to act in strict Conformity to his Conscience, and make a correct Statement of his Property, in order to pay his Supplement and rectify his former Statement, on pain of being subjected to an arbitrary Tax.

Bill of the National Commission, of the 3d of October 1794, signed Mathey, President.

"The commission, being called on by all the clubs to determine the degree of liberty to be allowed the citizens, condemned by the two tribunals to domestic detention at home, considering, that industry is the sole resource of the inhabitants of our city.....; considering also, that those thus confined form almost the whole of our national industry, decrees:

"1st, That such persons shall employ themselves, during the time they are allowed to be out of their houses, in necessary business only.

"2dly, That they shall not be out later than eight or nine at night.

"3dly, That they shall not go out of the town without special authority.

"4thly, That they shall not resort to any coffee-house, meeting or club, ale-house, lodging-house, inn, cellar, or public walk.

"The national commission invites the patriots to watch over the execution of the present decree."

Bill of the Genevese Government (Clavière and Janot being Syndics), dated the 4th of August 1794.

"The syndics and council, considering that the mono-

poly of any object of traffic is a serious crime, forbids all private persons whatever, directly or indirectly, to monopolise wine."

Extract of an historical Epitome of the Conduct of Bousquet, President of the Revolutionary Commissions and Tribunals, published by himself, the 26th of February 1795.

"When, on my return from Paris, I became witness on the spot of the evils which Geneva laboured under, and the dangers with which it was threatened, I was eager to relieve it from the critical situation it was in, by bringing forward some temperate and strong measure. Should I be asked what I proposed doing, I should reply, 'I had no settled plan.' I meditated the exile of those heads of the faction who were ruining the republic, the expulsion of Soulavie, and the levying an extraordinary contribution.

"The evil genius of Geneva had brought within its walls the most factious and wicked of mankind, Soulavie, and placed him in a sacred character there. He was the common centre of the faction (*of reuniters*), whose house became their refuge and rendezvous *."

Portrait and Intrigues of Dessonat, Secretary of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Clubs.

"Necker is at Lausanne. Coindet is travelling in Switzerland. There are various meetings at Soulavie's. Staël goes more frequently there. These manœuvres will

* This most wicked of men had for fourteen months kept Geneva independent, notwithstanding the plan of reunion of the majority of the committee of public safety. When released from prison, he made no other use of his liberty than to carry to Charles la Croix the papers proving the immorality of the directory in this point, of which he gave M. Michely a duplicate in the year 6.

conduct the chief agents in them to the guillotine. *(Dessonat's Letters, p. 134, vol. I.)*

Letter from (N.) to Dessonat at Paris, 17th Nivose, Year 2. p. 152.

" When you are writing to the jacobins, it would not be amiss to inform them, by a citizen of Geneva of whom they may be assured, that his son in-law, Necker, is on a good footing with Soulavie. This connexion is a touch-stone." *(Dessonat's Letters, published by the Government of Geneva.)*

A Conference between Baron Staël, the Swedish Embassador, and J. L. Soulavie, the French Resident at Geneva, respecting the Intentions of the neutral Powers of Europe, at the Time when religious Worship was abolished in France, and the Festival of Reason instituted by Chaumette.—The French Resident's Dispatch to the Committee of Public Safety, informing it of those Intentions.—Baron Staël's Penetration and excellent Advice.—So long as France shall be governed by the Executioner, none of the Powers of Europe will make Peace with her.

Notwithstanding the contempt I have ever felt and shown for the writings of Dessonat, and the mischievous denunciations of the spies of the legation, one in particular, of the 1st Brumaire of the 3d year, entitled, *Observations on the Conduct of Citizen Soulavie, in the Valais and at Geneva, relative to the Intimacy between Baron Staël and the Resident,* I wish to preserve, as an historical memorial, a dispatch not less curious than bold on my part, which I sent to the committee of public safety.

" Baron de Staël has just left me, after a stay of three hours; and I shall now give you an account of a very

long conversation with him, the conclusions to be drawn from which are far from being agreeable.

"Every government in Europe," said he, "is enraged at our new institution of the festival of Reason; and, being our enemies, they will, in the ensuing winter, and in future, derive what interest they can from it. We may still find in Europe faithful allies and friends, whom our valour and success may attach to our cause; but you will please to observe, that baron Staël being a short time since present at a conversation of various politicians, who are not more religious than the generality of people, heard them thus unanimously express themselves: 'What confidence could we expect from the people, should we adopt the cause of the French, who have abjured their God, and who, instead of worshipping those whom others adore, have brought forward women, void of all character, merely because they were beautiful, to represent Liberty, that is to say, a being absolutely ideal?' The madness which has just substituted what is called Reason in France to those objects of worship revered by all Europe, can have been only raised up by our enemies, to excite against France every nation that believes in a deity. Alter your calendar, your worship, your priests, if you wish it; but be wise enough to stay at least till you have peace. As long as your government shall exhibit revolutionary changes; as long as those in place shall acknowledge their own weakness, by offering the reins of government to the opposition, no power will negotiate with you: no one can venture to acknowledge your government: your influence will be at an end, and the war will continue to be carried on.

"And what besides is this new kind of government, which yields to every storm; which disconcerts the best

laid plans of the secret friends of France; which suffers its own secrets to transpire, so that there is nothing it means to execute but what is known before-hand, or one of its public officers who cannot be removed, cajoled, or corrupted, at pleasure?

"It is not long since that a public man, whom I shall not name, but who is a well-wisher to France, received proposals favourable in their tendency to the republic: his reply was, 'The fruit is not yet ripe; the government of France is still the government of the executioner. It is impossible for us to venture to degrade and dishonour ourselves in the eyes of those we govern. The introduction of the new calendar, and this worship of Reason, has spoiled every thing in France.'

"Unfortunately, the republic has no one left capable of negotiating. The arrest of Chauvelin, Maret, and Semonville, deprive you of those who, to fulfil their duty, must do many things liable to be misinterpreted in France, and to be punished in consequence of that misinterpretation ..... The power of the jacobins consists in many forced and artificial parties: at least this is the opinion of Europe concerning it.

"Such is the reply I have to make to the injury a deputy has just done me in the convention.

"I asked baron Staël what remedies he had to offer for so many evils. I send you a few of those which he regards as the most urgent and necessary, at a time when all public worship has been abolished.

"1st. .....

"2dly, To avoid, as to the constitutional priests, the errors committed in the case of the nonjuring ones.

"3dly, Not to trouble our country labourers about religious worship.

"4thly, To pass a law, allowing each parish to ordain regulations by a majority, as to its own worship and priests; providing however for the priest whom they shall expel.

" 5thly, To destroy the ill impression produced in Europe by our worship of Reason. Prior to this we had partisans in all the protestant kingdoms. We have now lost them. It is believed, that if the convention would declare, that, should it ever protect any religion, it shall be the protestant, as most compatible with a republic, such a declaration would be of service to us in the protestant states."

How should Dessonat, the secretary of the Genevese revolutionary tribunal, do other than destine Staël and Soulavie to the guillotine; when the former had the wisdom and humanity to inform France, that it could never obtain peace from the other powers of Europe, while the French government was that of the executioner; and the latter the courage to send that information to the committee of public safety, with Robespierre just placed at its head? This dispatch, which is the 50th in his correspondence, preserved in the depôt of foreign relation, is of the 16th Frimaire, year 2.

Who can wonder at the violence of the French Genevese clubs against the French resident *, when

* The plunder of the embassy began on the third complementary day, when the resident was forced from his house, without a single seal being affixed, by the armed force of the insurgent clubs, whose hands yet reeked with the blood of Witel and Rochemont.

The pillage was put a stop to on the 8th Vendémiaire of the third year, when the seals were first put on (by order of Thuriot, Treillard, and Merlin). They were still affixed to what remained from their plunder, when my successor Desportes was appointed; and it was from these remains that Charles la Croix, by order of the French government, obtained the official papers for this work, which the clubbists imagined they had secured, because they carried off the original draft of my Me-

their writings, the judgments of their tribunal, and the accounts of their revolutionary commission, all teach us, that the Swedish embassador, whose opinion, full of penetration and humanity, has been above related, was doomed to the guillotine; that his father-in-law, Necker, is exiled by them from Geneva for ever; and his brother, Mr. Germain, obliged to pay down 20,000 livres, to these rapacious clubbists, for his ransom. Such is the fate of a family, known through all Europe, plundered or proscribed by a few violent men, joined together and formed into a revolutionary tribunal.

What surprises me is, that the French resident, placed in so critical a situation, between the two revolutionary governments of Geneva and Paris, should have withstood their united ferocity.

Proscribed at Geneva, by the notes and dispatches of the Genevese revolutionary government:

Proscribed at Paris, by the correspondence of their clerks and spies, and the reports and preambles to the fatal decrees which they thrice obtained against him from the committee of public safety:

Proscribed in the jacobin clubs of Paris and Geneva, in their correspondence of all kinds, and principally through the intervention of the secretary of the Genevese revolutionary tribunal:

Proscribed in England in the writings of the Genevese d'Ivernois, gaining strength from his asylum, and sovereign arbiter of the revolutions and murders of which he

moirs. They were thus convinced, that I deserved all their persecution. Let them now read again the history of their revolutionary adventures, from the first imprisonment of their government at the inn, in 1782, to their pillage of Genova in 1794.

Is not ashamed to exhibit the plan, published from the press in London:

Proscribed in the convention by the famous deputy, to whom d'Ivernois grants his exclusive diploma of probity in the French finances *:

And, to conclude, proscribed or persecuted, from the time of my publishing, in the *Journal de Paris* of 1782, the project of England for republicanising France, to the present moment, by seven or eight Frenchmen, the enemies of their country, hackneyed, like d'Ivernois, in slander, and devoted to England:—yet, though thus persecuted, gathering courage, making his way securely through prisons, revolutions, and revolutionary bloodshed; and preserving, with the same zeal and success as he preserved his own days, for history and the good of his country, the official evidence and instruments of the ferocity of the Genevese democracy, when abandoned to its own conduct, and with the reins of government, which it had by violence acquired in its hands.

I have exhibited all the phænomena of a permanent revolution in Geneva during the whole of Lewis the Sixteenth's reign, constantly preceding, or keeping pace with, the French revolution. I have exhibited the plunder, conspiracies, murders, banishments, cabals, and plans of European devastation, set on foot by six commissioners of the Genevese revolution of 1782. Having taken refuge in London, they plan the revolutions of

* The reply of this deputy, Johanot, to the young bride of the French resident, when she solicited the liberty of her husband, then a prisoner of the deputy and the Genevese clubs, harrowed her with terror. "Were I the Genevese government," he barbarously said, "I would ask the French government for your husband's head, and I should have it."

France; whither retiring in 1789, they prepare their execution, and disturb and direct every revolutionary family; at every period of our sufferings. It is therefore useful to France, and to every other government of whatever kind, to exhibit to public view not my opinions and inquiries, but the official accounts of their conspiracies, which, in the madness of the moment, they or their inferior agents have published *.

And as history is the great school of government, I shall hope to have rendered an essential service to the government of every nation, if I have established by facts the following great political truth:

That if a pure and armed aristocracy produces such a government as Venice; if an armed tyranny, in the hands of a single person, produces the governments of Constantinople, Fez, and Morocco; a pure and armed democracy produces alike in great and small states the dreadful scenes of the revolutions of France and Geneva: while the distribution of power, the union of the interests of all, and the gradation of ranks and conditions, where none are neglected or oppressed, form the real basis of a state properly constituted, consonant to

* I here close my publication of the papers of the Genevese revolution, and refer to the notes of my successor, Desportes, for the description of the horrid feasts and monstrous outrages of the members of the Grate, the favourite club of the Genevese government; the chiefs of which, when the Genevese revolution relaxed its severity, offered draughts of human blood out of the skulls of their victims.

I have not published the complaints either of our custom-houses or municipalities, when the clubbists fired on our clerks or our vessel; or when they insulted the French women, in the cars of passage or passports for France, which they delivered out; but they are affixed to the Genevese hand-bills before quoted, and others, and placed in our national library to remain a public and official proof of the actions of the clubbists.

the laws of nature. And may my country, exhausted and bleeding from so many revolutions, approach every day nearer to this form of government, as it has in reality done since the great day of St. Cloud! It is for her that I publish my book, regardless of consequences or danger as to myself.

NOTE THE LAST,

Respecting Johanot, principal Administrator of the French Finances, in the Committee of the National Convention.

The foundation of all that has been said in this work against him may be found in his various reports, of Nivose, 4th Germinal, and the supplement, and in the opinions and writings that have been opposed to this deputy.

END OF THE FIFTH VOLUME.

Printed by S. Hamilton, Falcon-Court, Fleet-Street.

00037599

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 28 March, 2016